中觀論疏 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.2

Chapter 8: Examination of the Agent and Action

The preceding seven chapters form one cycle that briefly refutes person and phenomena to clarify the Mahāyāna contemplative practice; the ten chapters below repeatedly refute person and phenomena to clarify the Mahāyāna contemplative practice. The brief refutation was spoken for those of sharp faculties; the repeated refutation was spoken for those of dull faculties. Question: How do we know that the preceding was a brief refutation and the present is a repeated refutation? Answer: By taking the two passages before and after as evidence, we know there are expositions in two cycles. The final two verses of the "Examination of the Three Characteristics" contain three pairs: one verse washes away all entities of the conditioned and unconditioned; one verse refutes all names of the conditioned and unconditioned. Since both names and entities are non-existent, person and phenomena are completely empty; hence this is one cycle. The next verse clarifies that phenomena have nothing from which they originate, refuting from the gate of direct exposition of phenomena; one verse adduces an analogy, refuting through the gate of metaphorical comparison. Phenomena and analogy being complete, the one cycle is finalized. The next verse concludes the reason why the refutation establishes the absence of the three characteristics; one verse clarifies the reason why the sūtras speak of the existence of the three characteristics. Since the treatise both explains the treatise and harmonizes with the sūtras, this is the completion of one cycle. As for the evidence from the subsequent text, the prose preface states: "Heretofore, each chapter has refuted all phenomena without exception; but because your mind of attachment is deep, I shall now explain them again." Since there are the words "explain them again", we know it must be a refutation in another cycle. As for the reason to refute action and agent: from beginningless time all sentient beings have believed that good, evil, and indeterminate [natures] exist, and that a person performs good, evil, and indeterminate karma. Now, examining that there are no three persons performing three karmas, one awakens to the unarisen, ultimate emptiness and attains liberation. This meaning applies generally throughout each chapter. The ten chapters comprise two parts: the first four chapters primarily refute the person and secondarily refute phenomena; the subsequent six chapters primarily refute phenomena and secondarily refute the person. The reason for this is, first, in accordance with the sequence of the gates of contemplation. Because the non-arising of the person is easy to attain, it primarily refutes the person first; because the non-arising of phenomena is difficult to attain, it refutes phenomena afterward. Second, this cycle is for people of dull faculties; hence it refutes the person first and refutes phenomena afterward. Furthermore, the two cycles mutually manifest each other: the previous cycle primarily refuted phenomena and secondarily refuted the person. Inner students of sharp faculties mostly know there is no person, but few know there are no phenomena. Moreover, inner students mostly posit phenomena and rarely posit a person; among the eighteen schools, only the Vātsīputrīya posit a person. Furthermore, the previous cycle went from the fundamental to the derivative; therefore it refuted phenomena first, as phenomena are the root of the person; the subsequent cycle goes from the derivative to the fundamental, as the person is the branch of phenomena. This is the text's mutual manifestation. Furthermore, the previous cycle was based on the sequence of the gates of teaching, mostly going from deep to shallow; the subsequent gate is based on the sequence of the gates of practice, going from shallow to deep. That four chapters refute the person and six chapters refute phenomena is because the person is easy and phenomena are difficult. "Examination of Action and Agent" refutes the functioning of person and phenomena; "Examination of the Prior Entity" refutes the entity of person and phenomena; "Examination of Fire and Fuel" adduces an analogy to jointly refute entity and functioning; "Examination of the Prior Limit" penetrates to the source of person and phenomena. Thus the four chapters primarily refute the person and secondarily refute phenomena. Furthermore, the first chapter broadly refutes both the identical and separate selves, but refuting the identical is primary—as Śreṇika posited the agent as identical with the aggregates; the next chapter primarily refutes positing a self separate from the aggregates. The "Examination of Fire and Fuel" broadly refutes both identical and separate, and also the five propositions of identity and difference. "Examination of the Prior Limit" resolves doubts: an outsider doubts, "If these three chapters have no person and no phenomena, why does the Anamatagga-sūtra speak of their existence?" Hence it is called resolving doubts. Question: Why is action and agent refuted right after the three characteristics? Answer: Above, the conditioned and unconditioned were refuted as entirely empty. The outsider says: the three characteristics are conditioned; conditioned means arising and acting, so action and agent are adduced to prove the existence of the three characteristics. This is its secondary meaning. As for the primary meaning: from the "Examination of Causes and Conditions" to the "Examination of the Five Aggregates", the existence of phenomena is refuted, clarifying the gate of liberation of emptiness. From the "Examination of the Six Elements" to the "Examination of the Three Characteristics", seeking all characteristics they cannot be found; this is called the gate of liberation of signlessness. From this chapter to the very end of the treatise, seeking an agent it cannot be found; this clarifies the gate of liberation of wishlessness. Therefore, following the end of the "Examination of the Three Characteristics", action and agent are refuted. The outsider says: If the "Examination of the Three Characteristics" clarifies that the conditioned and unconditioned are all empty, how can current actions, operations, and conduct all be empty? The outsider believes that sentient beings of the six destinies are agents; body, speech, and mind are the methods of action employed; giving rise to the three karmas of sin, merit, and the immovable is called performing karma; and obtaining the suffering and pleasure of the six destinies is called karmic retribution. Persons of the three vehicles are agents; body, speech, and mind are the methods employed; giving rise to the karma of the three vehicles is performing karma; and obtaining the fruit of the three vehicles is karmic retribution. One presently observes that the nine realms are like this; how can you say they are ultimately empty? Furthermore, as for the sequence of the three emptinesses: previously, having finished explaining the gate of emptiness, the treatise master praised emptiness and explained the gate of signlessness to clarify not grasping at the characteristic of emptiness. Now, explaining wishlessness directly clarifies that when a bodhisattva gives rise to a thought or moves a mental state, that itself is performing karma; positing that there is a contemplation of emptiness and signlessness, the bodhisattva is the agent, and performing this contemplation to attain the Buddha path is the karmic retribution. Therefore this single gate can penetrate from the lowest to the utmost: the utmost refers to prior to the Dharma Cloud [bhūmi]; the lowest refers to refuting the world's actions, operations, and conduct as all unfindable. The twenty-seven chapters derive their titles in four ways: first, receiving a name from phenomena, such as the chapters on the sense faculties and aggregates; second, taking an appellation from a person, such as the "Examination of the Prior Entity" and so forth; third, establishing a name from an analogy, such as the "Examination of Fire and Fuel"; fourth, combining person and phenomena under a single designation, such as the "Examination of Action and Agent". Question: Between action and agent, and defilement and the defiled, what difference is there? Answer: Defilement and the defiled is solely the mental ground and clarifies only what is unwholesome; action and agent extends across the three karmas and across the three natures. Furthermore, defilement and the defiled is solely the gate of afflictions, whereas action and agent clarifies the gate of karma. Furthermore, defilement and the defiled cites sūtras to establish its thesis; action and agent cites concrete affairs to establish its thesis, meaning the presently observed matters of actions, operations, and conduct. Question: What is the difference between refuting action and agent now, and the agent among the sixteen views? Answer: The sixteen views merely refute non-Buddhist doctrines; what is here broadly refutes worldly, non-Buddhist, Hīnayāna, and Mahāyāna views—wherever there is the slightest action produced with a mind of grasping, all are included in this gate to be refuted. Question: Why refute all activity? Answer: The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra states: "A bodhisattva has coarse and subtle karmas: seeing body, speech, and mind is called coarse karma; not apprehending body, speech, and mind is called subtle karma." A bodhisattva is free from coarse karma; now, desiring to delineate the bodhisattva's pure karma, all grasping activity and conduct are refuted. Second, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra states: "Jīvaka said to King Ajātaśatru: 'Great King, if you hear the Buddha teach no action and no experiencer, your grave sin will immediately be purified.'" "No action" means there is no person who acts and no phenomenon that acts. "No experiencer" means there is no person who experiences and no phenomenon that experiences. Furthermore, the sūtra briefly indicated this and those of sharp faculties immediately understood; but because sins in the final age are grave, the treatise master broadly refutes them. Therefore, this chapter first clarifies no action and no agent, and later distinguishes no experiencing and no experiencer; this is precisely the pure repentance practice of the various Vaipulya sūtras. Bodhisattvas of the four reliances pity the sin-committing sentient beings of the final age, and therefore elucidate the great Vaipulya repentance of the Buddhas of the ten directions.

6.4

The chapter has two parts: first, the prose introduction on the grounds for refuting and establishing; second, the root verses that directly explain the refutation. Within the first, there is first an objection and then a reply. The objection does not accept the earlier refutation and re-establishes [the position]; the reply articulates the earlier refutation and does not accept the later establishment. In the establishing, where it says "There are actually action, an agent, and the instruments of action,—" as the previous [chapters] have exhaustively and vertically refuted everything without omission, the outsider has no words with which to defend himself, and merely cites the things actually seen before one's eyes to ask: If everything is ultimately empty, there would be no actual things to be seen; since there are actual things to be seen, how can it be ultimately empty? Thus, not believing the earlier refutation, he re-establishes it. Furthermore, it is like a person whose power of practicing the contemplation of non-arising is shallow: the contemplation of non-arising never manifests, while inverted phenomena constantly manifest; hence he asks by citing actual things. "Action" is karma, with three aspects: first, it can produce future results; second, it is performed by a person; third, its substance is an arising activity; hence it is called "action." "Agent" also has three meanings: first, its substance is the phenomenon of initiating activity; second, it produces previous results; third, it can perform karma; hence it is called "agent." The "instruments of action" are of two kinds: first, internal phenomena, meaning that sense faculties such as hands and feet can perform actions, hence they are called "instruments"; second, external tools, as when a person writes by hand he must use a brush, so the brush is the phenomenon used as an instrument. These two are causes, and the written characters are the result. The reply articulates the earlier refutation and does not accept the later establishment: first, it intends to show that the first cycle of refutation was already finished; second, it intends to refute the latter by means of the earlier approach; third, it shows that the dull-witted establish existence where there is none. Within the reply there are two parts: first, deprivation; second, concession. Depriving action and agent of existence has already been subsumed under the refutations of the conditioned and unconditioned. The non-Buddhists' permanent, omnipresent self was refuted under the unconditioned; the impermanent self was refuted under the conditioned. Furthermore, non-Buddhists posit a permanent body and an acting body; the inner teaching posits a conditioned person of birth-and-death and unconditioned persons and phenomena on the Buddha-ground: both are subsumed and refuted under these two gates. From "Your attachment of mind is deep" onward is the second, refutation by concession. According to phenomena, they are already non-existent; regarding inverted passions, they are deemed to exist; therefore, they are refuted. The twelve verses have two parts: first, eleven verses refute action and agent, which is refuting the person and phenomena in the cause; next, one verse refutes the experience and experiencer, refuting the person and phenomena in the effect. Since the person and phenomena of cause and effect are non-existent, everything is empty. Furthermore, first refuting action and agent refutes the function of person and phenomena; later refuting experience and experiencer refutes the substance of person and phenomena. Below it says: "Experience is called the five aggregates"; the aggregates are the substance of phenomena. If substance and function both collapse, everything is empty. Within the refutation of action and agent, there are two parts: first, refuting the view that person and phenomena exist; next, refuting the view that person and phenomena do not exist. Within refuting [the view of] person and phenomena, there are five meanings and four textual divisions. The five meanings are: 1. person and phenomena both exist, having no mutually active meaning; 2. person and phenomena both do not exist, also having no mutually active meaning; 3. half-existent and half-non-existent also having no mutually active meaning; 4. one existent and one non-existent also having no mutually active meaning; 5. person being one and phenomena three, or person being three and phenomena one, also having no mutually active meaning. Examining and investigating everything exhaustively through these five gates, the meaning of purposeful activity is ultimately without concession, which explains the gate of non-action in the sūtras; moreover, it thoroughly refutes all the outsiders' notions of purposeful activity. The four textual divisions are: 1. the gate of real existence and real non-existence; 2. the gate of half-existence and half-non-existence; 3. the gate of one-existence and one-non-existence; 4. the gate of one and three. The first gate has six verses, which again open into two: first, one verse states the main thesis; next, five verses explain the main thesis. The first half of the first verse clarifies that person and phenomena both existing has no meaning of action; the second half clarifies that person and phenomena both not existing also has no meaning of action. The first line of the first half clarifies that there is definitely a person, which refers to the four non-Buddhist traditions such as the Sāṃkhya, and within the Buddha's Dharma, the provisional substance and provisional function of the Vātsīputrīyas, Sautrāntikas, and Tattvasiddhi masters; the second line sets out the refutation: since there is definitely a person, the person does not perform definite karma. Definite karma is shared across internal and external [teachings], but precisely refers to the Sarvāstivādins' inherently existing good and evil karma in the future, which ultimately does not require a person to produce it. Furthermore, not discussing the future now, it directly clarifies that a real person's substance and karma's substance have no meaning of action. In the second half, the first line mentions the absence of a person, and the next sets out the refutation. Question: Does this cling to there being no person, or does it posit an unconditioned person? Answer: It does not cling to there being no person, but only says that the substance of the person is non-existent, yet it can initiate and perform karma. Question: Who posits that the substance of the person is non-existent yet performs karma? Answer: If one clings to the person as conditioned, one calls it existent; if one posits the person as unconditioned, one weighs it as non-existent. Furthermore, provisional existence of substance is clinging to the person as existent; provisional non-existence of substance is positing the person as non-existent. Furthermore, the Vātsīputrīyas posit the person as existent; the Sarvāstivādins clarify that the person is non-existent, having only a provisional name, yet they state that the person performs karma. Furthermore, in the first half, the person is not dependent on karma and karma is not dependent on the person, hence there is no mutual action; in the second half, the person is dependent on karma and karma is dependent on the person, so person and karma are both without substance, and being without person and karma, there is no mutual action. Question: How do we know that positing existence is the person and positing non-existence is the person? Answer: The chapter "Errors" says: "Whether self and phenomena are existent or non-existent, this can never be established." Hence we know that positing a person is [positing] existence or non-existence. From the second verse onward is the second part, explaining the main thesis, which has three parts: first, one verse explains the main thesis; next, one verse reveals that person and phenomena both existing falls into the fault of causelessness; third, three verses successively explain the fault of causelessness. The first half of the first verse refutes definitely existent karma; the second half refutes a definitely existent person. A definitely existent substance of karma has two faults: if the substance of karma really exists, it already exists fundamentally, and one cannot say that originally unmade it is only now made, which would mean that in the world there is only old karma and no new karma; second, since it already exists fundamentally, it does not require a person to initiate it, hence there is also the fault of being separate from a person. The second half also has two faults: first, since an agent already exists fundamentally, there should not be further purposeful activity; second, since it already exists fundamentally, it does not require performing karma to complete the person. One must finely grasp the meaning of the text: if there is even a hair's breadth of karma-substance, then karma has two faults; if there is even a hair's breadth of person-substance, the person has two faults. Why? Because if there is a hair's breadth of person-substance, it already exists fundamentally, neither relying on the coming together of conditions to be formed, nor relying on the separation of conditions to be destroyed, hence this person is permanent. Then, being permanent and already completed, why would it need to act further? And why would it need to rely on karma to be formed? The two faults of karma are also like this.

6.5

The prose first explains the root verse. From "not definite" onward, it shows the treatise master's intention not to refute that person and phenomena both do not exist. Even when both exist, existence still lacks action; when both do not exist, how could non-existence have action? Therefore, it is not necessary to refute non-existence. From "Furthermore, if there is definitely an agent" onward is the second part, reaffirming that person and phenomena both existing falls into the fault of causelessness, which is the four pairs of the initial section. If there is a person that can be a person, there is a phenomenon that can be a phenomenon. If there is a person that can be a person, the person is not dependent on phenomena; if there is a phenomenon that can be a phenomenon, the phenomenon is not dependent on the person. Therefore, the person is an independent person, and the phenomenon is an independent phenomenon; hence it is called "causeless." Yet one must observe the meaning of the text with a refined mind: if there is a hair's breadth of person-substance, then it does not depend on phenomena; phenomena are also like this. Likewise with long and short, birth-and-death, and nirvāṇa: if there is a hair's breadth without mutual dependence, lacking mutual dependence then refutes causes and conditions and refutes the middle way. If there is not a hair's breadth of person and phenomena, there is also nothing that can be mutually dependent. It can be said that the correct contemplation is subtle and wondrous, and false delusion easily collapses. From "The question says" onward generates the third part, successively revealing the fault of causelessness. The three verses in the reply have two parts: first, distinct clarification of the fault of causelessness; next, half a line summarising it. In the distinct clarification there are ten faults, namely cause and effect, person and phenomena, sin and merit, retribution of sin and merit, and mundane and supramundane. "Then there is neither cause nor effect": if a person is not dependent on phenomena, there is no cause of phenomena; if there is no cause of phenomena, there is no person, and the effect and phenomena are also like this. Question: Earlier it already clarified that there is no cause and effect, why does it again say there is no sin and merit, and no retribution of sin and merit? Answer: Earlier it clarified the absence of cause and effect among external phenomena such as a vase; later it clarified the absence of cause and effect of internal phenomena. Furthermore, according to the masters of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the latter only clarifies the absence of cause and effect of retribution causes, while the former generally clarifies the cause and effect of the remaining five causes. The Tattvasiddhi is also like this: the latter clarifies the cause and effect of retribution causes, while the former clarifies the cause and effect of habitual causes and relying causes. Question: The text of the treatise in some versions says "Heavenly Nirvāṇa" and in some says "Great Nirvāṇa," which one is correct? Answer: "Great" is correct, because earlier the retribution of sin and merit had already finished explaining heavenly retribution. The prose has two parts: first, it explains that person and phenomena both existing falls into causelessness, and causelessness has ten faults. From "The question says" onward, it shows that the treatise master only clarifies the fault of person and phenomena both existing, without displaying the error of both not existing. Even both existing still has faults, how much more so both not existing! Therefore, it is not necessary to reveal the error of non-existence. Furthermore, Piṅgala wished to fully display the errors of both existing and both not existing, initiating the following refutation of half-existing and half-not-existing.

6.6

From "Question: If without an agent and without an action, action cannot be done" onward is the second gate, refuting half-existence and half-non-existence. The outsider says: A person is half-existent, able to initiate karma; a person is half-non-existent, completed by karma. Karma is half-existent, able to complete a person; karma is half-non-existent, requiring a person to initiate it. If so, then there should be person and karma. Question: One should establish half-existence and half-non-existence; why does one only speak of existence? Answer: There are two meanings. First, in contrast to the words "both non-existent" in the prose, it is weighed as existence; second, by briefly citing half-existence, half-non-existence can be known. Question: Whose position is half-existence and half-non-existence? Answer: Person and phenomena possess the two truths: on the side of the meaning of conventional truth, they are half-existent; on the side of the meaning of ultimate truth, they are half-non-existent. Furthermore, Master Kaishan said: The provisional person lacks substance and has function; the meaning of lacking substance is half-non-existent, and the meaning of having function is called half-existent. Provisional phenomena also lack substance and have function, explained in the same way as the person. Furthermore, a single person possesses both provisional and real: when real phenomena perish, it is half-non-existent; when provisional phenomena continue, it is half-existent. This is common to various masters. The first half of the verse directly takes up and refutes it; the second half explains the refutation. As for the word "contradictory," there are two kinds: first, person and karma contradict individually; second, they contradict together. Contradicting individually means: person-existent contradicts person-non-existent, and person-non-existent contradicts person-existent. Karma is also like this. Contradicting together means: person-existent contradicts karma-non-existent, and person-non-existent contradicts karma-existent; karma-non-existent contradicts person-existent, and karma-existent contradicts person-non-existent.

6.7

From "Furthermore, what exists cannot perform what does not exist" onward is the third gate, of one-existent and one-non-existent, refuting the meaning of mutual action. "One-existent and one-non-existent" means that the person exists while karma does not, or the person does not exist while karma exists. Question: Whose doctrine is this? Answer: As the chapter "Prior Entity" says: "Before faculties such as eyes and ears exist, there is already a prior entity; this is having a person but no karma." The Tattvasiddhi masters say: "In the first three thoughts there are only phenomena and not yet a person; this is having phenomena without a person." Furthermore, as worldly people say: "Before good and evil karma is performed, there is already a person; this is having a person without phenomena." The Abhidharma says: "In the future there are phenomena, but not yet the designation of a person; this is having phenomena without a person." Furthermore, as the sūtra says: "There is no self, no agent, and no experiencer, yet good and evil karma does not perish." This is also having phenomena without a person. Furthermore, as the Tattvasiddhi masters explain the meaning of nirvāṇa, saying: "Phenomena perish and the person is delivered; this is again having a person without phenomena." Furthermore, performing good is why one is called a good person, and if one has not performed good one is not called a good person, and the other two natures are also like this; this is having phenomena without a person. The verse has two parts: the first half directly refutes it; the second half points to the earlier refutation. It says that existence does not go beyond total existence or half-existence, and non-existence does not go beyond total non-existence or half-non-existence; these having already been refuted above, since there is neither existence nor non-existence, how could there be mutual action?

6.8

From “An agent does not perform what is determinate” onward is the fourth gateway, [examining] the one and the three. The preceding was a separate refutation; this is a combined refutation. The two verses comprise two [sections]: the first verse explains that one person cannot perform three kinds of karma; the next verse explains that three persons cannot perform one kind of karma. “One person does not perform three kinds of karma” means taking any one person among the three kinds—either an existent person, a non-existent person, or a half-existent and half-non-existent person. An existent person not performing the three kinds of karma means: since the person is existent, karma is already non-existent and cannot be performed; karma already exists and need not be performed; half-existent is the same as existent, and half-non-existent is the same as non-existent. In the next verse, “three persons cannot perform one karma” refers to any [karma] among the three persons. “Question: If there is no action and no agent” onward: hitherto the view of existent person and dharmas has been refuted; from here below is the second [part], refuting the view of no person and dharmas. If treated as the intention of elucidating and refuting: the preceding was refuting errors, and now it is elucidating the sūtras. The final verse of Chapter [7, “Examination of the] Three Characteristics,” elucidated the sūtras, and seven chapters refuted attachments. Indeed, because the illness of attachment was so severe, it first had to be extensively refuted; before that was done, it was not yet possible to present the meaning of action for them, so illusions and transformations were provisionally adduced to enlighten them. When reaching the Chapter on the Agent, the illness of attachment was gradually eliminated, so in each chapter one or two essential phrases occasionally appear, enabling them to recognise the sūtras' meaning of dependent origination and provisional designation. The text has two parts: first the question, then the answer. Question: What is the difference between the heterodox master's faulting the treatise master here for [advocating] causelessness, and the treatise master's faulting the opponent above for causelessness? Answer: Previously, the opponent held that the person and dharmas exist; person and dharmas were each established without needing to depend on each other, and thus fell into causelessness. Now it is explained that there is no person or dharma at all, so there is nothing that can depend on each other; this is why they differ. “Answer: This karma arises from multiple conditions” onward is the second [part], the answer; first the prose, then the verse. Refuting this view has three approaches in all: First, since your [notion of] cause cannot be established, how could there be causelessness? Thus all five propositions are unobtainable. Second, existence and non-existence both arise from your mind: previously you asserted existence, but once existence was sought and found nowhere, you then saw non-existence; these are entirely your existence and your non-existence, and have nothing to do with me. Third, what was explained above as non-existent was merely the non-existence of the five kinds of person and dharmas seen by you, not the non-existence of a provisionally designated, dependently arisen person and dharmas. This single answer contains many facets: First, the above explanation of no person and no dharma refuted their view of existence; now, explaining the provisionally designated person and dharmas remedies their mindset of annihilationism, demonstrating the meaning of neither existence nor non-existence, neither annihilation nor permanence. Second, the above explanation of neither person nor dharma is the middle way; now, explaining dependently arisen person and dharmas is termed provisional designation; this is the meaning of the middle preceding the provisional, and the provisional following the middle. Third, the above explanation of neither person nor dharma is the emptiness of intrinsic nature; now, explaining dependently arisen person and dharmas is the emptiness of dependent origination, whereby person and dharmas can be established. Hence the old saying of the mountain tradition: “Within the emptiness of intrinsic nature all dharmas are established.” Fourth, the above explanation of no person and no dharma is conventional truth refuting intrinsic nature and speaking of emptiness, which is the middle way of conventional truth; now, explaining dependently arisen person and dharmas is the middle way: conventional dependently arisen person and dharmas have never been person and dharmas, which is called neither person nor dharma, termed the emptiness of dependent origination, which is the middle way of ultimate truth. Question: This merely explains dependently arisen person and dharmas; where is the text for “neither person nor dharma”? Answer: The text is clearly shown in the prose following the verse. Fifth, the above explanation of the absence of the five kinds of person and dharmas is refuting errors; now, explaining dependently arisen person and dharmas is elucidating the sūtras. The verse is divided into two: the first three lines explain that there are dependently arisen person and dharmas. The single line “there is no other thing” discriminates that there are none of the opponent's five kinds of person and dharmas. The statements on middle and provisional in a certain master's opening chapter were all formulated relying on this passage of the Chapter on the Agent. The faults of the four pairs in the opening chapter are the preceding faulting of the opponent's view that person and dharmas do not depend on each other; the correctness of the four pairs is the meaning in this passage that person and dharmas depend on each other. Therefore, the statements in the opening chapter originated from this passage. Middle and provisional arising from this chapter means: demonstrating that the opponent's intrinsically existent person and dharmas are unobtainable, being neither person nor dharma, is the meaning of the middle preceding the provisional. Dependently arisen person and dharmas is the meaning of the provisional preceding the middle. Dependently arisen person and dharmas being neither person nor dharma is called the meaning of the middle following the provisional. Neither person nor dharma being provisionally designated as person and dharmas is the meaning of the provisional following the middle. Although the Sanlun masters recite the words of middle and provisional in the opening chapter, they do not know the source in the text; hence I indicate it briefly here. The prose stating “karma is initially determinately non-existent” simply means that karma initially lacks determinacy; the rest is all easy to understand. Furthermore, from “Just as refuting action and agent” onward is the second [part], refuting experience and experiencer; its sequence is as before.

6.9

Chapter 9: Examination of the Prior Entity

6.10

There are eight reasons in all for the appearance of this chapter: First, the preceding refuted action and agent, which refuted the function of person and dharmas; this chapter next refutes the substance of person and dharmas. Fundamentally, there is a soul and the sense faculties, and only then is there the function of action. Although their function was refuted above, their root was not yet eradicated, so it must be refuted. Second, the preceding separately refuted [a self that is] identical to the aggregates; now it refutes [a self that is] separate from the aggregates. Third, the preceding comprehensively refuted five kinds of person and dharmas: 1. person and dharmas both existing; 2. person and dharmas both non-existing; 3. person and dharmas half-existing and half-non-existing; 4. person existing while dharmas do not, or dharmas existing while person does not; 5. one person with three dharmas, or one dharma with three persons. Thus it comprehensively refuted all persons and dharmas. Now this single chapter refutes the first proposition again—namely, that person and dharmas both exist—because the illness of existence is hard to eliminate and the two emptinesses are hard to believe; therefore this single chapter extensively refutes the existence of person and dharmas. Fourth, the preceding comprehensively refuted all selves—identical, separate, both identical and separate, neither identical nor separate; now this single chapter separately refutes the assertion of a self separate from the aggregates. In singling out the separate [self] for refutation among identical and separate: asserting a person and asserting dharmas mostly claims that dharmas are different from the person, and the person is different from dharmas; this is the common inclination of the deluded, a general view of both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Moreover, the Vātsīputrīyas say: when the five aggregates assemble, there is a distinct person. The Tattvasiddhi masters say: dharmas are real, while the person is provisional; thus this is the sense that there is a person separate from dharmas, which is why it must be particularly refuted. Fifth, this treatise primarily refutes the internal [Buddhist schools] and secondarily refutes external [non-Buddhists]; the Chapter on Action and Agent already concluded refuting the internal person and dharmas, and now this single chapter next refutes the heterodox person and dharmas. Question: How is it known that this chapter refutes heterodox views? Answer: The later prose text states, “Some treatise masters say that this inhalation, exhalation, winking, and so forth are the characteristics of the soul”; this is Ulūka’s assertion, so we know it refutes the heterodox. Sixth, hitherto it has refuted the action of a provisional person in saṃsāra; this single chapter specifically refutes Mahāyāna practitioners who consider Buddha-nature to be the support of the mundane and supramundane, which encompasses the beginning and end, mundane and supramundane. As Mahāyāna practitioners say: the fundamentally existent tathāgatagarbha serves as the support and foundation of saṃsāra, and saṃsāra relies on the tathāgatagarbha, termed the “prior entity.” Saṃsāra has arising and ceasing, while the tathāgatagarbha neither arises nor ceases, and the tathāgatagarbha exists separate from the aggregates. Thus the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: “The self is precisely the meaning of the tathāgatagarbha.” Hence we know that ātman, Buddha-nature, tathāgatagarbha, and amalavijñāna are all different names for the prior entity. The Abhidharma masters say: it is not merely that there is a mental soul; having a mental soul, there must be the principle of attaining Buddhahood. Therefore the mental soul is the basis, unlike grass and trees which are entirely confined to a single transformation. They also say that ultimate truth is the basis; ultimate truth is non-abiding, and thus all dharmas are established from the non-abiding basis. Question: If so, should this chapter refute the Nirvāṇa Sūtra? Answer: Buddha-nature is in truth neither existent nor non-existent, neither identical nor separate, never having beginning or end; yet the deluded arbitrarily cling to it as existent, which is Buddha-nature as prapañca. Now it refutes their prapañca regarding the nature as real; it does not refute Buddha-nature. Hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: “Sever grasping and attachment, but do not sever the view of self; the view of self is Buddha-nature.” Seventh, it follows from the preceding statements on remedying annihilationism. The above stated: there are a provisional person and provisional dharmas, but no real person and dharmas. The opponent says: although provisional and real differ, in the end there are person and dharmas. You say that dependent on dharmas there is a person, and dependent on a person there are dharmas; I also explain that dependent on the prior entity there are the dharmas of eyes and ears, and due to the dharmas of eyes and ears there is a prior entity; this is also person and dharmas depending on each other. Eighth, not accepting the treatise master's refutation above: You should not say there is no person and no dharma at all; now there is truly a person named the “prior entity”; because there is a prior entity, there are the faculties such as eyes and ears. If there were no prior entity, who would have these? As for what is called “prior entity” (ben-zhu), it has three meanings in all: First, the soul is fundamentally (ben) existent, hence called “fundamental”; it abides (zhu) prior to the faculties, and is designated as “abiding.” This is merely the name of a person. Second, the soul serves as the basis (ben) for the faculties, and the faculties abide (zhu) relying on the soul, hence called “prior entity.” This derives its name from the basis. Third, the soul is fundamentally (ben) existent, hence called “fundamental”; the faculties arise later and abide (zhu) relying on it, hence called “abiding.” This is a general designation for person and dharmas.

6.11

The chapter has twelve verses, divided into three parts: first, refuting the prior entity, explaining the meaning of the emptiness of sentient beings; second, refuting the sense faculties, explaining the meaning of the emptiness of dharmas; third, rebuking the non-Buddhists for falsely positing person and dharmas. The first two sections examine existence and show it is non-existent; the next section rebukes taking non-existence as existence. The first part is further divided into three: first, examining the non-existence of a prior entity prior to the six sense faculties, also called outside the six sense faculties; second, examining the non-existence of a prior entity within the six sense faculties; third, examining the non-existence of a prior entity amidst the four great elements. This is seeking selflessness in all places: when people of Hīnayāna capacity hear it, they attain the first fruit; when people of Mahāyāna hear it, they attain the ten abodes. The first of these has two parts: first, establishing [the opponent's position]; next, refuting it. The establishing has two parts: first, using dharmas to prove the person; second, using the person to prove dharmas. Each of the two sections has two parts. As for the first text having two parts: three lines present dharmas as a question; 'that is then named the prior entity'—this single line is the answer. In the second, the first half of the verse is the question; 'therefore one should know'—the latter half is the answer. The reason for posing this question and answer is that neither accepts the treatise master's refutation above of no agent and no action; therefore, they now raise the existence of person and dharmas to challenge the treatise master's assertion of non-existence, thereby manifesting their own tenet and explaining the meaning of existence. Question: Why does the treatise master not explicitly name their school, but only say 'someone says'? Answer: If he singled out a particular sectarian doctrine, he could not universally refute all schools; now, wishing to universally refute all schools, he says 'someone says.' Question: How is it known that this is the true ātman / Buddha-nature? Answer: The conception of a true ātman / Buddha-nature necessarily holds it to be fundamentally existent, whereas birth-and-death is illusory and called newly arisen; if both were fundamentally existent, then both would be real; if both were newly arisen, then both would be illusory. The present text also posits that the prior entity is fundamentally existent and the sense faculties are newly arisen, so we know it is the doctrine of a true ātman / Buddha-nature. The prose says 'life-faculty and so forth': according to the Sarvāstivādins, there is separately a dharma neither form nor mind that is the life-faculty; the Tattvasiddhi takes karma as the life-faculty. From 'The reply is' below is the second, the refutation. It opens into three sections: first, refutation by demanding the characteristic; second, refutation by reductio ad absurdum; third, refutation by interrogating the thesis. These introduce the three refutations: the first verse directly demands the characteristic; the next verse parallels the substances; the third interrogates the thesis. Having posited an ātman separate from the aggregates, [Nāgārjuna] therefore demands to find a characteristic separate from the aggregates; failing to obtain a characteristic, an ātman-substance is established in vain, hence he next parallels the substances; when the outsider's clinging is pressed hard by the reductio, they become confused and overturned, hence he interrogates their thesis. Furthermore, the first uses the characteristic to interrogate the substance; the next parallels dharmas with the person; the next adduces non-separation to refute separation. The verse has two parts: the upper three lines demand it. Since before the six sense faculties exist the ātman already exists, by what characteristic is it known? Because the six sense faculties do not yet exist, one cannot use the six sense faculties to prove its existence. Second, [one] asks: after depending on the sense faculties, by what characteristic is it known? Pain, pleasure, and so forth are mental characteristics; seeing, hearing, and so forth are bodily characteristics. Aside from these two, what is taken as the characteristic of the ātman? If one still takes these two characteristics, then they are still what is obtained through the six sense faculties, and cannot be a separate intrinsic nature; there ought to be a separate characteristic. Moreover, ultimately taking the aggregates as the characteristic, it is never separate from the aggregates, and outside the aggregates there is no ātman. Furthermore, outside the aggregates there is no separate characteristic, nor is there a separate substance outside the aggregates. If there were an ātman-substance distinct from the substance of the aggregates, there would also be an ātman-characteristic distinct from the characteristics of the aggregates. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Although these non-Buddhists speak of a self in various ways, it is never separate from the aggregates, realms, and bases.' Furthermore, if there is no characteristic of the ātman and one points to the aggregates as the characteristic of the ātman, that is like pointing to a horse as the characteristic of an ox, or pointing to water as the characteristic of fire. Moreover, since it lacks any characteristic, there is no ātman; previously you used the existence of dharmas to prove that the person exists, but I now use the absence of a characteristic to prove that the person does not exist. Question: The old theory says that sentient beings fundamentally possess the principle of attaining Buddhahood; since the principle of attaining Buddhahood is fundamentally existent, sentient beings must also be fundamentally existent. If sentient beings are newly arisen while the principle of attaining Buddhahood is fundamentally existent, to whom does this principle belong? In the prose, the first part has three aspects: first, identifying the demand for the characteristic; from 'Like external dharmas' down is the second, presenting the demand for the characteristic; from 'As the sūtra says' down is the third, concluding the demand for the characteristic. From 'Question' down is the second, the rescue. Inhalation and exhalation are bodily characteristics; pain, pleasure, and so forth are mental characteristics; they again use the two characteristics of body and mind to prove the existence of the ātman. Question: This is the doctrine of the non-Buddhist Ulūka; how can it be said to refute the true ātman / Buddha-nature? Answer: The conception of a true ātman / Buddha-nature is identical to Ulūka's doctrine. The true ātman is permanent and illusion is impermanent; Ulūka is also like this. Furthermore, now explaining that the non-Buddhist puts forward this rescue is precisely refuting the internal Buddhist: because the outsider makes this rescue, this makes clear that the internal doctrine is identical to the non-Buddhist, and thus it refutes the internal. From 'The reply is' down is the third, the refutation of the rescue. This again has four parts: first, refutation by demanding the locus; from 'If it is held' down is the second, refutation by grasping the intent; from 'Furthermore, if it is said that the body is large' down is the third, refutation via the approach of impermanence; from 'Furthermore, like a madness caused by wind disease' down is the fourth, refutation via lack of mastery. The four refutations reveal four meanings: first, demanding the locus refutes [the self] through the gateway of emptiness, showing selflessness; next, grasping the intent reveals selflessness through the meaning of suffering; third, the approach of impermanence reveals selflessness; fourth, lack of mastery reveals selflessness. Because non-Buddhists do not comprehend the suffering, emptiness, and impermanence of birth-and-death, he refutes them with these four meanings. From 'Thus in various ways' down is the fourth, the general conclusion. From 'If it is firmly held that separate from the eye' onward is the second, the refutation by reductio ad absurdum. The verse has two parts: the first half reiterates the premise; the second half parallels it. First, drawing an analogy from the person to dharmas: your person and dharmas are separate from each other, and so do not depend on each other; if the person is separate from dharmas and exists prior to dharmas, then dharmas must also be separate from the person and exist prior to the person. If the person is prior and dharmas are posterior, the person is permanent and dharmas are impermanent; if dharmas are prior and the person is posterior, dharmas are permanent and the person is impermanent. Moreover, if both were prior, both should be permanent; if both were posterior, both should be impermanent. Furthermore, you say the person is prior and dharmas posterior; it should also be that dharmas are prior and the person posterior. Second, drawing an analogy from dharmas to the person: dharmas must necessarily depend on the person, and the person must also necessarily depend on dharmas. Question: Since there is a person separate from dharmas, it is logically so that there are dharmas separate from the person; this is the other's own doctrine, so how is it a refutation by reductio? Answer: Looking at the text with a crude mind, it only appears to be so. The intention here is to make it so that dharmas exist prior to and separate from the person; one must include the word 'prior', otherwise it is not a refutation. The reason for posing this objection is that the person is the person of dharmas, and dharmas are the dharmas of the person, just like fuel and fire. The non-Buddhist rescues it by saying: 'Just as the earth is prior and grass and trees are posterior.' This is not so: we currently see that there is earth, but we truly do not see an ātman. Furthermore, prior to dharmas one does not see a person yet says the person is prior; likewise, prior to the person one does not see dharmas, so one should say dharmas are prior. Moreover, for a person to exist prior when dharmas do not yet exist is like having horns prior when an ox does not yet exist. The contemporary doctrine of a true ātman / Buddha-nature established by Mahāyāna practitioners who hold to attainment is largely identical. How is this known? They hold that Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent and deluded conceptualization is not fundamentally existent; thus we know that prior to the existence of deluded sentient beings, Buddha-nature exists beforehand. If both delusion and the real were fundamentally existent, then both should be permanent or both impermanent. Now we further ask: since Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent before deluded sentient beings exist, to whom does this Buddha-nature belong? Whose Buddha-nature is it? If one says that only when there are sentient beings is there Buddha-nature, since sentient beings are newly arisen, Buddha-nature should also be newly arisen; since Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent, sentient beings should also be fundamentally existent. If one says that the Buddha did not speak of a beginning for sentient beings: although the Buddha did not speak of a beginning for sentient beings, the Buddha said that sentient beings are impermanent, and what is impermanent is not fundamentally existent. Yet Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent; so prior to sentient beings, Buddha-nature exists—to what person does Buddha-nature belong? From 'Question: If the two things are separate, let it be so' down arises the third, interrogating the thesis. The outsider has no way to resolve the reductio, so they turn around in distress, hence this question arises. In the answer, the first half reiterates the thesis, and the second half interrogates the thesis. 'Through dharmas one knows there is a person' reiterates their first verse, adducing dharmas to prove the person. 'Through the person one knows there are dharmas' reiterates the second verse, using the person to prove there are dharmas. As for the second half's dual interrogation: 'Separate from dharmas, how is there a person?' interrogates the first thesis. 'Separate from the person, how are there dharmas?' interrogates the second thesis. There are differing Sanlun masters who claim this is a refutation based on the mutual dependence of person and dharmas; this is simply because they have not read the prose text. The reason for making this refutation is that above it explained that both are separate, while here it explains that both are not separate. Previously, explaining that both are separate used separation to refute their doctrine of separation; now, joining separation, it uses non-separation to refute their doctrine of separation, so they are cornered whether advancing or retreating.

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中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese