中觀論疏 7.5

7.5

Next, the eight verses of explanation and refutation have two parts: first, seven verses explain neither self[-made] nor other[-made]; next, one verse explains neither shared nor causeless. The seven verses have three parts: first, two verses clarify that phenomena (dharmas) are neither self[-made] nor other[-made]; next, three verses clarify that the person is neither self[-made] nor other[-made]; third, two verses conclude that person and phenomena are neither self[-made] nor other[-made]. The two verses have two parts: the first verse clarifies that phenomena are not self-made; the next verse clarifies that phenomena are not other-made. The first verse states: if suffering were self-made, the meaning of causes and conditions would be lost; the second half explains: these five aggregates arise from the preceding five aggregates, how could this be called self-made? If self-made, it should arise from itself. The second verse states: if one says that the arising of the later five aggregates from the preceding five aggregates is called other-made, this is not correct; the preceding five aggregates are the cause and the later five aggregates are the effect—how could cause and effect be called 'other'? Therefore it is not other-made. If one says it is other, that is not the meaning of cause and effect. From 'Question: The maker is a person' downwards, these three verses clarify that the person is neither self nor other. The three verses have two parts: the first verse clarifies that the person is not self[-made]; the next two verses clarify that the person is not other[-made]. The preceding two verses refuted phenomena, which generally refuted the Sarvāstivādins; now it does not refute the Sarvāstivādins, because the Sarvāstivādins do not postulate a person, but only refutes the non-Buddhists, the *Tattvasiddhi*, and different sects that assert that a person acts. The general meaning of the three verses here is very easy: it directly clarifies that outside the aggregates there is no person—who makes it of oneself, and who makes it of another? If there were a person outside the aggregates, one could grant that this person acts of oneself or another person acts. Question: If outside the aggregates there is no person, one may say there is no making by self or other; if one grants that the person is identical to the aggregates, could there be making by self or other or not? Answer: If one grants that the person is identical to the aggregates, this is still just the aggregates. Above, the refutation that the aggregates are neither self nor other has already been concluded, therefore there is no need to refute [a person] identical to the aggregates as self or other. 'If suffering is made by another person'—these two verses refute making by another person. The two verses have two parts: the first verse clarifies that outside the aggregates there is no person, so who experiences the suffering? The second verse clarifies that outside the aggregates there is no person, so who imparts the suffering? 'Furthermore, if self-made is not established'—the two verses below conclude the refutation of self and other: the first verse concludes that the person is neither self nor other; the next verse concludes that phenomena are neither self nor other. The first half of the first verse proceeds by the approach of mutual dependence, and the second half proceeds by the approach of mutual identity. As for the approach of mutual dependence: dependent on 'self', 'other' exists; since 'self' is already not established, 'other' is also not established. As for mutual identity: 'other' in relation to that other is itself 'self'. 'Furthermore, suffering is not called self-made'—this clarifies that phenomena are neither self nor other: the first half refutes self, and the second half refutes other. 'A phenomenon does not make itself' gives an analogy, just as a knife does not cut itself and an eye does not see itself—how could suffering make itself? The second half clarifies 'that has no intrinsic entity': that in relation to that is itself 'self'; if there were an intrinsic entity of that, one could speak of that [acting]; since there is no intrinsic entity of that, how could there be making by that?