中觀論疏 4.14

4.14

From "The opponent asks: Although you through various approaches..." onwards: if four approaches are established, the first approach of the three times has already ended; now this is the second approach, refuting in terms of identity and difference. If the meaning is explained in two rounds, the first round is already complete; now this is the second round. Question: How is it known that there is the intention of two rounds? Answer: Above, the refutation of going and staying as well as analogous activities such as walking and stopping was completed, yet now going and the goer are refuted again; one should know that this is a repeated refutation, and therefore there are two rounds. Question: Why explain it in two rounds? Answer: Those of sharp faculties, upon hearing the brief refutation of the first round, immediately understand; those of dull faculties have not yet awakened, so it is refuted further in detail. Regarding the text, there are two parts: first the question, then the answer. The question has two parts: first, accepting the preceding [conclusion of] non-existence; next, from "Yet seen with the eye..." onwards, the second part establishes the existence of going and staying. Question: At the beginning of the chapter it was already stated that the eye sees action occurring within the three times; now it speaks of what is seen with the eye again—how does this differ from before? Answer: First, regarding what is seen with the eye, the author of the treatise sought it through the approach of the three times and could not find it. The opponent says: "Although you present clever objections, I cannot answer them; nevertheless, in principle it ultimately exists, because it is seen with the eye." Second, above [the opponent] merely cited what is seen with the eye, and the author of the treatise immediately refuted it. Now the opponent turns the objection back on the author of the treatise: "If it does not exist within the three times, the eye should not see it; now, since it is seen with the eye, it should not be non-existent. Therefore, if it were non-existent it should not be seen; because it is seen, it is not non-existent." This is why it differs from before. Furthermore, the opponent turns the question back on the author of the treatise: "Does conventional truth exist or not? If conventional truth exists, then going and staying exist; if conventional truth does not exist, then that is wrong view. Moreover, ultimate truth may be non-existent, but how could conventional truth be non-existent? If you say that it is non-existent within conventional truth, then it should exist in ultimate truth, which would be total chaos. Furthermore, if the conventional is non-existent and the ultimate exists, then visible form could be heard and sound could be seen; the eye should hear and the ear should see." Third, the opponent further says: "If it is non-existent yet seen because of inversion, existence and non-existence are both inverted; why see existence and not see non-existence? Moreover, being equally inverted views, when there is no single act of going, one sees a single act of going; why not see two acts of going in one person, or see one act of going in two persons?" Fourth, "You speak of non-existence with your mouth, while I see existence with my eye; what is seen with the eye is real, whereas what is spoken with the mouth is hard to believe." Because there are such meanings, they repeatedly cite what is seen with the eye to question the author of the treatise. From "The answer is:" onwards is the second part, the refutation. Regarding the text, there are three parts: the first verse doubly takes up and doubly settles [the alternatives]; the next two verses doubly take up and doubly pose objections; the final verse doubly concludes and doubly reproaches. The preceding prose reproaches, saying: "What is seen with the physical eye cannot be trusted." If you trust what is seen by the eye and do not trust the verbal refutation of the author of the treatise, one should examine the two causes of mouth and eye. The opponent has ignorance and inversion as the cause, which brings about the physical eye; the Buddhas and bodhisattvas have prajñā as the cause, which they proclaim with their mouths. Therefore, the eye cannot be trusted, whereas my refutation can be trusted. Furthermore, in your present life the ignorant mind flows into the eye, and therefore what is seen with the eye cannot be trusted; I discern through contemplation in my mind and proclaim it in treatises with my mouth, which flows into this mouth from the mind of the two wisdoms, so the mouth can be trusted while the eye cannot be trusted. Furthermore, regarding the eye being untrustworthy: a person with a fever disease sees all kinds of things wildly, and thus says with their mouth that things exist. Through the fever disease of your ignorance, you wildly see things, and thus say that there is going and coming. Furthermore, regarding your claim, "If one sees one, why not see two?": both this seeing and not-seeing are your inverted feelings. Since your seeing one cannot be trusted, your not-seeing also cannot be trusted. Thus there are five clauses. Furthermore, this is inversion, and it accords with inversion, so what is seen is not confused. Furthermore, if I had asserted non-existence while seeing existence, I could be subject to this objection; but you yourself see existence, and now when we search for existence with you it cannot be found, so your existence cannot be trusted. If you grasped non-existence while seeing existence, I would also refute it. It is also said: Since it is called untrustworthy what is seen with the physical eye, how could it be said that the Buddha's seeing of conventional truth is no different from that of ordinary persons, differing only in attachment versus non-attachment, thus distinguishing ordinary from noble? Furthermore, since beginningless time you have held this trust and failed to attain liberation; if you wish to attain liberation, you should not trust these six sense faculties. Therefore, if one trusts prajñā, one does not trust any dharma; if one trusts all dharmas, one does not trust prajñā. When prajñā arises, all dharmas do not arise; when all dharmas arise, prajñā does not arise. This is also like the two rivers emptying and filling. Since the opponent cited what is seen with the eye as trustworthy, the author of the treatise uses the analogies of identity and difference to refute and reveal that it can be tested against the actual facts, and therefore searching for it through identity and difference fails. Furthermore, when identity and difference are examined and cannot be found, one should know that what is seen by the eye of wisdom is currently trustworthy. Just as in the "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" it is seen right before the world, it is seen by worldly eyes. Question: How does examination through identity and difference become currently trustworthy? Answer: You say that the eye sees a goer and the dharma of going; does your eye see them as one thing, or does it see them as two things? Pushing it to the actual fact, the opponent has no answer regarding the fact seen with the eye, and so the fact seen with the eye is not established. Furthermore, regarding the refutation via identity and difference: positing a goer is just the view of self; the view of self is the root of identity and difference; identity and difference are the root of annihilation and permanence; annihilation and permanence are the root of the sixty-two views. Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "Just as the view of self subsumes the sixty-two views," one knows that the view of self is the root. Because there is a self, inferring that the self and the aggregates are identical means that when the aggregates cease the self ceases, establishing the view of annihilation; inferring that the aggregates and the self are different means that when the aggregates cease the self survives, giving rise to the view of permanence. Thus identity and difference are the root of annihilation and permanence. Once there are annihilation and permanence, the sixty-two views arise; from views arises craving; and due to the causes and conditions of craving and views, there is karma and suffering. Now, refuting the root of identity and difference causes the branch views to collapse on their own, enabling sentient beings to realize that burdens are all stilled and virtues are all perfected. Because burdens are all eliminated, it cannot be considered existent; because virtues are all perfected, it cannot be considered non-existent; thus one attains the Dharma-body of the middle way. Furthermore, identity and difference constitute the fourteen unanswerable questions; once identity and difference collapse, the fourteen unanswerable questions are destroyed. Question: Does identity and difference refute one person, or two positions? Answer: If one merely cites what is seen with the eye to rescue the thesis, then identity and difference refute a single position; if they grasp identity or difference, then they refute two people. Question: What people grasp identity or difference? Answer: If one merely takes form dharmas as the body, and its motion is called the dharma of going, and the dharma of going completes the person called the goer, then this is not the doctrine of the four non-Buddhist schools such as Sāṃkhya, since the four non-Buddhist schools all posited that form and spirit are different. Yet among themselves they grasped spirit and consciousness as identical or different, having four teachers. If one collectively takes the five aggregates as the body, and motion is called the dharma of going, then this is also the doctrine of the four non-Buddhist schools. Moreover, when the Tattvasiddhi masters explain the provisional, there is the sense of being identical to the real and the sense of being different from the real; these then enter the present two approaches to be challenged. Furthermore, when the Tattvasiddhi masters posit that the provisional person has an essence and has a function, this is positing difference. When they posit that the provisional person has no essence and still takes the five aggregates as essence, this is the doctrine that person and dharma are identical. The first verse doubly takes up and doubly negates, which is easy to understand. The next two verses doubly take up and doubly refute. In refuting identity, the first half takes it up and the second half refutes it. The reason for citing action and agent together with going and goer is that the fault in going and the goer being identical is obscure, whereas the fault in action and the agent being identical is obvious; therefore the obvious is juxtaposed with the obscure. Action is the vase, which is a form dharma. The agent is the person, which is not a form dharma. Your going is also a form dharma, while the goer is not a form dharma. If going and goer are identical, then action and agent are also identical. If they are identical, both must be sentient or both must be insentient, both must possess form or both must be formless. The master rebukes the Tattvasiddhi position, saying: "Your person gives rise to good and evil; good and evil are what is done, while the person is the doer. If they are identical, there is no doer and done; if there is doer and done, they cannot be identical. If they are identical yet there is still doer and done, then they are both identical and different: being different there is doer and done, and being identical there is no doer and done. Furthermore, since doer and done are identical, since the arising of good and evil constitutes two dharmas, there should be two persons; if the person is one, then good and evil should be one. Also, just as a person gives rise to four minds, and the four minds alternate in succession, the four persons would be likewise; if the person is one, the four minds should be one." They also say: "The person can do good and evil, but is not identical to good and evil; the mind is the substance of good and evil, but is not identical to understanding and delusion." Now we ask: If understanding and delusion are identical with the mind, then since the mind is one, understanding and delusion should be one. If good and evil are identical with the person, since the person is one, good and evil should be one. If the person is not identical to good and evil, where apart from good, evil, form, and mind is there separately a person? If there is separately a person, the person should be outside good, evil, form, and mind, just as a pillar would have to be outside the four subtle atoms. Furthermore, if there were good and evil distinct from the mind, there should be form distinct from blue and yellow. In the second verse, the first half also takes it up and the second half refutes it. Bringing in separation to challenge their difference is also because separation is obvious while difference is obscure. Since you maintain difference, you should be able to separate them. There are five kinds of separation: First is spatial separation between east and west: if going is in the east, the goer should reside in the west. Second is temporal separation of existence and non-existence: before there is the dharma of going, there should first be the goer; before there is the goer, there should first be the dharma of going. Third is separation of persistence and destruction: when the goer dies, the dharma of going should persist; when the dharma of going perishes, the goer should remain. Fourth is separation of going and staying: the dharma of going goes by itself while the person stays by himself; the goer goes by himself while the dharma of going should stay. Fifth is the difference of not establishing each other: since person and dharma are different, they do not establish each other, like the two horns of an ox. The prose has two parts: first, doubly taking up, generally declaring that there are faults; next, "Why is that?", explaining the faults of identity and difference, first explaining identity, then explaining difference. In the section on identity there are three parts: first, indicating the fault of confusion and the fault of destroying dependent origination; second, from "Because of going there is a goer" onwards, doubly explaining; third, from "In identity..." onwards, doubly concluding. In the explanation there are two parts: first, explaining the destruction of dependent origination: since it is because of going that there is a goer, how could they be said to be identical? Therefore it destroys dependent origination. Next, from "Furthermore, going..." onwards, explaining confusion, which has two aspects: first, person and dharma; second, permanence and impermanence. The person pervades the four postures and is therefore permanent; the four postures alternately arise and cease, and are therefore called impermanent—this is not refuting the non-Buddhist position of a permanent person. If they were identical, both should be permanent or both should be impermanent; calling for the person one should get the dharma, and summoning the dharma one should get the person; therefore there is confusion. "In identity there are such faults" is the third part, doubly concluding. Or it is explained as follows: within identity, three faults are explained with one conclusion. The three faults are: the first approach is the fault of confusing the substantial entity of dharmas; from "Furthermore, going is called a dharma" onwards is the second, the fault of confusing names; from "The person is permanent and the dharma is impermanent" onwards is the fault of confusing meanings. When discussing erroneous positions, they do not go beyond the three confusions: namely entity, name, and meaning. "In identity there are such faults" is the fourth, the conclusion. In difference there should also be three separations: first, separation of east and west; second, separation of existence and non-existence; third, separation of persistence and destruction; fourth is the general conclusion. Here, the first separation is omitted. In the third section, the first half doubly takes up and the second half doubly reproaches, which is easy to understand.