中觀論疏 3.18

3.18

"[In] the world, it is seen by the eye that grain at the beginning of the kalpa does not arise": this is the second [section], which separately marks and separately explains, that is, adducing the specific to explain the general. Question: What is the difference between "manifestly seen" (xianjian) and "seen by the eye" (yanjian)? Answer: One can say they are different, and one can also say they are not different. Saying they are not different: manifestly seen is like this, seen by the eye is like this; it is stated redundantly to make it distinct and clear. Saying they are different: "manifestly seen" speaks generally, while "seen by the eye" speaks specifically. Furthermore, "manifestly seen" speaks broadly, while "seen by the eye" speaks pointedly. Furthermore, "manifestly seen" brings forward the object to approach the mind, while "seen by the eye" inclines exclusively to the mind. Furthermore, "manifestly seen" excludes causes and conditions—hence the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra states, "In matters manifestly seen, causes and conditions are of no use"; one manifestly sees that all dharmas are unarisen, not relying on the evidence of causes and conditions before being unarisen. "Seen by the eye" excludes hearsay; the eye personally sees unarising, it is not spoken by hearsay. Question: Since it says "manifestly seen to be unarisen", one should only see with the eye that present grain is unarisen; why does it adduce the distant beginning of the kalpa? Answer: There are two meanings. First, it wishes to exhaust the origin of arising: the origin is at the beginning of the kalpa; if the origin is already unarisen, how could the branch arise? Second, it wishes to reveal that all dharmas have originally been unarisen from the outset, not only beginning to be unarisen now. Question: Why adduce grain? Answer: It is commonly known to the world. As it is said, "he" (cereal crop) is sown in the second month and matures in the eighth month, arising and maturing because the seasons are harmonized. "Season" (ji), "year" (sui), "harvest/year" (ren), "sacrifice/year" (si), "record/year" (zai) are all established with reference to grain. For instance, "禾" (cereal) placed above "于" makes "年" (year), because one knows the cereal crop by one year. "歲" (sui, year) means filth (hui): in one year it is inevitably soiled by the cereal, hence it is written beside "禾". Longing for and obtaining the cereal in one year makes a "稔" (ren). Obtaining the cereal in one year to offer as sacrifice makes a "祀" (si). Transporting the cereal in one year makes a "載" (zai). Furthermore, grain is the basis for sustaining the [physical] body, revealing that non-arising is the basis for accomplishing the Dharma-body. "Why is this? Because apart from grain at the beginning of the kalpa, present grain cannot be obtained": the former generally marked non-arising, while this separately explains non-arising. Furthermore, three distinctions are unfolded: first, explaining that because it is not apart [from it], it does not arise; second, conceding that if it were apart [from it], it should arise; third, explaining that because being apart is refuted, it does not arise. This text is difficult to understand; lecturers often add their own personal views and consequently fail to interpret the text, leading to confusion and errors. Now I directly explain it, so that it becomes brilliantly comprehensible and one no longer follows various divergent interpretations. This text specifically explains that grain at the beginning of the kalpa does not arise; in adducing present grain, it uses present grain to reveal that grain at the beginning of the kalpa does not arise. "Apart from grain at the beginning of the kalpa, present grain cannot be obtained": this means that present grain exists because of grain at the beginning of the kalpa, so not being apart is precisely the meaning of cause. Since present grain exists because of the beginning of the kalpa, then present grain has a cause, and therefore present grain has arising. Then one knows that the beginning of the kalpa has no cause, and therefore the beginning of the kalpa does not arise. The intention is precisely this. If the beginning of the kalpa had a cause, it would not be called the beginning; since it is termed the beginning, it has nothing from which it is caused, and having nothing from which it is caused, it does not arise. Question: How does one explain that the beginning of the kalpa is seen by the eye not to arise? Answer: The eye sees that present grain has a cause, so present grain has arising. The eye also sees that the beginning of the kalpa has no cause, so the beginning of the kalpa has non-arising. This is readily understood. The second sentence, "conceding that if it were apart, it should arise": being apart from grain at the beginning of the kalpa simply means not being caused by the beginning of the kalpa. If present grain could arise without being caused by the beginning of the kalpa, then grain at the beginning of the kalpa should also be able to arise without having any cause, yet in reality it is not so. The third sentence refutes being apart: if it is seen by the eye that present grain is not caused by the beginning of the kalpa and present grain definitely does not arise, it is also seen by the eye that the beginning of the kalpa has nothing from which it is caused, and thus the beginning of the kalpa also ultimately does not arise. Question: If so, does the author of the treatise not grant the arising of the beginning of the kalpa, but grants the arising of present grain? Answer: The present is caused by the beginning of the kalpa; when even the beginning of the kalpa does not arise, how could the present arise? This is borrowing the present to refute the ancient: once the ancient is eliminated, the present also does not exist; therefore, both ancient and present are ultimately without arising. The treatise text is precisely thus. Now, looking outside the text, I broadly refute it: Is the ancient caused by the present, or is it not caused by the present? If it is caused [by it], since the present does not yet exist, what could it be caused by? Furthermore, if the beginning depends on the later to exist, then the later would precede the beginning, and the beginning would succeed the later. If the present exists because of the ancient, they would be simultaneous; how could they be called present and ancient? Furthermore, at the time of the ancient, it was not yet called ancient, and arriving at the present, the ancient no longer exists; how could they depend [on each other]? Furthermore, if it depends on the present, it should be in the present; if it is not in the present, it does not depend on the present. Furthermore, if the ancient is caused by the present, the ancient has no intrinsic nature; having no intrinsic nature, there is no ancient. Furthermore, if the ancient had a further ancient, there would be an infinite regress; an infinite regress would mean there is no cause. Furthermore, regarding the ancient giving rise to the present: does it give rise having ceased, or does it give rise without having ceased? If it has ceased, there is no ancient—what would give rise to the present? If it has not ceased, it is permanent. "Question: If there is no arising, there should be cessation." That there is this single question can have four meanings: First, the outsider establishes by going through the dharmas, not necessarily in sequence. Second, non-arising pairs with having cessation, termed a pairing like ox horns. Third, originally arising was established; the treatise author then refuted arising to make it non-arising, so arising is then destroyed, and therefore there should be cessation. Fourth, arising is the beginning of a dharma and cessation is the end of a dharma; since there is the end of a thing, how could there not be the beginning of a thing? Hence the question is posed. "Answer:" This responds to the four questions. If the outsider establishes by going through the dharmas, the internal [Buddhist] also refutes by going through the dharmas. If existence and non-existence pair with each other, this is still the pairing of arising and cessation: because there is no arising, there is no cessation to pair with; because there is no existence, there is no non-existence to pair with. If arising previously had an accomplished arising, one could destroy arising to make cessation; but arising is originally not established—what is there to cease? If there were a beginning of a dharma, there could be an end of a thing; since there is no beginning of a thing, how could there be an end of a thing? "Question: Not ceasing, it should be permanent." Those of the Tattvasiddhi school accept that continuity is permanent, only that it is not truly permanent. However, real permanence is a real ailment, and provisional permanence is a provisional ailment; in the end it is an ailment. But this question has both general and specific [meanings]. As for the general: since it was explained above that there is neither arising nor cessation, that is permanence. As for the specific: if there were cessation, it could be impermanent; since it does not cease, it should be permanent. "Answer:" This answers both the general and the specific. If there were impermanence, there could be permanence; since there is no impermanence, there is no longer permanence. As for the specific answer, there should be four propositions: first, challenging the present by means of the present; second, challenging the ancient by means of the ancient; third, challenging the ancient by means of the present; fourth, challenging the present by means of the ancient. But the text has only two propositions. The above two rounds challenged the ancient by means of the present; this text challenges the ancient by means of the ancient: if it were permanent, the seed should not disintegrate; it is manifestly seen that the seed disintegrates, so ancient grain is not permanent. "Question: Not permanent, it should be annihilated." The question also has both general and specific [meanings]. As for the general: since there is neither arising, cessation, nor impermanence, nor is there permanence without arising and cessation, is this not grand annihilation? As for the specific: if one says it is not permanent because the seed disintegrates, is not this disintegration of the seed annihilation? The general response intends: if there were permanence, one could speak of annihilation; there being no permanence at all, what is there to annihilate? The specific response: if one speaks of annihilation, the sprout should not continue; because they mutually continue, one knows it is not annihilated. Question: What difference is there between this and other schools' [claim that] real dharmas are impermanent while continuity is unannihilated? Answer: This is their adopting our meaning, not our adopting theirs. As the Śata-śāstra states: "Because of continuity it is not annihilated; because of disintegration it is not permanent." Question: If both this school and others possess this, what difference is there? Answer: Three meanings are different. First, these are two dismissals, not a dual adoption. Saying it is impermanent clarifies that it is not permanent, not that it is impermanence; the same applies to annihilation. If others explain non-annihilation, it is then permanence; if they explain impermanence, it is then annihilation. Second, these both borrow the outsider's doctrine to refute the outsider: borrowing their disintegration of the seed to refute their view of permanence, and borrowing their mutual continuity to dismiss their view of annihilation; it is unlike ordinary people who have principles of the provisional and real. Third, clarifying that impermanence and non-annihilation are precisely non-arising and non-cessation, whereas you regard impermanence and non-annihilation as conventional truth and non-arising and non-cessation as ultimate truth; therefore it is not the same. "Question: If so, all things are one." This also has general and specific [meanings]. General: without arising, cessation, annihilation, or permanence, are not all things blended into one? Specific intention: since continuity is unbroken, continuity is then identical as one. "Answer:" There are four points. First: if grain produces the sprout, then at the time of the sprout there would be no grain, like clay making a pot, where at the time of the pot there is no longer clay. Now it is manifestly seen that at the time of the sprout the grain still exists; therefore one knows grain does not produce the sprout. Second: directly refuting the concept of intrinsic nature. Grain maintains the nature of grain and does not further become the sprout; the sprout maintains the nature of sprout and does not turn into grain. If they did not maintain their natures, there would be neither grain nor sprout; because there is no intrinsic nature, there are no dharmas. Third: if the substance of the grain ceases, then there is no grain—with what could it produce the sprout? If the grain does not cease, it is always a permanent dharma and cannot produce the sprout. Fourth: grain does not produce the sprout, and the sprout does not produce grain; hence it says "does not produce". "Produce" is equivalent to "is". "Question: If they are not one, they should be different." The question has two intentions: First, if one does not grant that grain and sprout make each other, then grain and sprout are different. Second, above the treatise author borrowed difference to refute oneness, so the outsider thinks there is difference. "Answer:" Four points: First, challenging it through names. The sprout is named "grain sprout"; how could it be different from grain? The same applies to grain. Second: if the sprout is named "grain sprout" while being different from grain, the sprout is also different from a tree and should be named a "tree sprout". This is the challenge of both being different. Third: if the sprout is different from grain and the sprout arises from grain, since the sprout is different from a tree, it should arise from a tree. This is the challenge of both arising. Fourth: if the sprout is different from grain and the sprout can produce grain, since the sprout is different from a tree, it should be able to produce a tree. Furthermore, reproaching their difference: if one says they are different, the sprout being outside the grain would entail a distinction of east and west. Furthermore, if one says they are different, it should be inside the grain, like fruit in a vessel; since it is not like this, how can it be called different? "Question: There should be coming." This explains "no coming and no going out". A different Sanlun master said: "Coming" should pair with "going", but their meanings encompass each other; adducing "coming" encompasses "going", and revealing "going out" encompasses "entering". Wishing to show that the points of refutation are inexhaustible, it says "coming and going out". I now say it can possess two meanings: First, mutual encompassment: as above, that which goes out returns and goes to its original place, so it is appropriate to use coming to encompass going. Second, although the outsider has heard the six negations, they ultimately think that grain and sprout exist, because conventional phenomena cannot be absent. Therefore, the final two negations grasp their main essential: firmly believing that there is a sprout, if it does not come from outside, it should go out from inside; therefore next it explains "no coming and no going out". Question: Could anyone posit an emergence from within? Answer: When outsiders see the seed produce the sprout, they then claim it goes out from within; seeing it depend on water, earth, season, and human labor to arise, they therefore claim it comes from outside. Furthermore, the grain sprout being induced by sentient beings' karmic actions is "going out from within"; further saying that it is bestowed by Nārāyaṇa is "coming from outside", because various outsiders who serve that deity claim that good things in the world, men, women, and so on are all bestowed by that deity. Now refuting this matter, it therefore says "no coming and no going out". Furthermore, positing coming from outside is the outsiders' doctrine of uncaused arising, while positing going out from within is the internal [Buddhist] doctrine of caused arising. As the "Cause and Effect Chapter" of the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra says, "The effect in causes and conditions is ultimately unobtainable" refutes the internal doctrine of positing a cause. "Nor does it come from anywhere else" refutes the outsiders' doctrine of uncaused arising. All discussions of arising do not exceed these two; therefore the final two negations subsume them. The text is easy to understand. The first two negations exclusively address ancient grain to explain non-arising and non-cessation; the next one negation exclusively addresses present grain to explain impermanence; the next one negation exclusively addresses the sprout to reveal non-annihilation; the two negations of oneness and difference generally concern sprout and grain; the two negations of coming and going out exclusively concern the sprout.