中觀論疏 5.41

5.41

From "Furthermore, arising, abiding, and cessation are not established" downwards is the second [section] of this chapter, the concluding refutation. Above, the first [part] refuted the three characteristics; now the second refutes the entities of phenomena. The sequence of emergence is as at the beginning of the chapter. The first half clarifies that because the qualifying characteristics do not exist, there are no things qualified; the second half clarifies that because the conditioned does not exist, there is no unconditioned, which is ultimate emptiness.

That there are no things qualified because there are no qualifying characteristics has four meanings:
1. Defining the characteristic as identical to the phenomenon: when the characteristic is non-existent, the phenomenon is non-existent.
2. Defining the characteristic as distinct from the phenomenon: because the characteristic is non-existent, there is nothing to be depended upon, and thus no phenomenon either.
3. Analogizing the phenomenon to the characteristic: seeking the characteristic yields no origin, and the phenomenon is also like this.
4. In the first six chapters, the phenomenon was sought and found non-existent; now the characteristic is sought and found non-existent.

The second half clarifies that because the conditioned does not exist, the unconditioned also does not exist:
1. If identical to the phenomenon or distinct from the phenomenon, if conditioned and unconditioned are two entities, they are refuted by the gateway of mutual dependence.
2. If it is said that the absence of the three conditioned characteristics is precisely the unconditioned—as explained in the *Tattvasiddhi*—it is refuted by the gateway of mutual identity: because the conditioned is non-existent, the unconditioned is thereby non-existent.
3. Analogizing the unconditioned to the conditioned: since seeking the conditioned reveals it to be non-existent, seeking the unconditioned is likewise.
4. Above, it was already explained that the unconditioned does not exist, as in the "Chapter on the Six Elements"; now it is explained that the conditioned does not exist.
This verse explains the emptiness of the conditioned and the emptiness of the unconditioned in the sūtras, and is easy to see.

When the prose says "investigating by principle": the Fangguang [Vaitulya] expounded at length that all phenomena are without arising and cessation, but this is the wrong view that posits non-arising and non-cessation; here, it is correct contemplation that seeks them and finds them unobtainable, hence it says "by principle."
"As previously stated, there is no phenomenon without characteristics": this is the second verse in the "Chapter on the Six Elements," meaning that a phenomenon without characteristics exists nowhere. Why make this statement? Fearing that the heterodox opponent might say, "Although there are no three characteristics, what prevents the entity of the phenomenon from existing?" Therefore, it is now clarified that there is no phenomenon without characteristics. Since the characteristics have been refuted above, one thereby knows that there is no entity of phenomena.

"Question: If arising, abiding, and cessation are ultimately non-existent," how can there be names for them in the treatise? This is the second major section: above, the existence of the three characteristics was refuted; now, one verse refutes the non-existence of the three characteristics. Furthermore, above the entity of phenomena was refuted, and now names are refuted; combined, names and entities are ultimately empty. First the question, then the answer. This does not cite sūtras, nor is it the treatises of the Abhidharma or *Tattvasiddhi*. Above, they were all cited completely and their refutations concluded. Now it is said: if the conditioned and unconditioned are entirely non-existent, how can these names exist in spoken discourse? If they were totally non-existent, there should be nothing to discuss; since there is discussion, they should not be non-existent.

The answer: "Like a dream": in speech one also speaks the names of dreams and illusions; can they be said to exist?
Second: above, it was clarified that seeking the three characteristics in the treatise proves they are not existent; now, it is clarified that the three characteristics are not non-existent, but exist like illusions and transformations; how could they be said to be non-existent? Previously the view of existence was refuted; now the view of non-existence is refuted. Previously the five hundred schools positing that the three characteristics exist were refuted; now the Fangguang and various wrong views claiming there are no three characteristics are refuted, which reveals the meaning of the middle way.

Furthermore, what came before is the middle way, which is the middle prior to the provisional; what is here is provisional designation, which is the provisional subsequent to the middle. It is called the middle way because seeking a definitive nature of arising and cessation is ultimately unobtainable, hence called non-arising and non-cessation, and therefore named the middle way. Non-arising and non-cessation provisionally designate arising and cessation, hence it is provisional designation. One must first refute intrinsic arising and cessation before one can distinguish provisional arising and cessation.

Furthermore, what came before is the meaning of emptiness of intrinsic nature: seeking this intrinsic arising and cessation is unobtainable, hence it is emptiness of intrinsic nature, which is the middle way of conventional truth. Now, clarifying that arising and cessation are like illusions and transformations is emptiness of dependent origination. That these illusions and transformations are devoid of existence is called the emptiness of dependent origination, which is the middle way of ultimate truth.

Furthermore, what came before was refuting errors; here it is harmonizing with the sūtras. If the treatise merely refuted them into nothingness, why do the sūtras state that there are three characteristics? Therefore, it is explained: the treatise refutes attachment to existence, and therefore speaks of non-existence. But that the sūtras explain existence means it is necessarily existence like illusions and transformations.

Question: Why is refuting and elucidating explained in this chapter?
Answer: Because one full cycle of contemplation has ended, refuting and elucidating are explained. From the "Refutation of Causes and Conditions" to the end of the "Three Characteristics" has been refutation; now one verse briefly presents elucidation. By analogizing this to what preceded: since the three characteristics are like illusions and dreams, even up to the four conditions, going and coming, the six sense faculties, and the five aggregates, all are identical to the ten similes.

Furthermore, the primary intent above was revealing the real; now it is disclosing the expedient. Revealing the real explains that the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three periods of time all act to reveal the purity of the single path, also named ultimate emptiness, also named suchness, Dharma-nature, the limit of reality, and so on. Here it should be treated as ultimate emptiness, because both Great and Small, inner and outer, are all clinging to attainment, and thus need to be cleansed with ultimate emptiness. Now, disclosing the expedient means that the sūtras speaking of the existence of the three characteristics, the four conditions, and so forth, are merely speaking of their existence as expedients in accordance with conditions.

Furthermore, above, clarifying non-existence merely clarified that what exists is devoid of existence, which is the meaning of existence being non-existence; here, clarifying existence merely means the existence of what is devoid of existence, which is the meaning of non-existence being existence.

Here, in clarifying illusions and dreams, adducing illusion cites unreal occurrences during sentient beings' waking state; citing dreams cites unreal occurrences during sentient beings' dream state. As for the simile of the city of the gandharvas: for the dull-rooted of the Hīnayāna there were only similes like the plantain tree; now, for the sharp-rooted people of the Mahāyāna, it is spoken to reveal ultimate emptiness, using the city of the gandharvas to show that both the producing causes and the produced effects are empty. The reason three similes are adduced is to illustrate the three characteristics.

Question: Others also say that the three provisional designations of conventional truth are identical to illusions and transformations; how does this differ from the present view?
Answer: Sentient beings believe that what is seen in the waking state is real, and what is seen in a dream is unreal; now, one wishes to borrow the unreality they believe in to illustrate the reality they believe in, so that the reality they believe in becomes identical to the unreality they believe in. But since reality is not real, what unreality could there still be? Therefore, Master Kumārajīva's *Praise of the Ten Similes* says: "The ten similes are used to awaken to emptiness, / But emptiness must rely on these similes. / Words are borrowed to convey the intent; / When the intent is exhausted, there is no place to convey. / Having escaped the long net, / Abide here with nowhere to abide."

The prose has two parts: first, a profound answer to the question above; from "Like an illusion" downwards, it explains the text of the verse. The first also has two: first, an paired presentation of correctness and error; from "The wise and holy" downwards, the intent of teaching the three characteristics. The first also has two: first, an paired presentation of correctness and error. "The three characteristics are not definitive" marks correctness. From "Ordinary people" downwards marks error. Believing that there are distinct entities, definitive conditioned or definitive unconditioned phenomena, distinct or simultaneous times, and so on, all stem from definitively positing the three characteristics, generating further disputes over existence.

From "The wise and holy" downwards explains correctness and error, which answers the above question. The above question asked: Since the three characteristics are devoid of existence, why can the names of the three characteristics be spoken in the treatise? Therefore, it is said: in order to stop the inversion of permanence, three are taught; if the inversion of permanence ceases, the three are not retained either. This is also teaching three to stop three, not that teaching three implies that three exist. As the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: "Using sound to block sound is not seeking sound."

"The words are the same": both speak of the three characteristics. "Their minds differ": when ordinary people speak of three and hear of three, they form an understanding of three, not knowing that not-three is three, nor knowing that three is not-three. Not knowing that not-three is three, they lack the expedients of real wisdom; not knowing that three is not-three, they lack the real wisdom of expedients. Lacking both wisdoms, how could they have the four unassisted, teacherless knowledges? Therefore, ordinary people only have ignorance, not seeing Buddha-nature as permanence, bliss, self, and purity. The holy person clarifies three, knowing that it is not-three that is three, and also recognizing that three is not-three; possessing the four knowledges, they no longer have ignorance, and thus see Buddha-nature as possessing permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Therefore, it is said that the words are the same while their minds differ. Now, that the holy person uses the same words is also to make ordinary people know that not-three is three, and three is not-three, so that possessing the four knowledges, they enter the Buddha's knowledge and vision and attain Buddhahood.

The three characteristics being so, the four conditions, and even the three treatises, all Buddhist sūtras, and all treatises must be understood in this way.

Furthermore, as another expression: the holy mind rests in the four negations, yet words follow ordinary people in speaking of three. Why follow the ordinary in speaking of three? To lead them to awaken to the four negations. The four negations are: originally there never were three, so how could there be not-three? And so forth for the four propositions.

"There should be no objection": you should not have objected earlier, saying, "If there are no three, why speak of three?"
From "Like an illusion" downwards explains the three similes of the verse, which correspond to the three [characteristics].
From "Ordinary people discriminate" downwards secondly concludes comprehensively with correctness and error. Furthermore, closely concluding with the city of the gandharvas: when the sun rises it appears, and after a short while it vanishes; this matches "Like ordinary people discriminating it as existent, / When the wise seek it, existence is non-existence," precisely because discrimination corresponds to distinction like the rising of the sun.