中觀論疏 3.6

3.6

"Some claim that cause and effect are one, while some claim that cause and effect are different" is the second part, separately listing the nine positions. Although this text principally refutes internal delusions, it now fully elucidates what is established by both internal and external [traditions], because this treatise principally refutes internal [Buddhist errors] and secondarily refutes external [non-Buddhist errors]. Sāṃkhyas claim that cause and effect are of one substance; Vaiśeṣikas cling to cause and effect having different substances; Ulūka elucidates that they are both one and different—"both one" still belongs to oneness, and "both different" still belongs to difference; Nirgranthaputras elucidate that they are neither one nor different—"neither one" still belongs to difference, and "neither different" still belongs to oneness. Therefore, by only listing two schools here, all four attachments are fully included. Within the Buddhadharma, the two fundamental traditions are: first, the Mahāsāṃghika, which holds that cause and effect are one, so the seed transforms into the sprout and youth changes into old age; second, the Sthaviravāda, which clarifies that there is no transformation, so the seed ceases before and the sprout arises after, youth ceases before and old age arises after, which is the doctrine that cause and effect are different. The Abhidharma agrees with the Sthaviravāda view, while the Tattvasiddhi agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika attachment. "Some claim that the effect exists within the cause, while some claim that the effect does not exist within the cause": the Sāṃkhyas elucidate oneness, and oneness still implies existence; the Vaiśeṣikas clarify difference, and difference still implies non-existence. The Sthaviras clarify existence in the two periods of time [past and future], which is the effect existing within the cause; the Mahāsāṃghikas clarify non-existence in the two periods of time, which is the effect not existing within the cause. The Abhidharma agrees with the Sthaviras, and the Tattvasiddhi agrees with the Mahāsāṃghikas. If one says that the Tattvasiddhi does not agree with the existence and non-existence of the two periods of time, this meaning is incorrect. The text of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra only has two chapters on the existence and non-existence of the two periods of time; therefore we know that its refutation of existence and establishment of non-existence agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine. "Some claim that it arises from its own nature, from another, or from both": Question: Since there is arising from both in addition to self and other, why is this not also the case for oneness/difference and existence/non-existence? Answer: The intent is manifested through complementary phrasing. The non-Buddhists posit that primordial nature (prakṛti) can produce sentient beings, and when sentient beings cease, they return back to primordial nature; primordial nature is the nature of the world. This is sentient beings being reproduced from the category of sentient beings, and external objects are also like this. Within the Buddhadharma, just as the Abhidharma derives gross elements from essential elements, and the Tattvasiddhi derives phenomenal elements from principle elements, both are of the meaning of arising from intrinsic nature. As for arising from another, the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra says: "There are non-Buddhists who claim: 'I myself made the suffering of the five aggregates,' which is called self-arising; or they say: 'Maheśvara made it,' which is called arising from another." Those of the Abhidharma establish the cause and effect of the acting cause (kāraṇa-hetu): when one phenomenon arises, myriad phenomena do not obstruct it; when myriad phenomena arise, one phenomenon does not obstruct them; this is also the meaning of arising from another. The Tattvasiddhi says: "Habituation to inert objects produces intelligent awareness," which is also arising from another. Furthermore, the doctrine of existence in the two periods of time holds that there is the nature of the effect, which is arising from its own nature. Non-existence in the two periods of time holds that there is no nature of the effect and it relies entirely on conditions, which is the meaning of arising from another. As for arising from both, the non-Buddhist Nirgrantha posits that before heaven, earth, and the myriad things existed, there was a man and a woman, who through conjunction produced sentient beings. The abhidharmikas say: the eight marks support each other and arise together, mutually generating one another in turn. The Tattvasiddhi says: the conjunction of the four subtle atoms makes a pillar, and the conjunction of the five aggregates makes a person. These are all the meaning of arising from both. "Some claim that there is arising or that there is no arising": Some say: this still summarizes the above seven positions. Although the seven positions are different, they do not go beyond existence and non-existence; hence they are summarized here. We now say this is not so. This text states "some claim," which indicates separate positions, not a summary of the above. Another explanation says: "existence" is having a cause, and "non-existence" is being without a cause; since the various positions are numerous and cannot be cited exhaustively, it ultimately demarcates them by having a cause and being without a cause. We also disagree with this explanation; the refutation is as before. We now clarify that there can be two meanings: First, the above seven positions elucidate the substance of phenomena, whereas these two attachments clarify the characteristic of arising. For instance, the Sarvāstivādins and the Vibhajyavādins posit that apart from the substance of phenomena, there is a separate characteristic of arising, and therefore say "there is arising." As for "no arising," the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Dharmaguptakas elucidate that apart from the substance of phenomena, there is no separate characteristic of arising, and therefore say "no arising." Furthermore, those who hold that "there is arising" posit that the characteristic of arising is conditioned, like the abhidharmikas; those who hold that "there is no arising" posit that the characteristic of arising is unconditioned, like the Vibhajyavādins. Second, the above elucidated the existence and non-existence of the effect; now it elucidates the existence and non-existence of the cause. Some claim that the cause is an existing phenomenon, taking existence as the cause capable of producing phenomena; [or that] the cause is a non-existent phenomenon, taking non-existence as the cause capable of producing phenomena. Therefore this differs from having a cause and being without a cause. "Being without a cause" means having no cause whatsoever; here it clarifies taking non-existence as the cause. Question: Whose doctrine is this? Answer: Both internal and external teachings have these attachments. Among the non-Buddhists there are two masters: for example, the water-consuming non-Buddhists posit that water can produce all the myriad things, which is arising from existence; the mouth-strength non-Buddhists posit that great space can produce the four great elements, the four great elements can produce medicinal herbs, and medicinal herbs can produce sentient beings, which is arising from non-existence. Within the Buddhadharma there are also these positions: for example, Dharma Master Chen posited that phenomena are originally non-existent, and from non-existence existence arises, which is [arising from] non-existence. The Dilun masters posit an originally existent Buddha-nature, from which can be produced the contrary and accordant functions of the myriad things, which they call arising from existence. Another explanation: taking conventional truth as the substance and ultimate truth as the meaning is "arising from existence"; taking ultimate truth as the substance and conventional truth as the meaning is "arising from non-existence."