中觀論疏 3.20.2

3.20.2

Regarding origination without causes: the confused person, having heard that sentient beings are not produced from their own essence, and furthermore do not depend upon the other, the five aggregates, to be produced, thinks that if so, then sentient beings exist without causes. This too is not so: since they are not produced even from these two causes, how could sentient beings exist without causes? Because sentient beings cannot be found when sought in the four alternatives, this is called the unoriginatedness of sentient beings. Awakening to the unoriginatedness of sentient beings is called the patience regarding sentient beings. As for the unoriginatedness of phenomena: we now briefly rely on two types of phenomena. First, phenomena formed by causes, like the four subtle atoms forming a pillar; this is to be questioned analogously to the four propositions above, so there is no need to repeat it. Second, mutually dependent phenomena, like long not being long of itself, but being long by depending on short. Long does not originate from itself, nor does long exist within short, so it is not produced from another. If long existed within short, then it would not be called short. If long existed from both self and other together, it would have the two previous faults: first, the fault of long depending on itself; second, the fault of long existing within short. Furthermore, long is not long of itself, nor is it caused by short, and it is impossible for long to exist without cause; therefore it is not the case that it originates without causes. Since this is so for long and short, so too are all phenomena such as saṃsāra and nirvāṇa unfound when sought through the four gates. Since the origination of phenomena cannot be found when seeking through the four positions, this is the unoriginatedness of phenomena; awakening to the unoriginatedness of phenomena is called the patience regarding phenomena. Question: Why does the author of the treatise only say that phenomena do not originate, and not say that persons do not originate? Answer: Phenomena are difficult to refute, whereas persons are easy to refute. Furthermore, phenomena are the basis of persons. Moreover, this treatise specifically refutes Buddhists, and Buddhists mostly posit the existence of phenomena. In addition, this is to briefly indicate one path. Question: If one clings to origination, it cannot be found when sought through the four gates; if one conceives of unoriginatedness, how is that refuted? Answer: The refutation has many gates. First, one also uses origination to refute it. If there were origination through the four gates, there could be unoriginatedness; but since the thesis of origination through the four gates is unestablished, how could there be unoriginatedness, or even both origination and unoriginatedness, or neither origination nor unoriginatedness? The five propositions collapse of themselves. Only when one has thoroughly realized this is it truly unoriginatedness. Therefore, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, in explaining the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas, says: 'Neither origination nor cessation, neither shared nor unshared—this is called the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas.' Second, since origination cannot be found when sought through the four gates, unoriginatedness likewise cannot be found when sought through the four gates. If unoriginatedness were from itself, it should not depend on origination; since unoriginatedness is spoken of in dependence on origination, we know it is not unoriginated of itself. If unoriginatedness is spoken of in dependence on origination, then it is unoriginated from another; yet origination and unoriginatedness fundamentally do not have two separate substances, so how could it be another? Origination from both involves two faults: unoriginatedness is not caused by itself, nor is it caused by origination; how could there be unoriginatedness? Since unoriginatedness cannot be found when sought through the four gates, all propositions such as both origination and unoriginatedness, and neither origination nor unoriginatedness, are ruined; thus, when the mind has no affectionate attachment to any phenomenon, one awakens to the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas. Within this prose, it only explains the refutation of origination in the four propositions, and does not yet explain the fourth proposition's conclusion of unoriginatedness; only in the prose following the subsequent verse is it explained. Refuting origination in the four propositions consists of four distinct points. Regarding the refutation of origination in the four propositions, there is separation and combination. Separated, they form four objections; combined, they form two junctures. As for the four objections: first, refutation by deprivation of principle; second, refutation by two substances; third, refutation by loss of causes and conditions; fourth, refutation by infinite regress. As for combining them into two objections: the former one is the deprivation, and the latter three are conceded junctures. Regarding 'There is no origination from self-essence': in the Buddha-Dharma, whether Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, there is no origination from self-essence. The Hīnayāna says: ultimately there is no function capable of producing, because it is separated from its companions. The Mahāyāna says: there has never been a single phenomenon that does not originate from causes and conditions. Now, since it is not accepted in either the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, he directly rejects it. Regarding 'It must depend on multiple causes': the above formulated the deprivation, and this now explains the deprivation. Furthermore, the above clarified the absence of self, and this now borrows the non-self to refute the self. Question: Why does he say 'must depend on multiple causes'? Answer: The outsider merely thinks it is produced from the single cause of its own essence; now, depriving him of this, the myriad transformations depend on multiple causes—how could it be produced solely from the single cause of oneself? As for the 'multiple causes' mentioned: all phenomena have three kinds of causes: first, the primary cause, namely the grain seed; second, the conditional cause, namely water and earth; third, the cause of the characteristic of origination. Since it must depend on these three causes before it can be produced, how could it be produced from its own essence? Regarding 'If it were produced from its own essence': this is the second refutation by concession. Conceding that you are produced from your own essence, then there is an essence of oneself from which to proceed. If there is a thing from which it proceeds, then cause and effect become dissimilar, and that which is capable [of producing] and that which is [produced] become two distinct entities; how could it be called 'self'? Question: Now, we merely transform the sprout's nature into the actual sprout; how could there be two substances? Answer: If so, just as when hidden it is called Buddha-nature and when manifest it is called the Dharmakāya, it is only one substance, and thus cannot be called 'produced from its own essence.' Therefore, if you maintain one substance, you lose that which can proceed and that from which it proceeds, and the meaning of origination is unestablished; if there are that which produces and that which is produced, then the meaning of origination can be established, but its single substance is lost. Regarding 'If it is apart from other causes': this is the third refutation by loss of causes and conditions. In this text, regarding 'if it is produced from its own essence': previously he questioned that one substance becomes two substances. Now he again refutes its two substances, questioning the substance that produces: does it further proceed from something, or does it proceed from nothing? If it further proceeds from something, then proceeding from proceeding would be infinite regress, falling into the fourth objection. If it proceeds from nothing, then it falls into the third objection of being causeless. What is produced is also like this: if it can further produce another, then producing and producing would be infinite regress; if it cannot produce, then what is produced is also like this. In this text, if it originates independently: the initial objection explained that there is no self-origination, as it must depend on multiple causes; now he explains that if it originates of itself without depending on causes, then causes and conditions are lost. As for the 'other causes' mentioned: if a sprout originates from the substance of the sprout itself, then everything outside the substance of the sprout is called 'other.' The grain is its cause, and water and earth are conditions; none of these would be causes and conditions from which it originates. Regarding 'If an origination further has origination, this would be infinite regress': this is the fourth objection of infinite regress. There are five kinds of infinite regress: first, the infinite regress of proceeding universally from all: if there is no sprout inside the grain and yet it can produce a sprout, then all things also lack a sprout and a sprout should universally proceed from all things. Second, the infinite regress of producing universally: if there is no sprout inside the grain and yet it can produce a sprout, then it also lacks all things and should universally produce all things. Third, regressive infinite regress: since the sprout proceeds from the grain, the grain further proceeds from something else. Fourth, progressive infinite regress: since the grain produces the sprout, it further produces things, and this is infinite regress. Fifth, the infinite regress of constant origination: because the self-essence is ever-present, origination never ceases. Here, there are no two infinite regresses of universal producing and universal proceeding. If viewed in terms of further questioning the two substances, then there are the two infinite regresses, regressive and progressive: regressive is the infinite regress of causes, and progressive is the infinite regress of effects. If taken in terms of the self-essence being ever-present, then it is the infinite regress of constant origination. Since it fundamentally possesses a self-essence and can produce one sprout, this self-essence should further be able to produce an infinite number of sprouts.