中觀論疏 7.42

7.42

From 'If prior to that which can be bound there is a binding' downward is the second verse, next refuting binding by another. The reason for this refutation is that above it was clarified that whether with a body or without a body, both lack bondage. The opponent now rescues their position, saying: 'Because there is a body, bondage is discussed; but the meaning of bondage has two aspects: first, the five aggregates are the binder and the sentient being is the bound; second, the defilements within the aggregate of formations are the binder and the five aggregates are the bound. Therefore there are a binder and a bound, without falling into the fault of two bodies.' The first half grants this: If prior to that which can be bound there were separately a binder, one should bring that binder to bind what can be bound. Just as if prior to and apart from the sentient being there were separately the five aggregates, one should bring the five aggregates to bind the sentient being. Now, prior to and apart from the sentient being there are no separate five aggregates; how could one bring the five aggregates to bind the sentient being? The reason for making this refutation is precisely that the combination of the five aggregates constitutes a sentient being; before there is a sentient being, there cannot beforehand be the five aggregates; how could the five aggregates bind the sentient being? Furthermore, 'sentient being' is the collective name for the five aggregates; if one takes 'sentient being', there are no separate five aggregates that can bind the sentient being. The Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'Name-and-form binds sentient beings, and sentient beings bind name-and-form. Name-and-form accomplishing sentient beings is precisely name-and-form binding sentient beings. Sentient beings controlling name-and-form is precisely sentient beings binding name-and-form.' The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa also says: 'Name-and-form binds sentient beings, and sentient beings bind name-and-form.' It is just this sentient being that is bound, and just this sentient being that is liberated, like a rope tying itself and untying itself, without any other thing. One cannot say there is a separate name-and-form to bind the sentient being, nor can one say there is a separate sentient being that receives the bondage of name-and-form. Question: Does 'If prior to that which can be...' directly refute the person binding dharmas, or directly refute dharmas binding the person? Answer: It refutes both. The former refutes the person binding dharmas. Since it was stated above that the body of the five aggregates cannot have a binder and a bound, as one person would have two bodies, now the meaning is taken to explain that if the person is the binder and the body is the bound, there would be agent and object. Therefore it is now said: prior to and apart from the five aggregates that can be bound, there is no person; who binds the five aggregates? The text is precisely this. Also, prior to and apart from the five aggregates, there are no separate defilements; how can it be said that defilements bind the five aggregates? When the prose says, 'If apart from the five aggregates there were a separate sentient being,' it refutes the non-Buddhist and Vātsīputrīya view of a provisional existent having a real substance. Refuting defilements binding the five aggregates refutes the view of the Abhidharma theorists. The former refutes the school positing a self, and the latter refutes the school positing no self; those who posit bondage and liberation do not go beyond these two. Question: The Abhidharma theorists say that defilements arise in the mind within the aggregate of formations and bind the remaining five aggregates. How can you say that apart from the five aggregates there are no defilements? The answer says: They explain that the four aggregates arise simultaneously; when the binder exists, there are no separate pure five aggregates that are to be bound; when the wholesome or indeterminate five aggregates exist, there is no aggregate of defilements that acts as the binder. Furthermore, when the aggregates are defiled, they need not be bound again; when the aggregates are pure, there is no defilement coming to bind them. Furthermore, defilements are precisely the defiled aggregates; when the aggregates are defiled, their substance does not bind itself; when the aggregates are pure, there is no defilement coming to bind them. How can it be said that there are a binder and a bound?