中觀論疏 4.10

4.10

From "Question: It may be granted that apart from a goer there is no dharma of going" downward is the second part, refuting the goer. Question: Does this section refute the goer, or does it refute the goer's going? Answer: It has both meanings: first, refuting the goer; second, refuting the goer's going. Question: Following the sequence of contemplation methods, emptiness of persons is easy to attain and should be explained first; emptiness of dharmas is difficult to attain and should be analyzed later. Why now is the dharma refuted first and the person refuted later? Answer: Comparing the two treatises now, the *Madhyamaka-śāstra* and the *Śata-śāstra*, the *Śata-śāstra* follows the sequence of contemplation methods, so it first refutes the ātman and next refutes dharmas. Because non-Buddhists do not yet know the contemplation methods of the Buddha's Dharma, it shows them gradually. Furthermore, non-Buddhists hold the ātman to be primary, so it first refutes their primary [principle]. The *Madhyamaka-śāstra* refutes internal students [of Buddhism]; most internal students already know the emptiness of persons but few believe in the emptiness of dharmas. Because they already know the emptiness of persons, it does not refute the person first; because they do not yet know the emptiness of dharmas, it refutes dharmas first. Question: Since those within the Buddhist path already know the emptiness of persons, why is there a need to refute it? Answer: There are also those who do not know it, such as the Vātsīputrīyas. Moreover, this treatise primarily refutes internal [schools] and secondarily refutes external [schools]; primarily refuting internal ones, it refutes dharmas first, and secondarily refuting external ones, it refutes persons later. Furthermore, assembling dharmas forms a person; dharmas are the basis of the person, so it refutes their basis first. Question: What is meant by 'the goer's going'? Answer: In general, going is of two kinds: first, the going of dharmas; second, the going of persons. The preceding section has already refuted the going of dharmas; now it next refutes the going of persons. When both person and dharma are without going, then all going is completely negated. Furthermore, going is of two kinds: first, the going of non-sentient beings, like wind blowing or water flowing; second, the going of sentient beings, like proceeding from here to there. Above, the refutation of the going of dharmas also refuted the going of non-sentient beings; now it directly refutes the going of sentient beings. Again, above, refuting the going of dharmas refuted internal schools; now, refuting the going of persons refutes external schools. Again, above, refuting the going of dharmas refuted non-self schools; now, refuting the going of persons refutes self-affirming schools. Or it may be divided into four: first, proposition; second, refutation; third, rescue; fourth, re-refutation. Now in the text there are two parts: first the question, next the answer. The question has two parts: first, accepting the previous non-existence of dharmas; second, establishing that subsequently there is a person. However, the intention of this question arises on account of the treatise master. Above, the treatise master challenged: 'Apart from dharmas there is no person; because dharmas are two, persons should also be two.' This is borrowing the person to refute the dharma. Furthermore, the reason for borrowing the person to refute the dharma was to borrow the dharma to refute the person, so that errors regarding both person and dharma would cease. The opponent then says: 'Apart from dharmas there is no person; because the person exists, dharmas therefore exist.' From "Answer:" downward, the five verses have two parts: first, opening with a refutation by deprivation; second, concessive refutation. The first, refutation by deprivation, has two parts: the upper half repeats what was accepted, and the lower half directly deprives him of his proposition. These words 'not apart from' are used in three places altogether: first, used as a challenge that apart from dharmas there is no person, so if dharmas are two, persons are also two; next, used by the opponent to establish that if the person exists, dharmas exist; now, used again to refute dharmas: if there is no person, there are none. However, the opponent says: 'The person exists, so dharmas exist.' The treatise master says: 'Dharmas do not exist, so the person does not exist.' The treatise master's words have already been made manifest above; the opponent's thesis has not yet been demonstrated below; thus there is a concession and an extension. 'The goer does not go' is the second part, concessive refutation. This is again divided into two: the first verse opens three gates and rejects them generally; the subsequent three verses explain the chapter topics to elucidate the rejection. Many people explain: 'This verse still refutes using the three times. The first line is what has already gone, the second line is what has not yet gone, and the lower half is the time of going.' We now maintain that this is not so. Below, the opponent's rescue is a rescue of the first line; how could it be a rescue of what has already gone? As explained now, this refutes according to the gate of the three [agents]. The first line explains that a goer in the time of going cannot use a dharma of going to go; the second line explains that a non-goer also cannot use a dharma of going to go; apart from these there is no third going, as will be explained below. Now, proceeding to refute by this gate: previously, if going could be found, one could say that a goer uses the dharma of going to go, which is called 'the goer's going.' But previously, seeking going yielded nothing; what would the goer use? Furthermore, above it was explained that without the person dharmas do not exist; how could one say, within a dharma that lacks a person, that a person uses a dharma to go? Furthermore, since one is called a 'goer', the goer has no self-substance; how could it be able to use a dharma to go? Moreover, the goer is vividly evident and yet does not go; as Master Zhao said, 'Observing the direction, one knows that he goes, / Yet the goer does not arrive at the direction,' and just as river currents race along yet truly do not flow; therefore the goer is vividly evident and yet truly does not go. 'The non-goer does not go' refutes the second line; this is a direct contradiction. How could a non-going person go? If a non-going person were to go, it would be like a sinless person having sin, or a non-giving person giving. Furthermore, dependent on a goer there is a non-goer; above, seeking a goer proved impossible, so how could there be a non-goer? Since there is not even a non-goer, how could a non-goer go? Moreover, even a goer does not go; how could a non-goer go? Just as light is not yet light, how could darkness be light? Since going does not go and not-going also does not go, how could both going and not-going be going, or even neither going nor not-going be going? This directly refutes the meaning of non-existent being being existent. Since another existence cannot be existent, how could non-existence be existent? If one says that non-existence is existent, the non-goer should go. That immediately succumbs to this refutation. Thus, going cannot go, and not-going also cannot go; that is, existence cannot be existent, non-existence also cannot be existent, and both-existence-and-non-existence as well as neither-existence-nor-non-existence likewise do not constitute existence.