中觀論疏 8
English (machine translation) 8
- Language
- English
8.1
Composed by Shi Jizang
8.2
Chapter 17: Karma
8.3
This chapter is introduced on account of five kinds of people: First, the school positing a self, which claims that there is a person capable of creating karma, karma obtains retribution, there is a person who acts, and there is a person who experiences; this chapter is here to refute this view. Second, the school of non-self, which merely claims that there is an essential substance of karma that can induce retribution. Third, the Hīnayāna school of neither person nor phenomena, which also knows that karma is empty, but only explains emptiness by dissecting phenomena. Fourth, those with the heterodox view of the Fangguang, who claim that there are no karma and retribution. Fifth, practitioners of the Mahāyāna who grasp at nothing, in order to make them advance. Why is this? Attachment to phenomena is difficult to eliminate. For example, it is said that at the first bhūmi there is still attachment to a phenomenal self, and even bodhisattvas of the ten bhūmis, seeing phenomena as possessing intrinsic nature, do not see Buddha-nature clearly; it is also said that because they abide in the ten abodes they do not see clearly. Moreover, the reason for this chapter's occurrence has both general and particular aspects. As for the general, there are four: First, this treatise examines phenomena step by step to elucidate the middle way, giving rise to contemplation in accordance with the middle and extinguishing all afflictions. Now it reveals the middle way regarding the gate of karma. Therefore, a subsequent verse says: “Although empty, it is not annihilated; / although existent, it is not permanent.” The prose commentary explains: “The meaning explained in this treatise is free from annihilation and permanence.” Thus we know that it elucidates middle contemplation regarding karma; hence this chapter is spoken. Second, all the Mahāyāna sūtras explain the meaning of repenting and transforming karmic hindrances. As the Lion's Roar [Chapter] of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: “All karma has no fixed nature; there are only the foolish and the wise. The foolish take the light to be heavy and the non-existent to become existent; the wise transform the heavy into the light and transform the existent into non-existence.” Now it is made clear that if one clings to karma as determined, one is a fool; if one contemplates it as in this chapter, one is called a wise person. The Contemplation of Samantabhadra says: “The ocean of all karmic hindrances / is entirely produced from false conceptualization. / If you wish to repent, / sit upright and contemplate the true mark.” Since beginningless time, sentient beings have generated karma of the six destinies that is deep and vast; hence it is compared to an ocean. Without the contemplation of the true mark, there is no way to extinguish it. Now this chapter contemplates karma as being none other than the true mark, and is therefore able to extinguish karmic hindrances; hence this chapter is spoken. Third, although internal and external, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, establish various karmas, their positions are not established. For instance, Subhadra claimed: “The retributions of sentient beings are entirely due to past karma; there are no present conditions.” Nirgrantha-jñātiputra said: “All karma must inevitably receive retribution; even if one now cultivates the path, one cannot sever it.” Second, those such as the Sarvāstivādins cling to the three times as being existent: before sentient beings have created good or evil, there already is good and evil karma in the future; furthermore, although good and evil karmas perish into the past, their substance is ultimately not non-existent. Such views are called giving rise to a view of definitive existence regarding the gate of karma. Not knowing that the fundamental nature of this karma is intrinsically empty, they do not recognize the ultimate truth; neither do they know that karma exists like an illusion or a dream, and thus they are also confused about conventional truth. Now, to refute the karma that is not subsumed by these two truths, it is called the “Examination of Karma.” Those of the Tattvasiddhi school, although knowing karma is provisional, dissect karma to arrive at emptiness and thereby also destroy conventional truth; having destroyed conventional truth, they also destroy ultimate truth. A subsequent verse says: “All karmas are fundamentally unproduced, / because they have no fixed nature; / all karmas are also unceasing, / because they are unproduced.” How could it be that only by dissecting karma does karma become empty? Now, to refute the karma of such people and elucidate that karma is fundamentally empty of intrinsic nature, it is called the “Examination of Karma.” Fourth, this chapter is also spoken for the sake of all people who possess apprehension, fear sin, and perform repentance. Why is this? They think that having committed evil karma, fear arises in their minds, and therefore, relying on the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, they practice repentance wishing to extinguish this sin. For such people, not only is their transgression of sin not extinguished, but they further increase their faults. Why is this? When they originally generated the sin, they took the sinful karma to be existent—this is called the view of existence. Then, wishing to practice repentance to extinguish and eliminate this sin, they give rise to the view of non-existence regarding the sin. Having given rise to existence and non-existence, these are afflictions; afflictions are the causes and conditions, and therefore there is karma; having delusion and karma, one then receives karmic retribution. Hence Vimalakīrti rebuked Upāli: “Do not further increase the sin of these two monks. You should eliminate it directly and not disturb their minds.” “Eliminating it directly” means contemplating that the nature of this sin is none other than ultimate emptiness, just as elucidated in this chapter. It is for the sake of those who lack skillful means, possess apprehension, and practice repentance that this chapter is spoken. Question: What fault do such people have? Answer: Karma is fundamentally unproduced and unceasing. Now they claim that karma is produced and ceases—is this not destroying the ultimate truth? Having destroyed the ultimate, they also destroy the conventional; destroying the two truths, there are no two wisdoms; hence there are no Buddhas and bodhisattvas of the three times and ten directions, and they also destroy the world. Therefore, their sin is extremely great. Question: If so, should there only be the repentance of the true mark, and no practice of repentance relying on the dharma-gates of the prātimokṣa rules? Answer: The “Examination of Causes and Conditions” says: “The Buddha has two kinds of preaching: first, preaching the truth; second, preaching according to expediency.” If one performs the repentance of the true mark, this is preaching according to the truth for sentient beings of great sharp faculties; if one relies on the prātimokṣa rules to cause them to abandon sin and cultivate merit, this is spoken for ordinary beings of slight merit and dull faculties. Therefore, the true Dharma is trustworthy, whereas the Dharma spoken according to expediency cannot be taken as ultimate truth. Furthermore, this chapter is spoken for the sake of heterodox outsiders with wrong views, such as the six masters, who say: “There is no black karma, nor is there retribution for black karma; the same is true for white karma.” Next, those of the Fangguang school also say: “Everything is empty; there is neither sin nor merit.” Therefore, it is now explained that although it is ultimately empty, good and evil karma are distinctly not lost. Thus a subsequent verse says: “Just as the World-Honoured One through supernormal powers / creates a phantom person, / and such a phantom person / further creates a phantom person.” How could there be no karma? Thus, the karma of the nine realms is distinctly present while constantly free from the four extremes. Awakening in this way gives rise to prajñā and skillful means, and also gives rise to the four wisdoms, whereupon one enters the knowledge and vision of the Buddha, and therefore attains Buddhahood. Now, this is a Mahāyāna treatise, precisely causing all sentient beings to attain Buddhahood by means of the gate of karma. Next, as for its immediate occasion: the “Examination of Bondage and Liberation” explained that there is no bondage or liberation. The opponent says: “Bondage is affliction. If there are no afflictions, how could there be karma? Because there is karma, there must be afflictions. Furthermore, there are two kinds of karma: first, contaminated karma; second, uncontaminated karma. Contaminated karma is termed bondage; uncontaminated karma is called liberation. Since there is karma, there is bondage and liberation.” Question: How many kinds of karma are there? Answer: Karma has many categories. With respect to the body, there are body, speech, and mind; in terms of the realms, there are merit, demerit, and immobility; in terms of retribution, there are present, next-life, and subsequent; in terms of defilement and purity, there are black, white, mixed, and uncontaminated karma. In this way, there are one karma, two karmas, three karmas, seven karmas, and ten karmas, as explained at length in the text. Question: What is the essential substance of karma? Answer: The Abhidharma takes good and evil visible matter and sound as the substance of the two karmas of body and speech, and takes volition (cetanā) as the substance of mental karma. The Tattvasiddhi says: “All three karmas take the mind as their substance; body and speech are merely the instruments of karma, not karma itself.” Question: How do the three afflictions of the mental ground differ from karma? Answer: In the Abhidharma, when the three afflictions arise, they must be accompanied by volition. Volition is itself karma, whereas the three afflictions are not karma; this is easy to see. The masters of the Tattvasiddhi refute this meaning and establish the correct meaning: the mind is itself karma, and apart from the mind there is no separate volition. The proponents of the Tattvasiddhi say: of the two causes of wholesome dharmas—habitual cause and retribution cause—the retribution cause is precisely karma, while the aspect of habitual cause is not karma, being only conventionally called karma. Regarding the unwholesome aspect, there are many explanations. Master Kaishan says: unwholesome mind is both affliction and karma; if it is severed by the antidotal path, it is affliction and not karma; if in terms of the sense of inducing rebirth, one merely takes the prior, lighter one as affliction and the subsequent, heavier one as karma. Zhuangyan and Guangzhai say: one takes that which is determinate as karma, and that which is indeterminate as affliction. In this way, the ten determinate aspects are generally called karma, and the ten indeterminate aspects are called afflictions. Next, Master Jianchu says: the unwholesome is also the same as the wholesome; the habitual cause aspect of the unwholesome is affliction, and the retribution cause aspect is karma. Moreover, explaining the ten fetters, he says: doubt is affliction and not karma; the five views are karma and not afflictions; of the remaining four fetters, the determinate ones are afflictions and the indeterminate ones are karma. Now, without debating similarities and differences: whatever karma is conceptualized, when sought in this chapter, is all ultimately empty; hence it gives the chapter its title.
8.4
This chapter is divided into seven turns: first, directly refuting the substance of karma; second, from "The opponent asks: Just as sprouts and the like are continuous" onward, refuting the continuity of karma; third, from "The opponent asks: Now we shall further explain" onward, refuting the dharma of non-exhaustion (avipraṇāśa); fourth, from "The opponent asks: If so, then there would be no karmic retribution" onward, refuting the nihilistic wrong view; fifth, from "The opponent asks: If all afflictions" onward, refuting retribution; sixth, from "The opponent asks: Although you refute karma through various causes and conditions" onward, refuting the person who generates karma; seventh, from "The opponent asks: Although you refute karma in various ways" onward, refuting visible empirical phenomena. Within each section there is first an establishment [by the opponent] and then a refutation [by the treatise master]; thus there are seven establishments and seven refutations.
In the initial establishment, there are both prose and verses. The prose has four parts: first, "The opponent asks: Although you refute all dharmas," repeats the treatise master's refutation. Second, "karma definitely exists," is the outsider establishing the cause that is karma. As the Dharmapada states: "Neither in the sky nor in the ocean / can one escape [karma] by evading it"; hence it is said to definitely exist. Thus, among the ten powers of the Buddha, the power of karma is the deepest. Third, "which causes all sentient beings to experience karmic retribution": the preceding clarified the cause of karma, and this now explains the obtaining of its fruit. Śākyamuni suffered nine tribulations: in the past, Śākyamuni pricked Devadatta's foot with a nine-pearl thorn, and therefore he now received the retribution of being struck by a wooden splinter. Maudgalyāyana was unable to pull it out using his supernormal powers; when the World-Honoured One tried to evade it, the thorn followed him, because karmic retribution is definite, so the thorn pierced the Tathāgata and turned into a gold splinter. Confucius faced distress between Chen and Cai; if even sages and worthies cannot escape, how much less can ordinary persons! Thus we know that one definitely obtains the fruit. Fourth, from "As the sūtra states" onward, cites scriptures to briefly explain the three karmas: first, lower-grade karma, meaning evil doers enter hell; second, middle-grade karma, where those who cultivate merit are born in heaven; third, upper-grade karma, meaning those who practice the Path attain nirvāṇa. The first two are tainted karmas, and the latter is untainted karma. From "Therefore dharmas should not be empty" onward, the fourth concludes by reproving the treatise master.
Regarding the verses, there are five, divided into four sections: the first clarifies one karma; the next clarifies two karmas; the third is one verse clarifying three karmas; the fourth is two verses clarifying seven karmas.
The first "one karma" is simply the one good karma. Within good karma, it only clarifies the karma of benevolence (maitrī), for benevolence is the root of all good. Moreover, knowing that the treatise master is a bodhisattva who must possess a mind of benevolence and should not refute benevolence, it specifically cites this. "If a person can subdue their mind and benefit sentient beings": this clarifies the function of the karma of benevolence, being able to subdue evil and benefit sentient beings. Now, the karma of benevolence benefits beings: benefiting beings is the good of practice, and subduing evil is the good of restraint. Furthermore, subduing is self-cultivation, and benefiting is transforming others. "This is called the good of benevolence": because of having benevolence, one can subdue evil and benefit beings, cultivating oneself and transforming others. "The seed of retribution across two lives": the preceding analyzed the cause of practice, and this now clarifies obtaining the fruit. "Seed" means cause.
From "The Great Sage spoke of two karmas" onward, the second clarifies the two karmas. The previous clarification of one karma was a specific karma, because it only explained the karma of benevolence; now it clarifies general karma, which applies universally to both good and evil. Furthermore, the previous specifically clarified the function of karma, whereas this clarifies the substance of karma. The first half [of the verse] clarifies the two karmas and cites the Great Sage because, fearing the treatise master would refute it, it adduces the Buddha's word as proof. The next half-verse serves as the general heading for the three karmas and seven karmas below.
The next single verse expands the two karmas into three karmas, which explains the meaning of the two karmas above: the first half clarifies mental karma, and the second half clarifies bodily and vocal karma.
Next, regarding the two verses clarifying the seven karmas, someone said: body and speech make two; bodily action (vijñapti) and bodily non-action (avijñapti) [with vocal action and non-action] make four; taking one from either good or unwholesome makes five karmas; taking one from either good or evil in what arises from use makes six; and intention (cetanā) makes seven. A second interpretation states: bodily action and non-action, vocal action and non-action make four; good arising from use and evil arising from use make six; intention makes seven. Master Tanying also said: "This is Piṅgala's interpretation." Yet another interpretation states: the previous two both have flaws; now it is explained that bodily action and non-action, and vocal action and non-action—these four lines agree with the second interpretation; within what arises from use, there is itself the intrinsic good and the good arising from use, which along with intention make seven karmas. This interpretation means there are seven within good and seven within evil. Why is this? The body itself has good action and good non-action, and good speech is likewise; within what arises from use, there is intrinsic good and good arising from use; sins likewise have intrinsic sin and sin arising from use, just as copying a scripture is an intrinsic good, and reciting it is a good arising from use. Looking ahead to the prose below, it contains this meaning.
Our present explanation divides the verses into two: first, directly clarifying the substance of the seven karmas; and the final line praises the function of the seven karmas. In the first part, there are again two: one and a half verses clarify the six karmas of body and speech, and the following one line clarifies mental karma, which makes seven. In the first part, there are again two: the first verse clarifies internal bodily and vocal karma, and the next half-verse clarifies external bodily and vocal karma. What is called "internal" means bodily and vocal karmas generated by oneself, hence called internal; that which arises depending on another is designated as external. Bodily and vocal karmas do not go beyond this internal and external. Within the two karmas of body and speech, it is again divided into two: the first half clarifies the characteristics of karma, and the second half analyzes the nature of karma.
"Bodily karma and vocal karma": this line generally clarifies the two karmas of body and speech. "Action and non-action karma": this specifically clarifies the two karmas of body and speech. The body has action and non-action, and speech has action and non-action; thus bodily and vocal karmas are explained in terms of action and non-action.
From "Among these four matters" onward, the second clarifies the nature of karma. "Four matters" means bodily action and non-action, and vocal action and non-action, which are called the four matters. "Are both good and unwholesome": action and non-action only possess the two natures of good and evil; indeterminate karma, though having action, is not called karma. Furthermore, the two karmas of good and evil can generate non-action, whereas indeterminate karma is weak in power and does not generate non-action; hence it says "good and unwholesome."
From "arising from use" onward: the preceding clarified the four internal karmas; now it clarifies the two external karmas. The internal karmas above had two parts: first, the aspect of karmic characteristics; second, the aspect of karmic nature. Now external karma also has two parts: the three characters "arising from use" are the aspect of karmic characteristics. However, what arises from use has two: first, bodily arising from use; second, vocal arising from use. Bodily arising from use: for instance, if one physically provides clothing to another, and the other receives and uses it by wearing it, then the non-action good arises, belonging to the donor; this is called bodily non-action. Vocal non-action: for instance, if a Dharma master gives an exposition and a student repeats it, then vocal non-action is generated, belonging to the Dharma master. Question: Internal karma possesses both action and non-action, and external karma also possesses action and non-action; why does it specifically mention only the two kinds of non-action of body and speech as external karma? Answer: It aims to clarify that a single person possesses the seven karmas. Now, internal karma has the four karmas of bodily and vocal action and non-action belonging to the practitioner; next, there are also the two external non-action karmas that still belong to the practitioner. If the two kinds of action arising from use were considered, they would belong to the other person, so they are not counted; therefore it takes only the two non-actions.
From the two characters "merit" onward, the second clarifies the aspect of the nature of external karma. Since the nature of internal karma includes both good and unwholesome, the nature of external karma also includes both good and unwholesome. Some count sin and merit as two, but this is not correct. If sin and merit were counted as two, then they should also have been counted in the previous internal karma, and it should not have said: "Among these four matters, there are good and unwholesome." Since good and unwholesome were not separately counted before, the same applies here. These six internal and external kinds are bodily and vocal karma; the seventh, named intention, is mental karma.
"Can comprehend the characteristics of karmas": the second part praises [karma]. One who thoroughly understands these seven karmas can comprehend all karmas—internal, external, action, non-action, and so forth of body and speech. Question: Why did they establish these seven? Answer: These seven constitute a category of enumeration that completely subsumes all meanings and phenomena, just like categories such as the three [types] of good and evil or the four [types] of dark and bright [karma].
The prose follows the order of the verses to explain them: first, it explains the seven karmas; from "These seven kinds" onward, it explains the second verse that praises karma. From the initial text it explains the six karmas of body and speech; from "The seventh is named intention" onward, it explains the second, mental karma. Regarding the explanation of the six, the meaning has two parts: first, directly explaining the six karmas; "These are called the six kinds," second, generally summarizes the six meanings. The first part has two: first, explaining internal karma; from "There are also those arising from use" onward, second, explaining external karma. In explaining internal karma, the first explains the first half on the substance and characteristics of karma; from "These two kinds are good and unwholesome" onward, it explains the aspect of the nature of karma. The first part has two: the first explains the first line, generally clarifying the two karmas of body and speech; from "These seven kinds" onward, the second specifically clarifies action and non-action.
From "The answer states: Karma abides until the receiving of retribution" onward, the second is the treatise master's refutation. Although above, from one karma up to seven karmas, all clarified the obtaining of the fruit, now we generally question it: Does karma await the arising of the fruit before it perishes, or has karma already perished before the fruit arises? If it awaits the arising of the fruit before perishing, then karma is permanent. Now karma is a conditioned dharma that does not abide even for a single thought-moment; how could it await the arising of the fruit before perishing? If karma has already perished before the fruit arises, then karma no longer exists—what would draw forth the fruit?
The Sarvāstivādins say: when good and evil karma arise in the present, they pass beyond the present phase and enter the past, being attained through acquisition (prāpti) and belonging to the practitioner; later, when the fruit arises, this acquisition is severed. However, this position contains both annihilation and permanence: arising and immediately passing away is annihilation, and remaining unperished in the past is permanence.
The Mahāsāṃghika, Dharmaguptaka, and Dārṣṭāntika clarify that present karma, having passed away into the past, is non-existent in its substance, yet it possesses the meaning of "having once existed," and therefore one obtains the fruit. This also contains both annihilation and permanence: passing away into the past is annihilation, while possessing the meaning of having once existed is permanence.
Next, the Kāśyapīya combines the positions of the two schools. They say: when present karma passes away into the past, it remains permanent until the fruit is attained—this agrees with the Sarvāstivāda's meaning of permanence; later, when the fruit arises, this karma again passes away into extinction and non-existence—this agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika's meaning of annihilation.
Next, among the masters of the Tattvasiddhi: Zhuangyan said that when karma passes away into the past, its substance is non-existent, yet it possesses the meaning of "having once existed," so one obtains the fruit. He cites the treatise text: "Just as past meditative concentrations once existed in the mind, there is no contradiction if they bestow karmic retribution." Next, Kaishan said that karma passes away into the past, but its attainment comes into the present; thus within the present mind there is attained karma and presently arising karma. The treatise text states: "In the past a mind of greed arose and continued up to the present; the present mind is not different from the past, so we say 'I exist.'" Views such as these also do not depart from annihilation and permanence, and fall under the refutation of the present verse.
The masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: the ālayavijñāna holds worldly and transworldly seeds of good and evil, and therefore one obtains the fruit. Now, censuring them according to the verse: do the seeds perish awaiting the fruit, or do they perish before it arises? If they perish awaiting the arising of the fruit, that is permanence; if they perish before it arises, there would be no karmic retribution.
8.5
From "The question says" downward is the second round, which refutes the thesis of the continuity of karma; first it establishes it, and next refutes it. Within the establishment there are two parts: first, a general explanation that the continuity of karma is free from annihilation and permanence; second, a specific presentation of the ten wholesome karmas being able to obtain retributions. The first part also has two sections: the first two verses explain the continuity of external phenomena as free from annihilation and permanence, which is the explanation by metaphor; the next two verses are the continuity of internal phenomena being free from annihilation and permanence, which is the application of the metaphor. The [latter] two verses have three parts: the first verse directly explains continuity; the next half-verse explains that due to continuity there is a fruit; the third half-verse concludes that it is free from annihilation and permanence; the text is easy to understand. From "The causes and conditions and retribution of this wholesome karma" downward is the second part, which specifically presents the ten wholesome karmas being able to obtain retributions. The reason for particularly citing the ten wholesome actions is identical to the meaning of the karma of benevolence above: benevolence is the foremost among the wholesome karmas, and the ten wholesome actions are likewise so. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: "Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, there are always the ten wholesome actions; thus the ten wholesome actions are constant virtues. Other virtues exist when there is a Buddha and do not exist when there is no Buddha, and are called visiting virtues." Question: The text says "ten bright courses of karma"; what is karma, and what is a course of karma? Answer: Sūtras and treatises differ. The *Upāsaka[-śīla] Sūtra* says: "Of these ten items, three are karma and not courses, while seven are both karma and courses." The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: "Three are courses and not karma, while seven are both karma and courses." We must now harmonize and explain them. The sūtra takes volition directly as karma; but volition does not manifest by itself, hence it is karma and not a course. The treatise explains that the three afflictions give rise to karma and are not karma [itself], hence it says they are courses and not karma. Each relies on one approach. The treatise masters explain four permutations: 1. Karma and not a course, as in the *Upāsaka Sūtra*. 2. A course and not karma, as in the treatise's explanation of the three afflictions. 3. Both karma and a course of karma, as are the seven actions [of body and speech]. 4. Neither karma nor a course, as are bodily and vocal forms and sounds. The Abhidharma masters also have four permutations, which differ greatly from this: 1. A course and not karma, namely greed, anger, and wrong views; they are courses because they expand volition, but their substance is not volition, so they are not karma. 2. Karma and not a course, which is volition itself; because volition creates, it is called karma, and having no further volition, it is not the course of volition. 3. Both karma and a course, namely the seven of body and speech; their substance is karma, and they also expand volition as courses. 4. Neither karma nor a course, namely the three unwholesome roots preceding volition; they can only produce volition but cannot expand volition, hence they are not courses, and furthermore are not volition, hence they are not karma. Question: According to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, the three afflictions are courses and not karma; why does it now speak of "ten courses of karma"? The treatise master answers: Because the minority follows the majority, all are named courses of karma. From "The answer says" downward is the second part, the refutation. Why does it only offer a general negation? First, although the opponent has this defense, in the end it does not leave annihilation and permanence behind, and therefore it is not accepted. Second, intending to refute it all at once later on, it is therefore only briefly negated here. Furthermore, knowing that their argument has not exhausted its momentum, he simply negates it directly to draw out their subsequent defense and refute it completely all at once. The prose has two parts: first, a direct refutation; from "Furthermore" downward is a concessionary refutation.
8.6
From "The question says" downward is the third round, establishing the inexhaustible dharma (avipraṇāśa); first it establishes it, and next refutes it. Within the establishment there are three parts: 1. an introductory statement, 2. the direct statement, and 3. the explanation. "The question says: I shall now again explain the meaning that conforms to karma and retribution"—this chapter has seven rounds of refutation and establishment. In the first round, the substance of karma was established and immediately refuted. In the next round, he argued that karma is neither annihilated nor permanent to rescue the above establishment, and the treatise master immediately refuted it. Now he establishes that which preserves karma and retribution to comprehensively rescue the above thesis, hence he says, "I shall now again explain." "Conforms to karma and retribution" means that the thesis he establishes accords with cause and effect without violating the characteristics of phenomena; if the treatise master refutes it, he would oppose the principle of cause and effect and violate the characteristics of phenomena. Because it accords with cause and effect, it is praised by the worthy and noble of the three vehicles; if the treatise master refutes it, he would be disparaged by Buddhas and bodhisattvas. This one verse concludes the introductory statement. From "The so-called inexhaustible dharma is like a debt certificate, and karma is like borrowed property" downward is the second part, in which six verses directly establish the core thesis. In the text there are two parts: first, stating the two headings; next, explaining the two headings. "The inexhaustible dharma is like a debt certificate" states the heading of the inexhaustible dharma. "Karma is like borrowed property" states the heading of karma. Now let us explain them comprehensively. For people of the world to make a loan, four things are requisite: 1. having a creditor, 2. having a debtor, 3. executing a debt certificate to bind the debtor so that the property is not lost, and 4. the debtor must repay the property. The creditor is the sentient beings of the six destinies. The debtor is the wholesome and unwholesome karma of the six destinies. At the time of performing an action, there must be a dharma that arises following the karma, preserving the karma so that its fruit is not lost, just as when borrowing property a certificate must be executed. The debtor must repay the property to the creditor, and wholesome and unwholesome karma must yield the fruit of the six destinies, returning it to the practitioner to receive. The text of the treatise only explains the certificate and the debtor, merely citing the essentials for the sake of concision. Question: The creditor provides property to the other person, and only then does the other person repay the debt; can one say that the fruit comes forth from sentient beings and is given to karma, and only then does karma yield the fruit and return it to the practitioner? Answer: It is broadly citing a metaphor; it does not need to match completely. Even if it had to match completely, the principle is also there, for the retributions of the six destinies all emerge from within the minds of sentient beings; as the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* says, "The triple realm is entirely made by the one mind." Question: How does the opponent's citing of this rescue [his position from] annihilation and permanence above? Answer: In observed everyday affairs these four things are present, and the actions of cause, effect, and karma also possess these four. Since this matches affairs and conforms to principle, and both the wise and foolish believe in it, one knows that karma and its fruit definitely exist. However, karma is conditioned and arises and ceases moment by moment, hence it is not permanent; this inexhaustible dharma preserves it so that the fruit is not lost, therefore it is not annihilated. Being neither annihilated nor permanent, it avoids the aforementioned fault. Question: Karma is conditioned and arises and ceases moment by moment, and the inexhaustible dharma is also conditioned and arises and ceases moment by moment; how can it be neither annihilated nor permanent? Answer: Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha cited the Sammatīya school, explaining that the inexhaustible dharma possesses functional permanence (kāritra-nitya), waiting for the fruit to arise before it perishes, without momentary perishing in the interim. It is like a certificate, which is torn up only after the debt has been fully repaid. Both of these headings have both the doctrinal statement and the metaphor: "inexhaustible dharma" is the doctrinal statement, and "like a certificate" is the metaphor. "Karma" is the doctrinal statement, and "like borrowed property" is the metaphor. Wholesome karma is like another owing property, and unwholesome karma is like owing property to another; it can also broadly serve as a metaphor for wholesome and unwholesome karma inevitably repaying retribution, just like borrowed property.
8.7
"Its nature is indeterminate": this is the second part, explaining the two chapter-headings. The preceding two and a half stanzas explain the inexhaustible dharma, through five gates: 1. the gate of the three natures; 2. the gate of bound and unbound; 3. the gate of abandoned and unabandoned; 4. the gate of explaining the name; and 5. the gate of refuting rival views. Question: Why is the indeterminate inexhaustible dharma specifically refuted, rather than refuting the cord of attainment (prāpti) that runs through the three natures? Answer: For two reasons. First, attainment that runs through the three natures can also produce retribution, so it belongs under the gate of karma above and was already refuted; the indeterminate does not produce retribution, and not having been refuted above, it is refuted now. Second, attainment running through the three natures is merely a Hīnayāna doctrine and not worth refuting. The indeterminate runs through both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna: the Sāṃmitīyas are Hīnayāna, while the inexhaustible dharma of the ālayavijñāna is Mahāyāna. Ālaya is translated as "non-loss consciousness" (wumei shi): wu is an alternative word for "not" (bu), and mei is another term for "loss" (shi); hence ālaya is still the inexhaustible dharma (bu shi fa). Furthermore, the essence of the ālaya is indeterminate retribution, capable of retaining all good and evil seeds, which precisely matches the present opponent's view. Moreover, the reason the gate of the three natures is explained first is to address two schools: first, the school with promissory contracts; second, the school without promissory contracts. The school with promissory contracts, such as the Sarvāstivādins, also has four elements: the nominal sentient being is like the creditor; performing good and evil karma is like the debtor; there is a separate cord of attainment that obtains good and evil karma and prevents the fruit from being lost, which is like the contract; and the karma producing retribution is like the debtor repaying the debt. The school without promissory contracts—the followers of Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntikas, the Tattvasiddhi[-śāstra], and so forth—only explains three elements and has no separate cord of attainment serving as a contract; they merely say that the sentient being is the one that achieves (sādhaka), and good and evil karma are what is achieved. If one takes this as the inexhaustible dharma, there is no separate creditor, so there are only three elements. The Dharmaguptakas explain that the mind is what achieves, and likewise there is no separate entity serving as a contract. The Sāṃmitīya school previously addressed the position of having a contract, and thus distinguished it according to the three natures. Why is this? The Sarvāstivādins explain that the cord of attainment runs through the three natures. If so, since the cord of attainment is good or evil, it would in turn induce retribution and thus be identical with karma, both being debtors; how then could it be called a contract? Therefore it is now explained that good and evil karma produce retribution of themselves, whereas the inexhaustible dharma is indeterminate and does not produce retribution. It is like how in worldly matters the debtor himself repays the debt, while the contract does not repay the debt; hence the inexhaustible dharma is established as indeterminate. Question: What retribution does the cord of attainment of the Abhidharmikas induce? Answer: The Vibhāṣā says: "It merely tracks karma in receiving retribution; it cannot induce rebirth. Furthermore, it is merely retribution as cause producing its fruit, so it does not produce retribution by creating karma. The four characteristics are likewise." Question: Why does it differ from the school without promissory contracts? Answer: Sūtras speak of the meaning of having a contract, as when the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa cites a stanza spoken by the arhats in the Samyuktasaṅgīti-sūtra: "The contract of illness, old age, and death has already been torn to pieces." This explains that once an arhat has completely repaid his past debt of retribution and takes no further future debt, the contract of the inexhaustible dharma is destroyed, which is called "torn to pieces." But since Buddhavarman has no separate inexhaustible dharma, there is no separate contract, only the debtor; thus it does not accord with the sūtras, which is why it does not agree with the school without promissory contracts. Question: In how many ways does it differ from the school with promissory contracts? Answer: First, the difference between permanent and impermanent: the Sarvāstivādin cord of attainment is impermanent, arising and ceasing moment by moment; the Sāṃmitīya is functional permanence (gongyong chang), which does not cease moment by moment, but ceases only at the end of its grand period. Second, the Sarvāstivādin contract runs through good and evil and therefore induces retribution; the Sāṃmitīyas explain that it is purely indeterminate, so the contract does not induce retribution. Third, because the Sarvāstivādins hold that it induces retribution, the meaning of a contract is not established; because the Sāṃmitīyas hold that it does not induce retribution, the meaning of a contract is established. Fourth, the Sarvāstivādins explicitly hold that the cord of attainment is severed and the afflictions depart of themselves; for the Sāṃmitīyas, attainment is indeterminate and does not sever the indeterminate, but directly severs unwholesome afflictions. However, in both holding it to be neither form nor mind, it does not differ from the Sarvāstivādins. The explanations of "its nature is indeterminate" differ. Some say: this is still the Abhidharma doctrine, where the cord of attainment actually runs through the three natures. Here, it merely explains the metaphor of the contract above; the Abhidharmikas explain that the contract itself is purely indeterminate—just as the prices of gold and stone differ but the contract itself has no high or low value, so it is purely indeterminate—whereas if interpreted according to the doctrine, it runs through the three natures. Some say: this is not the Abhidharma doctrine, but rather that of Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntikas, and the Tattvasiddhi[-śāstra], which take the sentient being as the one that achieves. Thus the Vibhāṣā says: "Buddhadeva said: That a sentient being is not separated from this dharma is called 'achievement'. Sentient beings do not correspond to good or evil, and are therefore indeterminate." Some say: the Dharmaguptaka school explains the mind as that which achieves; the mind does not correspond to good or evil, so it is called indeterminate, being capable of achieving good and evil. Furthermore, according to the doctrine of the Sāṃmitīya school: the Sāṃmitīyas originally belonged to Vinaya scholarship and arose from the Vātsīputrīyas three hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa; they explain the essence of the inexhaustible dharma as indeterminate. The Mingliao lun (Saṃmatīya-śāstra / Prātimokṣa-sūtra-vibhāṣā) was composed by Master Buddhatrāta, based on the doctrine of the Sāṃmitīya school. The treatise says: "The Sāṃmitīya school has two kinds: first, attainment (prāpti); second, the inexhaustible dharma. The inexhaustible dharma exists only in good and evil, not in external dharmas. Furthermore, it is only intrinsically indeterminate. Moreover, it ceases only when it awaits the arising of the fruit. As for attainment, it tracks dharmas through the three natures and exists in both internal and external dharmas. Before the fruit arises, if one repents, attainment is destroyed. But with the inexhaustible dharma, even if one repents, the sin is not destroyed; it must wait for the fruit to arise before it is destroyed." In all, there are five schools: 1. the Sarvāstivādins, running through the three natures; the remaining four schools are all indeterminate: 1. the followers of Buddhadeva, 2. the Dharmaguptakas, 3. the Sāṃmitīyas, and 4. the Mahāyānasaṃgraha—all are indeterminate. The reason these four agree in being indeterminate has a profound justification: good and evil karma induce retribution of themselves; this dharma that holds karma does not induce retribution, hence it is indeterminate. It is like how in worldly matters the debtor himself repays the debt, while the contract does not repay the debt.
8.8
"Distinguished, it is of four kinds": this is the second gate, of bound and unbound, which precisely refers to the ālaya. The ālaya comprehensively retains seeds both within and outside the three realms: retaining seeds within the three realms, it is bound to the three realms; retaining seeds outside the three realms, it is unbound. To interpret this with the purport of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is extremely easy. According to the Abhidharma doctrine, the cord of attainment runs through the contaminated and uncontaminated: contaminated, it is bound to the three realms; uncontaminated, it is unbound. According to treatise doctrine, the nominal person also runs through contaminated and uncontaminated, and can likewise have four: sentient beings of the six destinies are contaminated persons; the worthy and noble ones of the three vehicles are uncontaminated persons. According to the Dharmaguptakas, the mind runs through contaminated and uncontaminated, and likewise can have four. Some say: the four kinds refer to the four indeterminates: retribution-born, comportment, craftsmanship, and transformation; here the inexhaustible dharma is the indeterminate of retribution. The Sāṃmitīya school has its own four indeterminates: 1. root indeterminate; 2. intrinsic indeterminate; 3. obscured indeterminate; 4. unobscured indeterminate. The root indeterminate refers to the primary mind and mental factors. The intrinsic indeterminate refers, aside from wholesome and unwholesome form, to the remaining indeterminate bodily and vocal form and all external forms. The obscured indeterminate refers to the two views of self and extreme, and the afflictions of the upper two realms. The unobscured indeterminate refers to pure indeterminate. These four subsume the four indeterminates of the Abhidharmikas: among the four—comportment, craftsmanship, retribution-born, and transformation—mind belongs to the root, and form belongs to the intrinsic; thus they are subsumed under these two indeterminates. Now, following Piṅgala, it is explained that it is the inexhaustible dharma, bound to the three realms and unbound; hence it says "four kinds." As for why it runs through the four kinds, the Sāṃmitīya school says: whenever a single thought of good or evil arises, an inexhaustible dharma arises together with it, preventing the fruit from being lost. If one gives rise to karma bound to the three realms, there is an inexhaustible dharma bound to the three realms; hence the inexhaustible dharma is bound to the three realms. If one gives rise to uncontaminated karma, an inexhaustible dharma also arises together with it, and this inexhaustible dharma is termed unbound. Question: That the inexhaustible dharma bound to the three realms is indeterminate may be so, but since it is called unbound, it is uncontaminated; how can it be called indeterminate? Answer: Some say that this school posits an indeterminate uncontaminated, so there is no contradiction—just as the Sarvāstivādins explain that one unconditioned dharma is indeterminate yet uncontaminated, and the Tattvasiddhi explains that an arhat's three minds of consciousness, conception, and feeling are indeterminate and uncontaminated. Here, although attaining the uncontaminated it is called uncontaminated, it is indeterminate; hence the inexhaustible dharma is also indeterminate. We now maintain that in the Sāṃmitīya school, the inexhaustible dharma exists only when good or evil karma arises; when uncontaminated and other dharmas arise, there is only attainment, not the inexhaustible dharma. As for saying "distinguished, it is of four kinds," above was merely a general declaration of "indeterminate"; now, distinguishing broadly, the inexhaustible dharma of karma in the three realms is indeterminate. Since the karma that is retained is bound to the three realms, the dharma that can retain it is also bound to the three realms; whereas what is unbound is attainment, which runs through the three natures. Why is this? If the inexhaustible dharma ran through bound and unbound, it should run through abandoned and unabandoned, and below it should not say specifically that it is unabandoned by the vision of the truths and abandoned by cultivation. Since below it specifically speaks of its abandonment and does not speak of its non-abandonment, we know that indeterminate specifically explains the inexhaustible dharma, not attainment. In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, when the ālaya is viewed enduringly, it is the mind of saṃsāric retribution and is contaminated; yet because the ālaya runs through both within and outside the three realms, it runs through both contaminated and uncontaminated, and therefore has four kinds.
8.9
"Not severed by seeing the truths, but severed only by contemplation": the third section differentiates the category of severed and unsevered. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, according to the Mahāyāna doctrine, divides [defilements into those of] seeing and contemplation: the first bhūmi is the path of seeing, and from the second bhūmi up to the vajra[-like samādhi] is the path of cultivation; when the ālaya reaches the state of the vajra-mind that counteracts it, the fundamental consciousness is entirely extinguished. Since the ālaya is a resultant consciousness, it is subsumed under the truth of suffering; as realization gradually brightens, the resultant consciousness of saṃsāra gradually diminishes; when it reaches the counteracting state, the truth of origination within the ālaya is severed completely, and the aspect of the ālaya as the truth of suffering is also extinguished, yet it is not truly severed. In terms of the understanding of seeing and contemplation, the severing of the seeds of the delusions of seeing and contemplation within the fundamental consciousness is merely the severance of origination; the aspect of the ālaya as the truth of suffering is not severed at all, yet because origination ceases, suffering also ceases. Now, the text states that it is not severed by seeing the truths but is severed by contemplation because the ālaya is the indeterminate retribution of the truth of suffering in saṃsāra, bound by the conditions of the delusions of seeing and contemplation. The understanding of seeing the truths does not exhaust the severance of the bondage of conditions, whereas the understanding of contemplation exhausts the severance of the bondage of conditions; hence it is said to be not severed by seeing the truths, but severed by contemplation. For the followers of Buddhadeva, sentient beings are indeterminate retribution; for the Dharmaguptakas, the mind is indeterminate; for the Sāṃmitīyas, the unerring phenomenon (avipraṇāśa) is indeterminate. By analogy to this meaning, none of them are severed; all are bound by the conditions of the two types of delusion, and the path of seeing does not exhaust their severance, while contemplation exhausts the bondage; thus it is merely called severance. Question: Could it also be that the arising of the understanding of seeing the truths impairs the fundamental consciousness, yet the fundamental consciousness is not yet exhausted, and only upon reaching the counteracting state is the fundamental consciousness entirely exhausted, and this is called not severed by seeing the truths, but severed by contemplation? Answer: There is also this meaning. However, the present text discusses severance, and the ālaya is indeterminate retribution, which has no meaning of being severed. The Dharmaguptakas do not sever karma at all; they merely sever afflictions, and the seeds of karma wither on their own. For the Sarvāstivādins, the rope of possession (prāpti) applies to both severances and to the unsevered, so it cannot explain this text. In the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, the provisional person has no phenomenon that is severed; merely upon the path of the non-learner, one abandons the provisional person and enters nirvāṇa, which is also not severance. The Sāṃmitīyas explain that seeing the truths only severs the eighty-eight unwholesome afflictions; it does not sever indeterminate phenomena, and therefore does not sever the unerring phenomenon. The Śāradīputrābhidharma (or Viniścayasamgrahaṇī) states: 'When a single thought of evil arises, there are two [accompanying factors]: first, acquisition (prāpti); second, the unerring phenomenon. Since acquisition applies to the three natures, if a thought of repentance arises, acquisition is immediately destroyed. But the unerring phenomenon is not unwholesome; when the counteracting path arises, it is not severed, and necessarily must obtain its fruit. Therefore, when an arhat experiences retribution, it is because this unerring phenomenon upholds it.' Question: How can the delusions of seeing the truths bind what is indeterminate? Answer: What is indeterminate is subsumed under suffering and origination; the delusions of seeing the truths take the principle of suffering and origination as an objective support and bind the principle of suffering and origination, and therefore bind what is indeterminate. Question: One should only sever the delusions upon the mind; how can one sever delusions upon the objective realm that is supported? Answer: Because one severs delusions upon the mind, the delusions upon the objective realm that is supported are thereby severed; thus it is called severance.
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- 中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese