中觀論疏 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.2

Chapter 2: Examination of Going and Coming

Question: Do the twenty-seven chapters have an ordered sequence, or do they lack an ordered sequence? If they lack an ordered sequence, then the teaching of the Dharma would be disordered; if they have an ordered sequence, why is this followed next by the "Examination of Motion"? Answer: All sūtras and treatises must have an ordered sequence, but ordered sequence is of two kinds: first, sequence according to meaning; second, sequence according to faculties. Sequence according to faculties has three meanings, and sequence according to meaning has seven headings, totaling ten points. That sequence according to faculties has three meanings [is as follows]: First, proceeding through the order of dharmas causes this contemplating mind to penetrate all dharmas without obstruction. Although previously contemplating producing causes and produced effects yielded nothing, now in succession one proceeds through the contemplation of motion and rest up to nirvāṇa. Second, sentient beings differ in grasping awakening; some naturally fail to attain the Way upon hearing the refutation of arising and cessation, yet upon contemplating motion and rest they immediately achieve complete awakening, and so on up to the twenty-seven meanings, which are also like this; because their faculties and dispositions differ, the author of the treatise unfolds these various contemplations. Third, wishing to explain the essential contemplations in the Mahāyāna: the sūtras explain the contemplative practice of the middle way either in terms of non-arising and non-cessation, or explain the contemplative practice of the middle way in terms of non-motion. However, when the Buddha was in the world, the faculties of sentient beings were sharp, and hearing an abbreviated exposition they immediately attained the Way; in the degenerate age, those of dull faculties hear an abbreviated exposition in the sūtras and do not understand, so the author of the treatise extensively explains it before they grasp awakening. As for the sequence according to meaning having seven headings: First, explaining that the eight negations are the great core of the treatise: the "Examination of Conditions" explains the beginning of the eight negations, namely non-arising and non-cessation; this chapter explains the end of the eight negations, discerning neither coming nor going. Since the beginning and end are already clarified, the middle can be comprehended; therefore, following conditions, motion and rest are clarified. Second, previously refuting the four conditions comprehensively refuted all dharmas, which is called the general contemplation; now contemplating motion and rest—motion and rest being the forms of raising the foot and lowering the foot—is called the particular contemplation. Thus, previously the general was clarified, and now the particular contemplation follows. Third, refuting motion and rest is done to establish non-arising. Outsiders say that the waning and cessation of the cause is going, and the continuing arising of the effect is coming; since there are going and coming, how could there not be arising and cessation? The Sarvāstivādins have only one kind of three times, saying that from the future one comes to the present, and from the present one passes away into the past. The Sautrāntikas have two kinds of three times: first, the three times of real dharmas, broadly similar to the Sarvāstivādins; second, the three times of transformational provisional designation, coming from the past into the present, and the present transforming into the future. If there were no arising through the four conditions, how could there be coming and going across the three times? Therefore, they cite coming and going to establish the meaning of arising; now refuting coming and going establishes the contemplation of non-arising. Fourth, there are two kinds of contemplation: first, contemplation based on concrete phenomena. Contemplation of concrete phenomena contemplates movement and stillness, coming and going, seen right before one's eyes, clarifying that they do not exist. Second, contemplation of principle directly contemplates the four conditions as lacking the meaning of arising. Question: Why engage in both contemplations of concrete phenomena and principle? Answer: Piṅgala, in two rounds of explaining the eight negations, engaged in the two contemplations of concrete phenomena and principle to explain them. Nāgārjuna, in explaining the eight negations from beginning to end, also engaged in both contemplations, precisely because concrete phenomena and principle comprehensively encompass the myriad transformations, and also in accord with what suits conditions. Fifth, viewed from the perspective of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, the previous chapter refuted arising, so searching for real dharmas yielded no ground; here examining the absence of going clarifies that the continuity of provisional designations cannot be found. Sixth, the end of the previous "Examination of Conditions" concluded that there are no conditions capable of producing nor effects that are produced. An outsider asks: If mutual production of cause and effect is ultimately non-existent, why do we visibly perceive coming and going? Therefore, following the end of the previous chapter, this section arises. Seventh, the previous chapter searched for arising and it could not be found, so an outsider immediately said: The subsiding of the disease of arising is going, and the arising of the contemplation of non-arising is coming. Thus, the attachment to arising and cessation fell, but the disease of coming and going arose; therefore, next refuting coming and going clarifies that originally there was no disease of arising, so what going could be discussed? Since there is no arising that can go, how could there be non-arising that can come?

4.4

Question: Contemplating the coming and going of what dharma gives the chapter the title "Coming and Going"? Answer: The previous "Examination of Conditions" clarified contemplation of three kinds of conditions; this chapter also clarifies three meanings: First, the previous chapter clarified that the twelve links of dependent origination are unarisen and unceasing; now, turning again to dependent origination, it discerns neither coming nor going. The cessation of the two past causes is going, and the arising of the five present effects is coming, up to the cessation of the three present causes being going, and the arising of the two future effects being coming; therefore, the twelve links of dependent origination have only two divisions: seven parts are coming, and five parts are going. Now, contemplating this coming and going, the chapter is titled accordingly. Question: Why contemplate the coming and going of dependent origination? Answer: It is contemplated on behalf of five kinds of people who have not penetrated dependent origination. First, worldly people only see going from here to there as going, and returning from there back to here as coming, while not knowing whence birth comes and whither death tends. Second, the ninety-six heterodox ways do not know the source and end of dependent origination, asserting that things come from Īśvara, atoms, and so forth, and that going is returning to their primal source. Third, the five hundred treatise masters, although knowing that the twelve links of dependent origination cycle through the six destinies, grasp them as definitively existing, failing to attain the emptiness of dharmas. Fourth, those of the sort of Sautrāntika-[Dharma]trāta, although comprehending that dependent origination is empty and non-existent, cannot know that its intrinsic nature is quiescent. Fifth, practitioners of the Mahāyāna, although knowing that the intrinsic nature is empty and quiescent, consequently repudiate cause and effect and the retributive consequences of sin and merit. Now, refuting these five kinds of people reveals the meaning of the neither coming nor going of true dependent origination; therefore, one contemplates the coming and going of dependent origination. Question: Why refute these five kinds of people? Answer: A sūtra says: "The river of the twelve links of conditions is deep and its bed hard to reach." That which is called the "bed" is named the mark of emptiness; penetrating the intrinsic nature of the twelve links of dependent origination as empty and quiescent reaches the river bed, and is therefore called a bull-king. Now, wishing to cause these five kinds of people to thoroughly understand that dependent origination originally has no coming or going, and likewise to reach the river bed and together become bodhisattvas, for this reason these five kinds of people are refuted. Question: Practitioners of the two vehicles also comprehend that the twelve links of conditions are empty; within emptiness, what dharma can be different? Answer: The two vehicles only contemplate the emptiness of the twelve conditions, without knowing that within dependent origination there is the meaning that the Buddha-nature is not empty; the great being thoroughly understands the emptiness of the twelve conditions and also knows the meaning that the Buddha-nature is not empty; therefore, they differ from the two vehicles. Question: The two vehicles only know that the twelve conditions are empty, falling into annihilation; since the great being fully knows both emptiness and non-emptiness, they should fully fall into both extremes. Answer: Because the great being knows that the twelve [conditions] are originally empty, they differ from ordinary beings' [attachment to] existence; because they know that there is the middle-way Buddha-nature that is not empty, they differ from the two vehicles' emptiness. Furthermore, because the twelve [conditions] are originally empty, they are not existent; because the Buddha-nature is subtle existence, it is not empty; neither empty nor existent is precisely the middle way. Question: In terms of this doctrinal principle, how are the two truths established? Answer: To broadly elucidate the Buddha Dharma, there are generally three kinds of two truths. First, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are combined as the two truths: the twelve links of dependent origination being deceptive and originally empty is called conventional truth; the Buddha-nature's subtle existence being inexpressible as empty is called ultimate truth. Second, discussing the two truths within the dharmas of saṃsāra themselves: the twelve links of dependent origination being like illusions or dreams, cycling through the six paths, is called conventional truth; while their intrinsic nature being empty and quiescent, with truly no coming or going, is called ultimate truth. Third, discussing the two truths within the dharmas of nirvāṇa themselves: nirvāṇa's subtle existence is called conventional truth; while nirvāṇa also being empty is called ultimate truth. Question: Where in the sūtras is it clarified that nirvāṇa is also empty? Answer: The places where it is clarified are very numerous; I will briefly cite two proofs. First, the *Large Sūtra*, in explaining the eighteen emptinesses, says: "As for the emptiness of the ultimate truth, nirvāṇa is called the ultimate truth; nirvāṇa is also empty, which is called the emptiness of the ultimate truth." The *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* says: "The city of Kapilavastu is empty; great parinirvāṇa is empty." Therefore, we know that all dharmas have never been saṃsāra, nor are they nirvāṇa; words are forgotten and thoughts are severed. Question: This chapter merely relies on concrete movement and stillness to clarify that there is no coming or going; how is it known that it concerns the twelve links of dependent origination? Answer: The previous chapter says: "For those who have already practiced the Mahāyāna, the twelve links of dependent origination are taught as completely possessing the eight negations." The previous chapter has already explained that dependent origination is neither arising nor ceasing, so now, in terms of dependent origination, it discerns neither coming nor going; but since principle and dharma are difficult to understand, it is explained by lodging it in concrete phenomena. Question: The text of the eight negations says "neither coming nor departing", so why does it now say "neither coming nor going"? Answer: The eight negations wish to refute the meaning of the mutual production of cause and effect; the last two negations exhaust its interior and exterior. If one says that there is definitely a cause that produces an effect, does the effect emerge from within the cause, or does it come from outside the cause? Therefore, it clarifies neither coming nor departing. This chapter wishes to contemplate it immediately in terms of concrete phenomena, taking going from here to there as going, and returning from there back to here as coming; therefore, it says "coming and going". Second, this chapter is spoken because it comprehensively contemplates all dharmas as lacking the meaning of coming and going. Assertions of coming and going are indeed inexhaustible, but I will briefly clarify seven: First, worldly people seize upon what is seen and heard by ear and eye, saying that human movement and stillness, and the coming and going of cold and heat, truly exist. Second, outsiders state that coming from Maheśvara is coming, and coming back in return is going; they also say that things come without a cause and go without a cause. Third, the school asserting the existence of the two times holds that from the future one comes into the present, and from the present one passes away into the past. Fourth, the school asserting the non-existence of the two times holds that the future does not yet exist, but comes on account of conditions, and when conditions disperse, goes. Fifth, the *Tattvasiddhi* and Mahāyāna doctrine states: "Streaming from the cave of ignorance and consciousness, entering the three realms, the initial arising of a single thought of a wholesome cause is coming; returning to the source is going." Sixth, the doctrine of the former Dilun masters: deviating from the real to give rise to delusion is coming; ceasing delusion to return to the real is going. Seventh, the Sheling masters clarify that sentient beings of the six paths all come from the fundamental consciousness; because within the fundamental consciousness there are seeds of the six paths, they are born in the six paths. From the pure dharmadhātu the twelve divisions of sūtras stream forth; giving rise to a single thought of perfuming through hearing attaches to the fundamental consciousness, which is the beginning of turning back and going. As perfuming through hearing gradually increases, the fundamental consciousness gradually diminishes; if understanding is completely fulfilled, then the fundamental consciousness is completely extinguished, using the nature of understanding within the fundamental consciousness to accomplish the reward Buddha, for the nature of understanding cannot decay or perish. The naturally pure mind is precisely the Dharmakāya Buddha; when the nature of understanding and the naturally pure mind are constantly united to the ultimate point, the nature of understanding and the naturally pure mind correspond as a single substance; therefore, the Dharmakāya is eternal and the Sambhogakāya is also eternal. People such as these all assert that coming has a source and going has a destination, clinging to them with fixed attachment. If one claims there is coming and going, it is not seen by the five eyes; therefore, this coming and going does not exist. Third, as in the text, it clarifies contemplating concrete coming and going, so that there is no coming or going, which explains the chapter refuting coming and going. Therefore, Master Zhao's *Immutability of Things* says: "Looking at the direction, one knows they went; but the goer does not arrive at the direction." It also says: "Rivers vie to rush along yet do not flow; the sun and moon traverse the sky yet do not orbit." Question: If rivers vie to rush along, how do they not flow? Since you say they do not flow, how can they vie to rush along? Answer: The ordinary sentiments of worldly people are as you have asked. People of the two vehicles have not yet attained simultaneous contemplation, so they also cannot know how it is so. The great being attains the non-dual contemplation: without destroying provisional designations they expound real mark, and therefore they rush along without flowing; without moving from the true limit they establish all dharmas, and therefore without flowing they rush along. Question: This matter is difficult to believe; how can it be understood? Answer: "As for that which is near yet cannot be known, is it not the nature of things? Moving yet still, seemingly going yet remaining, it can be grasped by the spirit, but cannot be sought through concrete matters." Please allow me to present an analogy close at hand to illustrate the distant principle. Just as when my body is in a foreign land and I dream of returning to my homeland, after waking, the body after all has not moved. Thus we know that although going, there is no motion; without motion, there is going. All dharmas are analogized as like a dream: having a night's sleep, there is a morning's awakening; having slumbered through the long night, there is also the bright great awakening. Wheeling through the five paths is analogized as like a dream; right contemplation penetrates that there is truly no going and returning, which is called awakening.

4.5

Question: It was said earlier that this chapter explains the sūtras' meaning of non-going and non-coming. How does it explain it? Answer: The passages in the sūtras are very numerous, but now I will briefly cite the essentials. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra says: "Coming with the characteristics of non-coming, going with the characteristics of non-going; coming with nowhere to come from, going with nowhere to go to." This expresses the present meaning. The Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: "Vaidūrya came forward. The Buddha asked, 'Did you arrive and come, or did you not arrive and come?' He replied, 'Arriving, one also does not come; not arriving, one also does not come. Arriving is having already come, [so there is] no coming; not arriving is not yet coming, [so there is] no coming. As I observe this meaning, there is no going or coming whatsoever.'" Next, in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Sadāprarudita doubted the coming and going of the Buddha, and Dharmodgata refuted him inversely, saying: "Does the water in a mirage come from the eastern sea or the western sea, and go to the southern sea or the northern sea?" Sadāprarudita replied: "In a mirage there is not even any water; how could there be coming or going?" Through this, he awakened to the meaning that the dharmakāya has no coming or going. Next, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in explaining the factors of awakening and expounding the right action of a bodhisattva, also clarifies that there is no coming or going, sweeping all such passages together here. Simply reading this chapter, one may not perceive it to be profound; yet when viewed in light of all the Mahāyāna sūtras, one then realizes its profound taste. Question: Setting aside the other sūtras for now, since the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says "coming with the characteristics of non-coming," in terms of what meaning is this explained? Answer: The Tattvasiddhi masters say: "Substantial entities have no coming, but continuity has coming; therefore it says 'coming with the characteristics of non-coming.'" They also say: "In conventional truth there is coming, while in ultimate truth there is no coming; therefore it says 'coming with the characteristics of non-coming.'" The Daśabhūmika masters say: "The essence of the dharmadhātu has no coming, but its functioning has coming." The Middle and Provisional masters say: "In the middle way there is no going or coming, but in provisional designations there is going and coming." The present [teaching] agrees with none of these explanations. One simply must read the sūtra: coming is just evident, yet in reality there is nowhere it comes from; it cannot be split into two pieces.

4.6

The chapter is broadly divided into seven [sections], moderately into four, and briefly stated into two cycles. As for the seven: first, refuting the act of going through the gate of the three times; second, refuting the goer through the gate of the three times; third, refuting the initial departure through the gate of the three times; fourth, refuting abiding and the abider through the gate of the three times; fifth, refuting going and the goer through the gate of identity and difference; sixth, refuting going and the goer through the gate of causes and conditions; seventh, refuting going and the goer through the gate of the determined and undetermined. Next, explaining the moderate opening into four gates, named after the refuting gates: the first is refutation by the gate of the three times; the second is refutation by the gate of identity and difference; the third is refutation by the gate of causes and conditions; the fourth is refutation by the gate of existence and non-existence. The general purpose is to cause sentient beings to awaken to the absence of coming and going, enter into the true nature of reality, generate right view, and extinguish all defilements. But because their receptive awakening varies, multiple gates are opened. The reason these four gates exist is that conceptualizing coming and going as active phenomena inevitably falls into the three times. Thus, the preceding refutation is through the gate of the three times. The opponent says: "If the three times did not exist, the eye should not see [them]"; therefore, what is seen by the eye is refuted through identity and difference. Furthermore, they consider coming and going through causes and conditions to be neither identical nor different; thus, causes and conditions are refuted next. Afflictions are endless, and the gates of contemplation are not just one; now, wishing to grasp their main points and disperse their attachments, the gate of existence and non-existence follows. Next, although there are four gates, combining them makes two: the first cycle briefly refutes coming and going; the latter three broadly refute coming and going. Furthermore, the first cycle generally refutes going and abiding; the latter three specifically refute going. Furthermore, the first cycle directly refutes coming and going; the latter three refute what is seen by the eye. Furthermore, the first cycle refutes solely through the gate of the conditioned; the latter cycle refutes all conditioned and unconditioned [phenomena]. Now we should rely on the four gates. Regarding the first, there are two [parts]: first, refuting going and the goer; second, refuting abiding and the abider. Although there are four bodily postures, they do not go beyond movement and stillness; hence these two are briefly examined. Regarding the first, there are again three: first, refuting the act of going; second, refuting the person who goes; third, refuting the cause of going. Regarding the refutation of the act of going, it opens into four distinctions: first, the prose establishing [the thesis]; next, the verse refuting it; third, the rescue; fourth, the refutation of the rescue. From "The question says: In the world, the eye sees action in the three times" onward, this establishes the thesis. In the preceding chapter, seeking the production of an effect by the four conditions was ultimately impossible; the opponent's reason was defeated, their words exhausted, and their tongue unable to rescue [their thesis]; hence they now cite what is seen by the eye to establish the thesis. Non-Buddhists, the Sāṃkhya, the Dārṣṭāntikas, and their like all explain that time cannot be seen; thus it only says now that one sees phenomena within time, not that one sees time. Coming and going are the physical forms of lifting and lowering the feet, which are seen by the eye; hence it is called "seen by the eye." Question: The previous [chapter] established the four conditions, while this one establishes coming and going; how do they compare in breadth and narrowness? Answer: Previously the phenomena were broad and the persons narrow: the four conditions encompass all phenomena, which is why it is broad; but it was conceptualized only by Buddhist schools, hence the persons were narrow. In this chapter, the persons are broad and the phenomena narrow: both the great and small [vehicles], both insiders and outsiders, alike conceptualize coming and going, hence the persons are broad; coming and going are merely conditioned phenomena, hence the phenomena are narrow. Question: How many kinds of three times are there? Answer: Briefly, there are three kinds: first, the three eons; second, the three time periods; third, the three thought-moments. Here it is established with reference to the last. And as for saying "action in the three times": phenomena falling into the three times flow, move, arise, and act; hence it is called "action." Furthermore, "action" has the sense of karma; since going is precisely karma, it is called "action." From "The answer says: In what has [already] gone there is no going" onward, secondly, the treatise master refutes the opponent's explanation that the three times exist; the treatise master then explains that the three times do not exist. However, looking directly at this refutation, one might not perceive its subtlety; comparing it to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, Mañjuśrī answered: "If one has already come, one does not come again; if one has already gone, one does not go again." This is explaining the absence of coming and going through the gate of the three times. But when Mañjuśrī arrived at the ten-foot room, the assembly thought that having already come was called coming; therefore, here one of the three times is briefly cited, stating that having already come, one does not come. When the Buddha was in the world, sentient beings had sharp faculties; hearing one, they understood three; hence it was not fully cited. Vairocana's arriving also is not coming, and not arriving also is not coming: arriving is the already, and not arriving is the not yet; among the three times, two gates are cited. Next, the Maitreya chapter of the Vimalakīrti-sūtra fully cites the three times to reprove the absence of a prediction of one rebirth. Therefore, this gate can confound the ordinary and humble the noble, demonstrating its subtlety when compared to the sūtras. The first half of the verse clarifies that the two gates of the already and the not-yet have no going; the second half clarifies that in the present going there is no going. The already is the past, which has ceased and vanished; therein is no going. The not-yet is the future, where the phenomenon of going does not yet exist; it also has no going. The intent of the refutation in the second half: the first half causes them to accept that the already and the not-yet have no going—the already was gone in the past, so at the present moment there is no going; the not-yet is to go in the future, so at the present moment there is also no going. The second half immediately states that the present going is not separate from these two. Since they believe that these two have no going, they should know that the present going also has no going. The prose says, "Apart from going, an act of going cannot be found": "act" (karma) is an alternate name for movement; when going has already occurred, going has ceased, and there is no longer any sense of movement. If one says that in what has already gone there is going, this would mean that apart from going there is an act of movement. That the phenomenon of going has already ceased yet an act of movement still exists is impossible. From "The question says: Where there is movement, there is going" onward, thirdly, is the rescue of the thesis. If taken as one person establishing the thesis: previously they established that in the three times there is going. The two checkpoints having already been exhausted, they now merely rescue [the claim that] in the present going there is going. If taken as two schools establishing the thesis: previously, establishing that in the three times there is action referred to the Sarvāstivāda. Now, establishing that in two times there is no going and in one time there is going is the Sautrāntika (those who hold the non-existence of two times). The verse has two parts: the first half establishes the existence of the temporal phenomenon; the second half clarifies existence and non-existence. "Where there is movement, there is going" establishes the existence of the phenomenon of going. The reason it establishes the existence of the phenomenon of going is that the treatise master, in the second half of the preceding verse, explained that within the present going there is no going; now, in contrast to non-going, they say that where there is movement there is going. As for saying "movement": the opponent considers going to be coarse and movement to be subtle; coarse going falls into the "already," whereas subtle movement is not the "already"; and since it is called "movement," neither is it the "not-yet." Wishing to set aside the already and the not-yet, they therefore say "movement." "Where" (place) has two meanings: first, it is called "place" from the location trodden upon; second, it designates the very movement of lifting the foot as the "place." Because the above explained non-going, the opponent says: precisely in this place of movement there is going; why would there be none? "Herein there is the time of going": the second line establishes that time exists. Because movement necessarily depends on time, they take movement to prove time. "Neither what has gone nor what has not gone": the second half clarifies existence and non-existence. If taken as one person establishing the thesis, having already established that going exists in the three times and been refuted, they now yield the two checkpoints of the already and not-yet. If taken as two persons establishing the thesis, the first half establishes that the present exists, now negating the doctrine that the [past and future] two times exist. "Therefore, in the present going": the second concludes that in the present going there is going. Dividing this verse another way: the first half establishes the existence of time; the third line yields the two checkpoints of the already and not-yet; the fourth line directly establishes going in the present going. This division is good. The prose says, "Wherever there is an act": wherever there are thoroughfares extending in all directions, moving a step entails going. From "The answer says" onward, fourthly, is the refutation of the rescue. Question: How does this refutation differ from the above? Answer: Observing the four rounds now, they can be grouped into three kinds: the first question-and-answer is a general establishment and general refutation; the second question-and-answer is a specific establishment and specific refutation. First, broadly explaining that going exists in the three times is a general establishment; broadly refuting that going exists in the three times is a general refutation. Next, establishing only that going exists in the present going is a specific establishment; refuting only going in the present going is a specific refutation. Furthermore, the first question-and-answer establishes the existence of the three times to refute the existence of the three times; the second question-and-answer establishes the non-existence of the two times to refute the doctrine of the non-existence of the two times. Third, the earlier refutation of going in the present going was a refutation by deprivation, clarifying that apart from the already and the not-yet there is no time of going—hence it is deprivation; now, hypothetically conceding that apart from the already and the not-yet there is a distinct going in the present going, it opens four checkpoints to interrogate it—hence it is a refutation by concession. Question: Why previously did it use the already and not-yet to deprive the time of going, while now it concedes that the time of going exists? Answer: Going is coarse and movement is subtle. Because going is coarse, it was possible to divide it by the already and the not-yet; because movement is subtle, it cannot be divided further by the already and the not-yet. Therefore, hypothetically conceding that they have movement, seeking movement is impossible. For instance, when a person sits quietly, there is simply the person; when they just move one foot, they are called a goer; due to this movement, it is called the phenomenon of going and also called the act of going. Before taking a step, it is called not-yet-gone; what the moving foot has traversed is called already-gone; taking its present movement, it is called the time of going. Taking its initial movement, it is designated as departing; the movement of the step at hand is called this going; other steps compared to this are called different goings; what the foot treads upon is called the place of going. Yet these are merely nominal designations falsely received in the assemblage of conditions; examining them closely, not one can be found. But those who cling to characteristics claim they are determinate; therefore, the treatise master investigates them accordingly. As for the four checkpoints: first, refutation by lack of substance; second, refutation by separate substances, which the teacher also calls refutation by loss of cause; third, refutation by two phenomena; fourth, refutation by two persons—this is the sequence. In the first verse, the first half quotes without accepting; the second half directly refutes. "How in the time of going": this quotes the opponent's thesis. The opponent explains that the two times of the already and not-yet have no meaning of going, but within the third time there is the phenomenon of going; thus this phenomenon of going depends upon time to go; hence it quotes it. "Could there be a phenomenon of going?": this rejects that there is a phenomenon within time and that the phenomenon depends on time to go. The second half directly performs the refutation by lack of substance; this explains that time has no separate substance, hence it is called refutation by lack of substance. Since you speak of "the time of going," time therefore exists dependent on going; time then has no separate substance. If it has no separate substance, on what does the phenomenon depend so as to be able to go? This is not using the Sāṃkhya view that time is a provisional designation dependent on phenomena and that apart from phenomena there is no separate time to refute the opponent; rather, the opponent themselves says that in the time of going there is going, which means time is dependent on going; therefore, time has no separate substance, meaning the phenomenon has nothing to depend upon. Furthermore, that time has no separate substance means it is time through causes and conditions; time through causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature; if it has no intrinsic nature, then there is no time; since there is no time, on what can the phenomenon depend? Question: How does this differ from the Sāṃkhya? Answer: Although the Sāṃkhya knows that time is provisionally designated dependent on phenomena and there is no separate time, they do not know that phenomena are provisionally designated dependent on time and there are no separate phenomena; hence it is different. Now we question the master of the Tattvasiddhi: If phenomena depend on time to go, upon what does time depend to be produced? If you say that dependent on phenomena there is provisionally designated time and no separate time, then dependent on time there should also be provisionally designated phenomena and no separate phenomena. If there are no separate phenomena, and phenomena are produced by time, then there should also be no separate time, and time should be produced by phenomena. Furthermore, if time is non-existent, and there are no further separate phenomena that produce time, then phenomena should also be non-existent, and there should be no separate time that produces phenomena. Furthermore, if apart from time there are real phenomena, phenomena still do not produce time; now, if apart from phenomena there is no separate time, how could time produce phenomena? Furthermore, to challenge the opponent: if time is not phenomenon and phenomenon is not time, such that time and phenomenon are distinct, then since time is not phenomenon and phenomenon is not time, time and phenomenon should be separate from each other. If you say that in principle they are not separate yet ultimately distinct, then in principle they should also be not distinct yet ultimately separate. Yet being not distinct is just being not separate, and being not separate is just being not distinct. In the prose, the earlier [part] quotes the first half; from "Why?" onward, it explains the second half. First, explaining that time has no separate substance is the refutation by deprivation; next, explaining mutual separation is the checkpoint of concession.

4.7

The second verse is the refutation by distinct substance, also called the refutation by solitary going. Its purpose is that the first verse refuted [it by showing that time has] no substance, which is called refutation by deprivation; the following three verses are all concessive cross-examinations. 'Concessive cross-examination' means that conceding time and dharma to be separate, one immediately challenges and refutes them. Furthermore, the first verse's refutation of no substance refutes the schools that maintain there is no distinct time; the subsequent three verses refute the schools that maintain there is a distinct time. When these two are refuted, then all positions are exhausted. The first half repeats [the opponent's claim] and identifies the fault; the second half challenges and explains the fault. 'If one says there is going in the time of going' repeats the external proposition. Above, it was explained that in the time of going there cannot be going; now it is conceded for the sake of argument that there is going in the time of going, which is why there is the phrase 'If one says'. 'That person falls into error' identifies the fault. This verse together with the preceding one establishes an error whether one advances or retreats: the preceding one explained that because time has no distinct substance, the dharma has nothing to rely upon and thus cannot go; the present one explains that if there were a substance of time that could be relied upon and one goes in it, then there would be the fault of time and dharma being separate from each other. 'There is a time of going apart from going' in the lower half directly explains the fault. Since one claims that the dharma relies on time to go, there must be a distinct substance of time apart from the dharma. 'Because the time of going would go alone' successively reveals the flaw of separation. Why is the flaw of separation successively revealed? Within the Buddhist schools there are two kinds of positions: as with the Sāṃkhya and others, time is a provisional designation dependent on dharmas, and apart from dharmas there is no distinct time, so there is no flaw of separation. As with the Dārṣṭāntika and others, it is held that there is a distinct substance of time; dharmas are form and mind, whereas time is neither form nor mind, so it is necessary to reveal the flaw of separation. If so, the upper line refutes the Sāṃkhya, and the present line reproaches the Dārṣṭāntikas. If they are separate, both going and time would each go alone; 'going alone' means the two are mutually separate: going not depending on time is the meaning of the dharma being alone; time not depending on going is the solitary time. Furthermore, someone says: 'Now the time of going goes on its own, hence it is said to go alone.' This is not the meaning of the text.

4.8

The third verse is the refutation by two dharmas. Its purpose is that the first verse obtained mutual dependence but lost going, while the second verse obtained going but lost mutual dependence; therefore, whether advancing or retreating, it incurs error. The opponent now wishes to establish mutual dependence and also explain that there is going, thereby avoiding both errors. Why is this so? Because if one says there is going in the time of going, then the going prior to time is taken as the substance of time, avoiding the fault of having no substance; second, the going subsequent to time relies on time to go, avoiding the error of solitary going. The first half repeats [the opponent's claim] and identifies the fault; the second half explains the fault. 'One is deemed the time of going' refers to taking one dharma of going as the substance of time. 'The second is deemed the going in the time of going' refers to there being another dharma that borrows time to go. Question: What fault is there in this? Answer: Since there are two dharmas, there must be two times; if there is one time, there should be one dharma. How could there be two dharmas of going within a single time? Furthermore, the dharma of going is called physical motion; since there are two motions, there must be two bodies and two form aggregates. With the form aggregate being two, how could the four mental aggregates be one?

4.9

"Question: What fault is there in two goings?" This generates the fourth refutation by two persons. The opponent has not yet realized the flaw of two dharmas, and therefore poses this question. Furthermore, although knowing there is a flaw, being attached to the challenge, he raises an analogical objection; hence the question. The answer has two parts: the upper half repeats [the claim] and directly pairs them; the lower half explains the pairing. The two dharmas of going are two form aggregates; since there are two form aggregates, they constitute two persons. If there is only one person, there should also be only one dharma; thus, whether advancing or retreating, [the opponent] is again cornered. Moreover, if one says the dharmas are two while the person is one, it should also be that the persons are two while the dharma is one. The lower half explains the pairing: because apart from dharmas there is no person, dharmas being two means persons are also two. Furthermore, originally there was one person, but because you assert that within the time of going there is going, two persons are constituted; having become two persons, one person goes east with a dharma of going, and one person goes west with a dharma of going. The person in the west and the person in the east again go within the time of going, constituting another two dharmas and two persons; in this manner, one person becomes immeasurable persons, and one dharma becomes immeasurable dharmas. If that were so, one would lose the single person and the single dharma. Having lost the one, how could there be many? Therefore, both the one and the many are destroyed. Up to this point, the establishment of dharmas has been exhausted.

4.10

From "Question: It may be granted that apart from a goer there is no dharma of going" downward is the second part, refuting the goer. Question: Does this section refute the goer, or does it refute the goer's going? Answer: It has both meanings: first, refuting the goer; second, refuting the goer's going. Question: Following the sequence of contemplation methods, emptiness of persons is easy to attain and should be explained first; emptiness of dharmas is difficult to attain and should be analyzed later. Why now is the dharma refuted first and the person refuted later? Answer: Comparing the two treatises now, the *Madhyamaka-śāstra* and the *Śata-śāstra*, the *Śata-śāstra* follows the sequence of contemplation methods, so it first refutes the ātman and next refutes dharmas. Because non-Buddhists do not yet know the contemplation methods of the Buddha's Dharma, it shows them gradually. Furthermore, non-Buddhists hold the ātman to be primary, so it first refutes their primary [principle]. The *Madhyamaka-śāstra* refutes internal students [of Buddhism]; most internal students already know the emptiness of persons but few believe in the emptiness of dharmas. Because they already know the emptiness of persons, it does not refute the person first; because they do not yet know the emptiness of dharmas, it refutes dharmas first. Question: Since those within the Buddhist path already know the emptiness of persons, why is there a need to refute it? Answer: There are also those who do not know it, such as the Vātsīputrīyas. Moreover, this treatise primarily refutes internal [schools] and secondarily refutes external [schools]; primarily refuting internal ones, it refutes dharmas first, and secondarily refuting external ones, it refutes persons later. Furthermore, assembling dharmas forms a person; dharmas are the basis of the person, so it refutes their basis first. Question: What is meant by 'the goer's going'? Answer: In general, going is of two kinds: first, the going of dharmas; second, the going of persons. The preceding section has already refuted the going of dharmas; now it next refutes the going of persons. When both person and dharma are without going, then all going is completely negated. Furthermore, going is of two kinds: first, the going of non-sentient beings, like wind blowing or water flowing; second, the going of sentient beings, like proceeding from here to there. Above, the refutation of the going of dharmas also refuted the going of non-sentient beings; now it directly refutes the going of sentient beings. Again, above, refuting the going of dharmas refuted internal schools; now, refuting the going of persons refutes external schools. Again, above, refuting the going of dharmas refuted non-self schools; now, refuting the going of persons refutes self-affirming schools. Or it may be divided into four: first, proposition; second, refutation; third, rescue; fourth, re-refutation. Now in the text there are two parts: first the question, next the answer. The question has two parts: first, accepting the previous non-existence of dharmas; second, establishing that subsequently there is a person. However, the intention of this question arises on account of the treatise master. Above, the treatise master challenged: 'Apart from dharmas there is no person; because dharmas are two, persons should also be two.' This is borrowing the person to refute the dharma. Furthermore, the reason for borrowing the person to refute the dharma was to borrow the dharma to refute the person, so that errors regarding both person and dharma would cease. The opponent then says: 'Apart from dharmas there is no person; because the person exists, dharmas therefore exist.' From "Answer:" downward, the five verses have two parts: first, opening with a refutation by deprivation; second, concessive refutation. The first, refutation by deprivation, has two parts: the upper half repeats what was accepted, and the lower half directly deprives him of his proposition. These words 'not apart from' are used in three places altogether: first, used as a challenge that apart from dharmas there is no person, so if dharmas are two, persons are also two; next, used by the opponent to establish that if the person exists, dharmas exist; now, used again to refute dharmas: if there is no person, there are none. However, the opponent says: 'The person exists, so dharmas exist.' The treatise master says: 'Dharmas do not exist, so the person does not exist.' The treatise master's words have already been made manifest above; the opponent's thesis has not yet been demonstrated below; thus there is a concession and an extension. 'The goer does not go' is the second part, concessive refutation. This is again divided into two: the first verse opens three gates and rejects them generally; the subsequent three verses explain the chapter topics to elucidate the rejection. Many people explain: 'This verse still refutes using the three times. The first line is what has already gone, the second line is what has not yet gone, and the lower half is the time of going.' We now maintain that this is not so. Below, the opponent's rescue is a rescue of the first line; how could it be a rescue of what has already gone? As explained now, this refutes according to the gate of the three [agents]. The first line explains that a goer in the time of going cannot use a dharma of going to go; the second line explains that a non-goer also cannot use a dharma of going to go; apart from these there is no third going, as will be explained below. Now, proceeding to refute by this gate: previously, if going could be found, one could say that a goer uses the dharma of going to go, which is called 'the goer's going.' But previously, seeking going yielded nothing; what would the goer use? Furthermore, above it was explained that without the person dharmas do not exist; how could one say, within a dharma that lacks a person, that a person uses a dharma to go? Furthermore, since one is called a 'goer', the goer has no self-substance; how could it be able to use a dharma to go? Moreover, the goer is vividly evident and yet does not go; as Master Zhao said, 'Observing the direction, one knows that he goes, / Yet the goer does not arrive at the direction,' and just as river currents race along yet truly do not flow; therefore the goer is vividly evident and yet truly does not go. 'The non-goer does not go' refutes the second line; this is a direct contradiction. How could a non-going person go? If a non-going person were to go, it would be like a sinless person having sin, or a non-giving person giving. Furthermore, dependent on a goer there is a non-goer; above, seeking a goer proved impossible, so how could there be a non-goer? Since there is not even a non-goer, how could a non-goer go? Moreover, even a goer does not go; how could a non-goer go? Just as light is not yet light, how could darkness be light? Since going does not go and not-going also does not go, how could both going and not-going be going, or even neither going nor not-going be going? This directly refutes the meaning of non-existent being being existent. Since another existence cannot be existent, how could non-existence be existent? If one says that non-existence is existent, the non-goer should go. That immediately succumbs to this refutation. Thus, going cannot go, and not-going also cannot go; that is, existence cannot be existent, non-existence also cannot be existent, and both-existence-and-non-existence as well as neither-existence-nor-non-existence likewise do not constitute existence.

First 10 of 35 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese