中觀論疏 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

Above it was said that there is neither saṃsāra nor a beginning point. An opponent says: "The sūtras state, 'Saṃsāra is suffering; nirvāṇa is bliss.' Now, since there is suffering, there is saṃsāra; and if there is saṃsāra, there must be a beginning, an end, and an interval in between. Second, it is explained that when the Tathāgata was first born, he immediately proclaimed that the three realms are all suffering; hence we know that this teaching is the very source of the Buddha's dispensation. Now, since this teaching exists, we know that suffering exists; because suffering exists, saṃsāra exists. If there were no saṃsāra, what thing would the Buddha have called suffering? Third, the very reason the author of this treatise refutes things must be his wish to pull sentient beings out of suffering and give them bliss. If he did not wish to pull them out of suffering and give bliss, why would he engage in refutation? Since he wishes to pull sentient beings out of suffering, and suffering is precisely saṃsāra, one should not say that there are no sentient beings and no saṃsāra. Fourth, he wishes to explain the profound and essential contemplations of the Mahāyāna, as the Pañcaviṃśati states: 'Form is neither permanent nor impermanent, neither suffering nor bliss.' And as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Pervasively penetrating the five aggregates of appropriation to be empty and unarisen is called the meaning of suffering.' The bodhisattva understands suffering to be without suffering; therefore, there being no suffering, there is ultimate truth. For this reason this chapter is spoken. Fifth, it is to pull sentient beings out of suffering and give them bliss that this chapter is spoken. If one genuinely sees suffering to exist, then one cannot become free from suffering; it is truly because of understanding suffering to be without suffering that one is able to be free from suffering." Question: What is called suffering? Answer: Śākyamuni's entire teaching career contains briefly three approaches: first, explaining one suffering; next, explaining three sufferings; and finally, explaining eight sufferings. As for the "one suffering," when the Buddha fell to earth upon his first birth, he immediately walked seven steps, pointed one hand to heaven and one to earth, and spoke the gāthā: "Above heaven and below heaven, only I am supreme. The three realms are all suffering; what could there be to enjoy?" This is the teaching of one suffering. Question: What is meant by "one suffering"? Answer: One explanation says that all three realms have painful sensation, and therefore all are the suffering of suffering. The Tattvasiddhi states: "All three realms have painful sensation, differing only in being heavy or light." A second says that all three realms are constituted by the suffering of conditioned existence; because of the suffering of conditioned existence, all are suffering. A third says that generally speaking of all sufferings is called "one suffering." Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: "There is no safety in the three realms, just like a burning house; there are always the worries and tribulations of birth, old age, sickness, and death." Because the three realms equally have this tribulation, it is called "one suffering." The Dharmaskandha Abhidharma states: "The desire realm is called the suffering of suffering, the form realm is called the suffering of change, and the formless realm has the suffering of conditioned existence." Because the three realms possess all three sufferings, it says that the three realms are all suffering. Question: Why is that so? Answer: According to the Abhidharma doctrine, the desire realm has painful sensation, and hence is called the suffering of suffering. The form realm has no painful sensation but only pleasant sensation, and when pleasant sensation deteriorates it gives rise to suffering, which is called the suffering of change. The formless realm has no physical form and the meaning of deterioration is not apparent, but it is merely driven by impermanence; hence it is called the suffering of conditioned existence. This is the teaching of one suffering. Next, regarding the explanation of the three sufferings, there are two kinds of three sufferings: first, the suffering explained by the Sāṃkhyas, as set forth in the Commentary on the Śata-śāstra; second, as the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: "Painful sensation is called the suffering of suffering; the other two sensations are the suffering of change and the suffering of conditioned existence." Various masters have forced interpretations and divergent theories abound, yet none has grasped its gateway. Now I merely rely on what is stated by the Tripiṭaka Master in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya: "Regarding suffering: when sensation arises it is painful, when it abides it is painful, and when it ceases it is pleasant; because painful sensation is painful both at the time of arising and abiding, it is given the name 'suffering of suffering.' Pleasant sensation is pleasant when it arises and pleasant when it abides, and is painful only when its fruition deteriorates; therefore pleasant sensation is called 'the suffering of change.' With neutral sensation, the sense of suffering is not apparent at any of the three times of arising, abiding, or deterioration, but being driven by impermanence, neutral sensation is termed 'the suffering of conditioned existence.'" The Tattvasiddhi masters say: If classified according to planes of existence, the three bad destinies are painful sensation, which is the suffering of suffering; humans and gods up to the third dhyāna are pleasant sensation, which is the suffering of change; the fourth dhyāna up to the station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is neutral sensation, which is the suffering of conditioned existence. If classified according to principle, each and every plane possesses all three sufferings, but in the upper two realms the three sufferings are light, while in the lower realm suffering is heavy. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says, "The suffering of death in the higher realms is worse than that among humans," hence we know that the higher realms also have painful sensation, unlike the Sarvāstivādins who hold that the higher realms have no painful sensation whatsoever. If one encounters pleasant conditions, pleasant sensation arises; if one beholds hated enemies, painful sensation arises; if neither enemy nor kin, neutral sensation arises—these three conditions give rise to the three sensations. Just as when cold, encountering fire is pleasant; drawing closer so that it burns is painful sensation; and in between the two is neutral sensation: thus a single fire-condition fully gives rise to three sensations. Next, as for the teaching of the eight sufferings: dwelling for ten months in the prison of the womb, fully experiencing boiling and burning, and upon first being born, the cold air touching the body is no different from hell—this is called the suffering of birth. The Lotus Sūtra says: "Hair white and face wrinkled, teeth sparse and form withered away, thinking that his death will not be long"—this is called the suffering of old age. When one great element is out of harmony there are a hundred and one ailments; when in total the four great elements run contrary there are four hundred and four ailments—this is called the suffering of illness. Death is the ultimate grief under heaven: the wind of the blade dismembers the form, the body is severed and the consciousness departs—this is called the suffering of death. Father to the east and son to the west, elder brother to the south and younger brother to the north—this is called the suffering of separation from the beloved. Gathering together with what is unloved—this is called the suffering of encountering what is hated. Matters sought after not complying with one's wishes—this is called the suffering of not getting what one seeks. Possessing these five aggregates, all sufferings blaze fiercely—this is called the suffering of the five blazingly rampant aggregates. Moreover, these five aggregates abundantly contain all sufferings, and hence are called the suffering of the five blazingly rampant aggregates. Question: How do the eight sufferings subsume the three sufferings? Answer: The Nirvāṇa-sūtra says, "Birth possesses five kinds," so within birth the three sufferings are fully contained. In detailed analysis, old age, illness, and death possess all three sufferings; broadly classified, they comprise the two sufferings of conditioned existence and change. Death and separation from the beloved are the suffering of change; encountering what is hated is the suffering of suffering; not getting what one seeks has two: first, seeking wholesome dharmas and not obtaining them is the suffering of change; second, not being free from unwholesome dharmas is the suffering of suffering. This is the explanation by [Master] Zhaoti. If explained according to the three sufferings in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, it can be known that among these eight sufferings, since having painful sensation necessarily entails the two [other] sufferings, one knows that the eight sufferings all possess the three sufferings; but the Sarvāstivādins and the Tattvasiddhi differ in their understanding of suffering. The Sarvāstivādins say: The three categories of form, mind, and [non-concurrent dharmas] are all suffering. Why so? All conditioned dharmas desire to abide in pleasure, but now they are pressed by impermanence; therefore all are suffering. The Tattvasiddhi says: "Only the mind is suffering; the other two categories are without suffering. As for the sūtras stating that form is all suffering, this is an instrument of suffering, and hence is called suffering." Although the Sarvāstivādins say that both form and mind are suffering, it is defiled dharmas that are suffering because of being pressed by impermanence. When undefiled dharmas are pressed by impermanence, they accord with nirvāṇa, and therefore are not suffering. The Tattvasiddhi explains that both defiled and undefiled dharmas are entirely suffering. Following the subsequent text, the non-Buddhists explain suffering in the narrowest way: only painful sensation is suffering. Question: Does saṃsāra have pleasure, or is it devoid of pleasure? Answer: Kaishan says that saṃsāra is truly suffering and entirely devoid of pleasure; it is merely that within painful dharmas, one mistakenly gives rise to the conception of pleasure and says that pleasure exists. Zhuangyan says: Although there is no real pleasure within saṃsāra, there is illusory pleasure. Illusory pleasure is mixed with the suffering of conditioned existence; when grasping signs evokes impermanent wholesomeness, it evokes pleasure. Now, because wholesomeness that grasps signs evokes pleasure, pleasure is illusory. However, although the two masters differ in their explanation of pleasure, they agree in stating that saṃsāra contains real suffering. The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya says: "Saṃsāra has pleasure, but pleasure is little and suffering is much; therefore it is said that all is suffering." Kātyāyana adopts this view. Fascicle forty-two of the Mahāvibhāṣā asks: "Is there pleasure within the aggregates or not? If there is, why is pleasure not spoken of? If there is not, why did the Buddha teach three sensations? Answer: It should be said like this: There is pleasure within the aggregates, but because pleasure is little, just like a jar of poison into which a single drop of honey falls, on account of that one drop of honey it is not called a honey-jar, but because poison is much it is called a poison-jar. Another explanation: In reality there is no pleasure, and therefore only the truth of suffering is taught. That three sensations are spoken of is merely that when one experiences severe suffering, looking toward mild suffering it is taken as pleasure. Just like experiencing the suffering of hell, looking toward the suffering of animals it is taken as pleasure." These two masters differ from Kaishan and Zhuangyan: Kaishan and Zhuangyan debated whether illusory pleasure exists or not; now the debate is between real pleasure existing and real pleasure not existing. Now regarding the refutation: among the great afflictions of beings, none exceeds suffering. The ninety-six heterodox arts all vie to seek release from it, but failing to reach its causes, they give rise to four kinds of delusions. Although the five hundred different sects recognize the causes of suffering, they have not plumbed its root; clinging rigidly to fixed intrinsic nature, the fruits of suffering do not cease, and they further create causes of suffering. Now, wishing to show that the suffering of dependent origination has no fixed intrinsic nature, so that the fruits of suffering may be made to cease and causes of suffering are not generated, this is why it is called the 'Chapter on Examining Suffering.'"

7.4

This chapter has ten gāthās, divided into three sections: the first gāthā generally negates the four views; the second section of eight gāthās explains and refutes the four views; the third section of one gāthā applies the refutation by analogy to all dharmas. In the first gāthā, the first half takes up [the views] and the second half generally negates them. In explaining the four views, there are generally two kinds: first, four views concerning persons; second, four views concerning dharmas. As for the four concerning persons, these are four views of non-Buddhists: first, saying that suffering is self-made, namely that the self within the body makes this suffering; second, saying that Maheśvara creates the suffering of the six destinies, which is called other-made; third, saying that at the beginning of the kalpa there was first one man and one woman who gave birth to all sentient beings, which is precisely jointly made; fourth, saying that this fruit of suffering exists spontaneously, which is called causelessly made. Second, worldly people say: 'I myself committed wrongdoing, and I myself suffer the pain.' They also say: 'I committed no fault, but someone else inflicts suffering upon me,' which is called other-made. Third, they say: 'Because I committed a fault, someone else inflicts suffering upon me,' which is called jointly made. Fourth, they say: 'Unaware of being made by oneself or another, suffering arises for no apparent reason,' which is called causelessly made. As for the four concerning dharmas: there are those who say that the suffering of the five aggregates is its own substantial entity, and from its own entity gives rise to its own entity, just as the occurrence of fire arises from fire-nature, which is self-made. There are those who say that the suffering of the five aggregates arises from preceding five aggregates, which is called other-made suffering. There are those who say jointly made, in that relying on the preceding five aggregates, subsequently there is its own entity, which therefore is called jointly made. The first thought of ignorance arising while relying on space is causelessly made. As for the second half stating 'regarding the fruit, none are so,' the four makings are the causes, and the fruit is suffering. The Lotus Sūtra says: 'As for the source of all sufferings, greed and craving are the root.' Now, contemplating that suffering arises from conditions and thus has no intrinsic nature, one then enters into the true aspect and severs greed and craving; therefore all sufferings do not arise. Question: Is it because there is no fruit of suffering that 'regarding the fruit, none are so,' or is it because they run contrary to the fruit of suffering that they are not so? Answer: It possesses two meanings. First, the four lines above do not recognize the fruit of suffering, and hence it says 'none are so'; second, the treatise master correctly [demonstrates that] dependent origination produces suffering, and suffering produced by dependent origination is identical with the nature of quiescence, and hence he explains that there is no suffering. It possesses both of these.

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Next, the eight verses of explanation and refutation have two parts: first, seven verses explain neither self[-made] nor other[-made]; next, one verse explains neither shared nor causeless. The seven verses have three parts: first, two verses clarify that phenomena (dharmas) are neither self[-made] nor other[-made]; next, three verses clarify that the person is neither self[-made] nor other[-made]; third, two verses conclude that person and phenomena are neither self[-made] nor other[-made]. The two verses have two parts: the first verse clarifies that phenomena are not self-made; the next verse clarifies that phenomena are not other-made. The first verse states: if suffering were self-made, the meaning of causes and conditions would be lost; the second half explains: these five aggregates arise from the preceding five aggregates, how could this be called self-made? If self-made, it should arise from itself. The second verse states: if one says that the arising of the later five aggregates from the preceding five aggregates is called other-made, this is not correct; the preceding five aggregates are the cause and the later five aggregates are the effect—how could cause and effect be called 'other'? Therefore it is not other-made. If one says it is other, that is not the meaning of cause and effect. From 'Question: The maker is a person' downwards, these three verses clarify that the person is neither self nor other. The three verses have two parts: the first verse clarifies that the person is not self[-made]; the next two verses clarify that the person is not other[-made]. The preceding two verses refuted phenomena, which generally refuted the Sarvāstivādins; now it does not refute the Sarvāstivādins, because the Sarvāstivādins do not postulate a person, but only refutes the non-Buddhists, the *Tattvasiddhi*, and different sects that assert that a person acts. The general meaning of the three verses here is very easy: it directly clarifies that outside the aggregates there is no person—who makes it of oneself, and who makes it of another? If there were a person outside the aggregates, one could grant that this person acts of oneself or another person acts. Question: If outside the aggregates there is no person, one may say there is no making by self or other; if one grants that the person is identical to the aggregates, could there be making by self or other or not? Answer: If one grants that the person is identical to the aggregates, this is still just the aggregates. Above, the refutation that the aggregates are neither self nor other has already been concluded, therefore there is no need to refute [a person] identical to the aggregates as self or other. 'If suffering is made by another person'—these two verses refute making by another person. The two verses have two parts: the first verse clarifies that outside the aggregates there is no person, so who experiences the suffering? The second verse clarifies that outside the aggregates there is no person, so who imparts the suffering? 'Furthermore, if self-made is not established'—the two verses below conclude the refutation of self and other: the first verse concludes that the person is neither self nor other; the next verse concludes that phenomena are neither self nor other. The first half of the first verse proceeds by the approach of mutual dependence, and the second half proceeds by the approach of mutual identity. As for the approach of mutual dependence: dependent on 'self', 'other' exists; since 'self' is already not established, 'other' is also not established. As for mutual identity: 'other' in relation to that other is itself 'self'. 'Furthermore, suffering is not called self-made'—this clarifies that phenomena are neither self nor other: the first half refutes self, and the second half refutes other. 'A phenomenon does not make itself' gives an analogy, just as a knife does not cut itself and an eye does not see itself—how could suffering make itself? The second half clarifies 'that has no intrinsic entity': that in relation to that is itself 'self'; if there were an intrinsic entity of that, one could speak of that [acting]; since there is no intrinsic entity of that, how could there be making by that?

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From 'Question' downwards, this generates the one verse of the second section, which refutes shared making and causeless making; it is easy to see.

7.7

'Furthermore, it is not only of suffering that it is spoken'—this is the third, single verse of the chapter, which analogously refutes the remaining phenomena. This verse does not refute the Sarvāstivādins' meaning of suffering. The Sarvāstivādins clarify that the contaminated five aggregates are suffering; if the refutation of suffering is concluded, contaminated phenomena are completely exhausted. Now, external mountains, trees, and the like are all contaminated; therefore, now for the sake of the *Tattvasiddhi* masters, it clarifies that only mind is suffering, while form and unmanifest [matter] are not suffering. The *Tattvasiddhi* masters have two explanations: one says that the two minds of consciousness and conception do not yet have suffering, and only upon reaching feeling is there suffering. The next says that the two minds of consciousness and conception already have suffering, but the feeling aggregate is merely classified as third. Yet both masters agree in clarifying that form and unmanifest [matter] are not suffering, but merely instruments of suffering. Non-Buddhists hold that only painful feeling is suffering, while pleasant feelings and so forth are not suffering. Since these two kinds of people define suffering narrowly, therefore, having finished refuting suffering, one must further analogously refute the remaining phenomena that are not suffering.

7.8

Chapter 13: Examination of Formations

7.9

It is produced on account of three meanings. First: the preceding examination of suffering refuted the effect; now, refuting formations means emptying their cause. Because sentient beings produce the three types of formations, they experience the effects of the three realms: as producing transgressive actions leads to retributive birth in the three bad destinies, producing meritorious actions leads to birth in the human and heavenly realms, and performing immovable actions leads to birth in the form and formless realms—by this meaning we know that formations are causes. Second: it explains the meaning of suffering above. The reason why conditioned phenomena are suffering is precisely because they fluctuate, arise, act, and are shifted by arising and ceasing; therefore they are suffering. Now, since there are formations of arising and ceasing, one should know that there is suffering. Third: from the chapter 'Examination of Conditions' onward, real persons and real phenomena have been refuted; now this chapter washes away illusory persons and illusory phenomena. An opponent clings: 'Although real persons and real phenomena cannot be found, illusory persons and illusory phenomena are certainly not nonexistent; and in contrast to the illusory persons and phenomena of saṃsāra, there are supramundane real persons and real phenomena.' Question: Are formations only causes, or do they also extend to effects? Answer: It possesses both meanings. If one explains the meaning of formations by fluctuating, arising, acting, and never stopping moment to moment, then all conditioned phenomena, irrespective of cause and effect, are equally called formations. Therefore the sūtra states: 'All formations are impermanent; they are phenomena of arising and ceasing.' Second: causes such as good and evil lead people constantly to traverse saṃsāra, hence they are called formations (saṃskāra). Question: This chapter says that all formations are called the five aggregates—is this causal formation or resultant formation? Answer: The five aggregates being called formations possesses both meanings: first, the five aggregates are produced from karmic formations, hence they are called formations; second, these very five aggregates arise, cease, and act, hence they are called formations. Question: Between the formation-link of the twelve links of dependent origination and the aggregate of formations among the five aggregates, what difference is there? Answer: The formation-link of the twelve links of dependent origination is only causal formation. The aggregate of formations among the five aggregates possesses both meanings: first, the aggregate of formations generates causes of good and evil, which is called formation; second, excluding the other four aggregates, all conditioned phenomena are subsumed within the aggregate of formations, hence it is called formations. As the *Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya* states: 'Because conditioned phenomena are numerous, they constitute one aggregate of formations, not the others.' Question: What difference is there between 'Examination of Formations' and the 'Examination of Karma' chapter? Answer: The 'Examination of Karma' chapter only refutes their cause, whereas this section examines fluctuating formations in general, and is therefore different. Furthermore, there are three kinds of formations: breathing in and out is bodily formation; investigation and analysis are verbal formation; feeling is mental formation. Speaking generally of formation, there are four kinds: first, cultivation is called formation—this is the ten thousand practices of good dharmas; second, action is called formation, extending across the three moral natures of good, evil, [and neutral]; third, impermanent arising and acting is called formation, extending across cause and effect, the three aggregates, the three natures, and so forth; fourth, the mind acting upon cognitive objects is called formation—this is only the functioning of the mind. Question: Is there a gradation of sequence or not? Answer: Master Tanying says that formations have three gradations: volition (cetanā) is true formation, body and speech are secondary; because volition directly can act, it is called formation, and body and speech, through volition, are able to initiate karma, so they are called secondary. For the remaining conditioned phenomena, two causes and conditions make them called formations: first, being produced from formations; second, being shifted by arising and ceasing in their own entity is a derivative matter—hence they are called formations. The present chapter comprehensively examines all formations as unattainable, hence it is called 'Chapter on the Examination of Formations'.

7.10

The chapter is opened into three sections: first, refuting the outsider's assertion of illusory persons and phenomena; second, refuting the outsider's attachment to the meaning of emptiness; the third section refutes all of emptiness, existence, and neither emptiness nor existence. Concerning the first, there are four: first, propounding; second, refuting; third, rescuing; fourth, refuting the rescue. Within the first, propounding the thesis, there are again two: the first half cites the sūtra; the second half propounds the thesis. Question: What is the difference between being false and deceptive and erroneous grasping? Answer: False and deceptive refers to the object; erroneous grasping relies on the mental disposition. What is seen is not real—this is called false and deceptive. Among the eighteen sects there are two sects: the first is named the Ekavyāvahārika sect, which maintains that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are equally provisional designations and unreal, hence called 'One Convention' (Ekavyāvahāra), which originated from the Mahāsāṃghika school. The second is the Lokottaravāda sect, which clarifies that mundane phenomena arise from illusory causes and are therefore unreal, whereas supramundane phenomena do not arise from illusory causes and are called real. If based on the opinions of contemporary thinkers discussing this in terms of the four truths: suffering and origination are illusory causes and effects, hence called illusory; the path is the real cause, and cessation is the real effect, not illusory. If divided by conditioned and unconditioned: the three truths have not escaped being conditioned, hence they are illusory; the truth of cessation is unconditioned, not illusory. Furthermore, the old Dilun masters take the seventh consciousness as illusory and the eighth consciousness as real. The She-dacheng masters take the eighth consciousness as illusory and the ninth consciousness as real. They also say that the eighth consciousness has two meanings: first, illusory; second, real: having the meaning of understanding nature is real; having the retributive consciousness is illusory functioning. The *Awakening of Faith* joins arising-and-ceasing with non-arising-and-ceasing to form the entity of the ālayavijñāna. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* also has two texts: one says that the ālaya is the tathāgatagarbha; the second says that the tathāgatagarbha is not the ālayavijñāna. This one chapter precisely refutes the assertions of the Dilun masters; it does not refute the Sarvāstivādins and the like. The Sarvāstivādins and the like do not clarify that conditioned persons and phenomena are all mere illusory imputations. The second half propounds the thesis, as in the text. From 'Answer' downwards, the second [part] is the treatise master's refutation. The two verses have two parts: the first verse explains the sūtra, corresponding to its first half; the second refutes the propounding, corresponding to its second half. The first verse elucidates the sūtra: it clarifies that the Buddha, in order to refute the view of really existent persons and phenomena, therefore clarified that there is no reality, but there are only illusory appearances that are conceptually held to exist. This intention lies in the absence of reality, not in the existence of the illusory—why do you not grasp the absence of reality, but conversely preserve the existence of the illusory? If one says that there is a single hair's tip that can be grasped, then in principle it exists; how could it be illusory? Because it is called illusory, not a single hair's tip can be grasped; since not a single hair's tip can be grasped, it is emptiness. However, originally 'real' exists in contrast to 'illusory'; since it does not exist even in the illusory, how could there be a real? Contemporary She-dacheng masters and others, upon hearing 'illusory', immediately interpret it as an existent illusion, as in their explanations of the eight kinds of illusion in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and so forth. Now examining carefully, the treatise master elucidates four intentions of the Buddha's speaking of the illusory: first, to refute the sickness of clinging to real persons and phenomena, he speaks of the illusory—within saṃsāra there are no real persons or phenomena, there is only illusion. Second, like the Daśabhūmika masters and others who, hearing 'illusory', interpret it as an existent illusion, holding that while there are no real persons or phenomena, there are illusory persons and phenomena: the treatise master elucidates the Buddha's intention, saying that since it is called false and deceptive, what could there be? The Buddha spoke this wishing to reveal emptiness. Third, when the Buddha spoke of false and deceptive, he did not preserve emptiness either. Fourth, not only did he not preserve emptiness or existence, he also did not preserve neither emptiness nor existence, so that there is completely nothing to rely upon or attain, causing [one] to awaken to the true nature of phenomena. Now, hearing 'illusory' and interpreting it as an existent illusion, one merely grasps the word 'illusion', but does not understand the intention of 'illusion'. The Buddha speaking of suffering also had four intentions: first, to refute pleasure; second, not to preserve suffering; third, not to preserve emptiness or existence; fourth, having no reliance on anything whatsoever.

7.11

The prose section consists of three parts: first, a brief explanation of the verse; second, an extensive explanation; third, a general conclusion. The first is as in the text. From "Formations are called the five aggregates" onwards, the second part extensively explains the root verse. Within this text there are two parts: first, explaining that all formations are empty, which constitutes the contemplation of the two truths; next, explaining the attainment of benefit. The first part also has two subdivisions: first, generally explaining the emptiness of formations as the object of contemplation; next, separately contemplating the emptiness of formations. Within the general explanation, they are empty on account of four meanings: first, they are empty because they are deceptive, which explains that the objective sphere has no reality; second, they are empty because they are falsely grasped, which means that this mind is not real. These two explain emptiness according to name. Next, [third,] they are empty because they do not abide: if there were abiding, then there would be an entity; having no abiding, there is no entity, hence they are empty; fourth, they lack self-nature, and because they lack self-nature, they are empty. The latter two explain emptiness according to the meaning. The first is as in the text. From "Why is this so?", the second part separately contemplates the emptiness of formations among the five aggregates, which comprises five distinct sections. In contemplating the emptiness of the aggregate of form, there are two parts: first, the actual refutation; second, a general concluding refutation. The actual refutation has two parts: first, refuting in terms of the approach of impermanence; next, refuting in terms of the approach of identity and difference. The refutation by impermanence has two parts: first, refuting in terms of the approach of gross impermanence: because there are changes across the ten stages of life, there is no fixed nature, and thus one knows form is empty. From "Just as form does not abide from moment to moment" onwards, the second part refutes in terms of subtle impermanence. The reason it refutes in terms of the meaning of impermanence is that impermanence is the primary gateway to entering emptiness and the essential technique for refuting errors; it clarifies that the treatise master's understanding of impermanence differs from that of others. Others explain impermanence as the absence of permanence while maintaining the presence of impermanence, and therefore there is an entity and it is not empty. When the treatise master explains impermanence, the absence of permanence is precisely the absence of any entity, which is why it is empty. Furthermore, if an entity abides temporarily, one might say it exists temporarily; but because it does not abide, it does not exist, and therefore it is empty.

7.12

From "Is the form of an infant identical to..." onwards, the second part refutes in terms of the approach of identity and difference. This also opens into five divisions: first, refutation; second, rescue; third, refutation of the rescue; fourth, repeated rescue; fifth, repeated refutation. The first part has four sections: first, establishing the alternatives; from "Both have faults" onwards, the second part generally indicates that there are faults; from "Why is this so?" onwards, the third raises difficulties; from "Therefore, both have faults" onwards, the fourth provides a general conclusion. Within raising difficulties, he first refutes identity, and next refutes difference. The main idea is: if old age and youth are identical, then one falls into the fault of permanence; if old age and youth are different, then one falls into the fault of annihilation. Permanence would mean remaining constant, so that being young, there would never be old age, and without old age there would also be no youth; annihilation would entail the loss of father and son, contradicting conventional worldly phenomena. Question: Why is there a refutation by identity and difference following impermanence? Answer: There are two reasons. First, an opponent says that although form possesses both gross and subtle impermanence, the aggregate of form ultimately exists; therefore, it is now shown that when seeking form in terms of identity and difference, it cannot be found, and thus there is no aggregate of form. Second, the refutation by the gateway of impermanence is common to both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna, for the Hīnayāna also says that form is impermanent, yet they hold that impermanent form exists and is not empty; therefore, it is now shown that seeking form through identity and difference, it cannot be found. Previously, adducing the gateway of impermanence to refute form clarified that form is not permanent; now, refuting form in terms of identity and difference clarifies that form is not impermanent. Refuting form as permanent refutes the non-Buddhist doctrines; refuting form as impermanent refutes the Hīnayāna doctrine. Hence the Prajñāpāramitā states: "Form is neither permanent nor impermanent; one who trains in this way accords with prajñā." Question: Whose doctrine does the refutation of form as identical or different refute? Answer: Identity refutes the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya; difference refutes the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika. Moreover, refuting form through the gateway of identity refutes the Pariṇāmavāda, which is the doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghika; refuting form through the gateway of difference refutes the doctrine of the Sthaviravāda. From "Question: Although form is not fixed..." onwards, the second part is the opponent's rescue. The intention of the rescue is: form possesses two aspects—first, moment-by-moment arising and ceasing; second, continuity. Because it ceases from moment to moment, there is no single [abiding] form, and thus no fault of permanence; because old age and youth form a continuity from beginning to end, it is called a single form, so there is no difference and no fault of annihilation—how could there be any loss of father and son, or contradiction of conventional worldly phenomena? The masters of the Tattvasiddhi explain continuity in two schools: first, continuation by conjunction; second, continuation by replenishment. Continuation by conjunction has three explanations. First, Kaishan says: when the preceding moment should cease but has not yet ceased, the subsequent moment arises, continuing the preceding moment to constitute the meaning of a single provisional entity; hence it is called continuation. Zhuangyan says: transforming the preceding moment into the subsequent moment is merely designated as the subsequent moment arising to continue the preceding one; just as conception transforms into sensation, one therefore says that sensation continues conception, but there is actually no separate sensation that continues conception. Next, Master Yan says: when conception arises, it remotely forms a single meaning with sensation, and hence one merely says it continues. Next, the provisional designation of continuation by replenishment is used by Guangzhai. Traditionally it is said: Zhuangyan is the provisional entity of the rolling lotus leaf; Kaishan is the provisional entity of carrying lamps on a shoulder-pole; Guangzhai is the provisional entity of replenishing water droplets. Here it generally covers the doctrines of all three masters, but specifically accords with Kaishan: because the prior ceases and the subsequent arises, they are not identical; because of continuous transformation, they are not different. From "Answer:" onwards, the third part refutes the rescue. The main idea is simply to question the preceding moment: if the preceding moment ceases, then there is that which can continue, but nothing to be continued; and if there is no object, there is also no subject. If the preceding moment does not cease, the subsequent moment does not arise: there is that to be continued, but nothing that can continue; and having no subject, there is also no object. Furthermore, if the preceding moment does not cease, why would a subsequent continuation be needed? Moreover, if the preceding moment ceases, one reverts to falling into difference and annihilation; if it does not cease, it ultimately remains a single permanent thing. This refutation is already logically sufficient, but the followers of the Tattvasiddhi do not accept this refutation, saying: at the time of the preceding moment there are two capacities—the capacity to cease and the capacity to transform; the capacity to cease ceases on its own, and the capacity to transform transforms on its own; therefore, in its entire substance it ceases, and in its entire substance it transforms. Now we refute it in three steps. First, we ask: your consciousness supposedly possesses two capacities; now does conception continue your cessation, or does it continue your non-cessation? If it continues cessation, how can one speak of continuation? If it continues non-cessation, since consciousness has not ceased, how could conception arise to continue consciousness? Second, we ask: is the consciousness of that preceding single moment a single substance, or two substances? They answer that it is only a single substance. Now we ask: if it is only a single substance, since there is a conception that transforms, it would carry you away in transformation—how could there be cessation? Otherwise, the capacity of cessation would carry it away in cessation—how could there be transformation? They say: that which transforms transforms on its own; that which ceases ceases on its own. If that were so, then there would be two substances that do not accommodate each other—how could it be a single phenomenon? Third, your consciousness and conception are two phenomena that together continue to form a single provisional entity, so the provisional entity exists. Now do you say that consciousness and conception are two unceasing phenomena that continuously form a single unceasing phenomenon, or not? If so, then the provisional entity would always remain and never cease. From "Question:" onwards, the fourth part is a repeated rescue. The intention of the rescue is: by not speaking of cessation or non-cessation, one avoids the two faults of cessation and non-cessation above; but because the preceding form does not abide, it is neither permanent nor identical; and because it arises in a similar continuity, it is neither annihilated nor different, so there are none of the above faults. Moreover, because it does not abide for an instant, it is not unceasing; and because it can produce a similar [moment], it is not ceased. From "Answer:" onwards, the fifth part is a repeated refutation of the rescue. As for "then there would be a determinate form that is produced anew," examining the intention of this refutation, it is not refuting the meaning of continuation by replenishment. If one establishes the meaning of continuation by replenishment, where the preceding form departs and the subsequent form replenishes it, then there would be two faults: first, falling into the aforementioned fault of having no father and son: if the prior son's form departs and the subsequent son's form arrives, it is no longer the prior son—how would this not lose father and son? Second, one would also fall into having tens of millions of kinds of form: with one form departing and one form arriving, how could there not be tens of millions? Yet now he says: "then there would be a determinate form that is produced anew." Just earlier he merely said that the preceding form does not abide and that a subsequent similar form arises, [which is] a non-abiding form. This statement is still ambiguous: it might either transform into the present, or pass away into the past. If it transforms into the present, how is that not a determinate form produced anew? Furthermore, saying that a subsequent similar form arises entails tens of millions of kinds of form: because the preceding form does not abide, it is a determinate form produced anew; because the subsequent similar form arises, there are tens of millions of kinds of form. To refute the preceding two lines, there are these two passages. Moreover, since there would be tens of millions of kinds of form, there would be tens of millions of bodies and tens of millions of kinds of persons, which could not be called a continuity remaining a single form, a single body, and a single person from beginning to end. From "In this way everywhere..." onwards, the second part is the general conclusion. This also opens into five divisions: first, concluding via doctrinal statement; from "Like a plantain tree..." onwards, the second concludes via metaphor; from "In this way the wise..." onwards, the third repeatedly concludes via doctrinal statement; from "Like the flame of a lamp..." onwards, the fourth repeatedly concludes via metaphor; from "Therefore, form lacks a determinate nature and is empty" onwards, the fifth is the overall conclusion. As for "conventional discourse," this is introduced to resolve a doubt. The doubt asks: if there is no form, why do the sūtras speak of it? Therefore it explains: it is merely spoken in accordance with convention, not because it really exists. Question: How does it exist as conventional discourse? Answer: The Buddha taught deceptive and false grasping; in reality there is no such entity, but in accordance with worldly conventions one forcibly applies the name of form. Question: If so, is there only a name in conventional truth? Answer: For conventional persons there are names and entities; for the noble ones there are not even names, but they merely make names in accordance with convention.

7.13

From "Sensation is also like this" onwards, the second part explains the contemplation of the aggregate of sensation; it should also be refuted through the gateways of impermanence and identity-and-difference, and explained through the gateway of continuity, just as above. However, stating that the three sensations exist in the body because of awareness refers to ordinary persons: because they possess awareness, the three sensations arise dependent on agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral conditions, and therefore one merely says that sensation exists.

7.14

From "Conception arises conditioned by names and marks" onwards, the third part contemplates the aggregate of conception. This is also divided into three: first, doctrinal explanation; from "Like a shadow" onwards, the second is metaphorical explanation; from "Conception is also like this" onwards, the third synthesizes the metaphor. Refuting the aggregate of conception is done directly through the gateway of lacking self-nature, whereas the earlier refutation of the aggregate of form was through the gateway of impermanence. "Arises conditioned by names and marks" means that, conditioned by names of good and bad, one grasps marks of fine and ugly. Furthermore, conditioned by the ear hearing names and the eye grasping marks, it exists dependently on conditions; lacking intrinsic nature, it is empty.

7.15

From "Consciousness conditioned by form..." onwards, the fourth part refutes the aggregate of consciousness. Within the text there are three parts: first, refuting through the gateway of lacking self-nature; next, refuting in terms of identity and difference; from "Therefore it should be known" onwards, the third is a general conclusion. The first is as in the text. From "Only arising to cognize dust..." onwards, the second part refutes in terms of identity and difference. "Is the consciousness that cognizes this person identical to the consciousness that cognizes that person, or is it different?" opens two gates to interrogate him. If the consciousness that cognizes this person is still the consciousness that cognizes that person, then it is a single consciousness from beginning to end, falling into the fault of permanence. If the consciousness that cognizes this person is not the consciousness that cognizes that person, then cognizing this person today, tomorrow one would not cognize him, because yesterday's consciousness no longer exists, which again falls into annihilation. "Some say identical, some say different": the bhikṣu Sāti said that the one transmigrating through the six destinies is permanent, being a single consciousness. The Sāṃkhya say that the intellect-principle (buddhitattva) is permanent, which is also a single consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins and others explain that when the preceding consciousness ceases, the subsequent consciousness arises, so they are different consciousnesses. The Tattvasiddhi incorporates both identity and difference: when real phenomena cease, they are different consciousnesses; through continuous transformation, they are called a single consciousness. Because real phenomena cease moment by moment, they avoid the fault of permanent identity; because continuity is one, they avoid the fault of not cognizing the prior person. Now we clarify that if the provisional and real doctrines were tenable, they might avoid the two faults; but now, since the provisional and real are not tenable, they incur both faults. If real phenomena cease, the provisional has nothing to continue; if the provisional continues, the real cannot cease. Thus, if the provisional is established, the real is destroyed; if the real is established, the provisional is destroyed. When the provisional is destroyed, there is also no real; when the real is destroyed, there is also no provisional. Nothing is established at all.

7.16

From "All formations are also like this" onwards is the fifth [section], contemplating formations (saṃskāra). Although in the sequence of the five aggregates formations are the fourth, this chapter is named "Contemplating Formations"; wanting to refute them extensively, [the author] places them fifth. The text has three parts: first, explaining the three formations of body, speech, and mind; second, from "There are two kinds" onwards, explaining the two formations of pure and impure; third, from "Or increasing or decreasing" onwards, explaining the meaning of the increase and decrease of formations. The text comprises three parts, namely the statement of doctrine, the simile, and the application of the simile. The first is the statement of doctrine. The aggregate of formations contains many phenomena, but here it specifically takes the creating of good and evil karma and calls it "formations". Karma can induce retribution, and is therefore called "increasing"; when the experiencing of retribution reaches its limit, it diminishes, and is therefore called "decreasing". From "Just as a person has an illness" onwards is the second [part], the simile, which illustrates the aforementioned meaning of increase and decrease. From "All formations are also like this" onwards is the third [part], the application of the simile. By showing that increase and decrease are unfixed, formations are therefore empty.

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中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese