中觀論疏 3.20.3

3.20.3

Because self-substance is simply self-nature, and self-nature cannot be altered, it would have to arise perpetually. As the 'Examination of Karma' states: 'Having experienced retribution, / One would have to experience it yet again.' If you say that the self-substance, having produced the sprout, then ceases and becomes non-existent, then since that which already existed turns into non-existence, it would follow that what was originally non-existent now exists. Since the substance was originally non-existent and now exists, and the sprout was also originally non-existent and now exists, how could it arise from an original self-substance? If the self-substance existed originally, it would be permanent; and being permanent, it would arise perpetually without end. These two reductios—uncausedness and infinite regress—completely refute the positions of two traditional schools. The first school explains 'beginningless ignorance' by saying: 'Because there is nothing prior to me, it is called beginningless.' This establishes the position that ignorance has a beginning. The refutation states: The second thought-moment arises from the first thought-moment, so it can have a cause; but since the first thought-moment is at the very beginning, it falls into uncausedness. The second school says: Ignorance has no beginning, and therefore it is called beginningless ignorance. If so, while the second thought-moment has a beginning, the initial thought-moment must in turn arise from another, which constitutes an infinite regress. As for 'since there is no self, there is also no other': in the preceding [treatment of] 'self' there were four points, forming two pairs: the first pair was that self is not arising, and arising is not self; the next pair was that if there is a derivation, there is an infinite regress, and if pushed to its limit, there is no cause. Arising from other is likewise: other is not arising, as with oxen, horses, pears, and crabapples; arising is not other, as with clay and a pot, or reeds and a mat. If it arises from another, there is again another it arises from; if there is derivation, there is an infinite regress, and pushed to the limit, there is no cause. The Sanlun tradition refutes 'other' through three approaches: First, the comprehensive approach: no dharma whatsoever is anything other than self, and outside self there is no other; if self is refuted, other is refuted. Second, mutual identity: just as an 'other' is 'self' to itself, refuting self refutes other. Third, mutual dependence, which is easily understood. As for 'arising from both involves two faults': this refutation of 'both' has two parts. First, it demonstrates that there is no 'both'. Originally, the combination of self and other was called 'both'; because self and other exist, 'both' exists; because self and other are non-existent, 'both' is non-existent. Second, even granting arising from both, it merely combines the two faults into the fault of 'both'. As for 'uncaused': Question: What kind of person conceives the view of uncausedness? Answer: Dull-rooted people mostly give rise to the view of causality, while sharp-rooted people, through critical deduction, give rise to the view of uncausedness. Furthermore, those who grasp at attainments hold that the cause itself is uncaused, because their establishment of a cause fails; so although they speak of a cause, it is in fact uncaused. Question: Does our mountain lineage have a doctrine of uncausedness? Answer: The 'cause' and 'uncaused' of others are both exclusively 'cause'—they fail to grasp the uncaused. Failing to grasp the uncaused, how could it constitute a cause? In our view, the cause is simply the uncaused; therefore cause and uncaused are non-dual. Question: How many kinds of uncausedness are there? Answer: There are two kinds. First, positing that there is no cause whatsoever, hence called uncaused. Second, positing that existing causes are uncaused, as the opening section says: 'Existing being can exist; existing being is self-existent,' and thus does not depend on non-being. Refuting the proposition of uncausedness involves four faults: first, the fault of permanence; second, demolition by principle; third, reversal of parity; fourth, inverted fruition. The fault of permanence: since it does not arise from the conjunction of causes and conditions, neither does it cease through the separation of conditions. Neither arising nor ceasing, it is therefore permanent. Furthermore, if space is not from a cause and is permanent, all things not from a cause should likewise be permanent. As for 'this is not so': this is the second, demolition by principle. In the realm of principle, things are not without causes. Thus the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'All phenomena truly possess causes and conditions; it is only through delusion that one fails to know them.' Just as someone seeks wind from a fan or fire from wood, how could this be uncaused? As for 'if there is no cause, there is no fruit': this is the third, reversal of parity. Because there is no cause, there is no fruit; it should also follow that because there is a fruit, there is a cause. If there is a fruit without a cause, there could also be a cause without a fruit. As for 'if there is a fruit without a cause': this is the fourth, inverted fruition. In principle, one should say that without bad causes one obtains bad fruits, and without good causes one obtains good fruits; but if this were not so now, a person who upholds the precepts, lacking the cause for hell, should be born in hell, and a person who commits the five heinous deeds, lacking the cause for heaven, should be born in heaven. Furthermore, regarding 'As the self-nature of phenomena': compared to the preceding verse, this verse can have three meanings. First, for the sharp-rooted, merely proclaiming the fourfold non-arising brings understanding; now, for the dull-rooted, the meaning of non-self-arising is discussed again. Moreover, the three verses can correspond to the three capacities: those of superior capacity understand upon hearing the Buddha's eight negations; those of middling capacity understand when the treatise master proclaims the four kinds of non-arising; those of inferior capacity must await the explanation before awakening. Second, the preceding [verse] refuted the doctrine of self-arising apart from causes and conditions, and therefore plainly stated 'not arising from self'. Now it refutes the doctrine of self-arising through causes and conditions, such as the Abhidharma view that there is a self-nature that arises depending on conditions; hence the text says, 'As the self-nature of phenomena does not reside in conditions.' The 'self' of all phenomena does not emerge from either a self that does not depend on conditions or a self that does depend on conditions; therefore these two verses refute it completely. Third, the first verse primarily refutes the erroneous arising from self, other, and so forth, while the subsequent verse expounds provisional arising through causes and conditions. Thus the prose says: 'It is merely through the conjunction of conditions that there are designations.' Question: Why do you not say that the first verse sets forth the chapter's thesis and the subsequent verse explains it? Answer: Because Piṅgala did not frame it as setting forth and explaining a thesis. If we now take it as setting forth and explaining a thesis, this is the second: explaining the thesis. Previously, the treatise master set out the four propositions to explain the eight negations, which is explaining scripture by means of a treatise; now this verse explains the preceding verse, which is explaining a treatise by means of a treatise. In this verse, only 'not from self' is explained, not the remaining three. The reason is that Nāgārjuna took up the eight negations and explained one, and the remaining seven became clear. Although four were listed above, understanding one allows the remaining three to be grasped. Question: Why is this so? Answer: There are four reasons. First, he wishes to show that all phenomena are simply unarisen. All attachments to attainments are notions of arising; although the Buddha spoke of eight negations, they bundle down to a single non-arising. As is commonly said, the surging forth of arising is 'arising'; but cessation merely newly begins to surge forth, so why is it not arising? The fading away of arising is again cessation, so we know that the arising and ceasing of phenomena is just arising. Furthermore, in all phenomena there is the arising of thoughts: if one speaks of the principle of the fourfold transcendence, the thought of fourfold transcendence arises; even hearing words of conception, the thought of conception arises; therefore, within all phenomena there is the arising of thoughts. Now, by refuting arising, all conceptual thoughts do not arise; hence one realizes the anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. Second, because all sentient beings have arising, they have old age, sickness, death, bondage, and the like; if arising is brought to rest now, then old age, sickness, and death will come to rest; therefore he explains only non-arising. Third, since the dharma of arising is non-existent, the remaining seven collapse of themselves. Fourth, having opened the four gates to refute arising, the remaining seven are analogous. This verse also has three meanings: first, he wishes to show that 'self' encompasses all phenomena; if there is no self-substance, then all phenomena are non-existent.