中觀論疏 8.7

8.7

"Its nature is indeterminate": this is the second part, explaining the two chapter-headings. The preceding two and a half stanzas explain the inexhaustible dharma, through five gates: 1. the gate of the three natures; 2. the gate of bound and unbound; 3. the gate of abandoned and unabandoned; 4. the gate of explaining the name; and 5. the gate of refuting rival views. Question: Why is the indeterminate inexhaustible dharma specifically refuted, rather than refuting the cord of attainment (prāpti) that runs through the three natures? Answer: For two reasons. First, attainment that runs through the three natures can also produce retribution, so it belongs under the gate of karma above and was already refuted; the indeterminate does not produce retribution, and not having been refuted above, it is refuted now. Second, attainment running through the three natures is merely a Hīnayāna doctrine and not worth refuting. The indeterminate runs through both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna: the Sāṃmitīyas are Hīnayāna, while the inexhaustible dharma of the ālayavijñāna is Mahāyāna. Ālaya is translated as "non-loss consciousness" (wumei shi): wu is an alternative word for "not" (bu), and mei is another term for "loss" (shi); hence ālaya is still the inexhaustible dharma (bu shi fa). Furthermore, the essence of the ālaya is indeterminate retribution, capable of retaining all good and evil seeds, which precisely matches the present opponent's view. Moreover, the reason the gate of the three natures is explained first is to address two schools: first, the school with promissory contracts; second, the school without promissory contracts. The school with promissory contracts, such as the Sarvāstivādins, also has four elements: the nominal sentient being is like the creditor; performing good and evil karma is like the debtor; there is a separate cord of attainment that obtains good and evil karma and prevents the fruit from being lost, which is like the contract; and the karma producing retribution is like the debtor repaying the debt. The school without promissory contracts—the followers of Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntikas, the Tattvasiddhi[-śāstra], and so forth—only explains three elements and has no separate cord of attainment serving as a contract; they merely say that the sentient being is the one that achieves (sādhaka), and good and evil karma are what is achieved. If one takes this as the inexhaustible dharma, there is no separate creditor, so there are only three elements. The Dharmaguptakas explain that the mind is what achieves, and likewise there is no separate entity serving as a contract. The Sāṃmitīya school previously addressed the position of having a contract, and thus distinguished it according to the three natures. Why is this? The Sarvāstivādins explain that the cord of attainment runs through the three natures. If so, since the cord of attainment is good or evil, it would in turn induce retribution and thus be identical with karma, both being debtors; how then could it be called a contract? Therefore it is now explained that good and evil karma produce retribution of themselves, whereas the inexhaustible dharma is indeterminate and does not produce retribution. It is like how in worldly matters the debtor himself repays the debt, while the contract does not repay the debt; hence the inexhaustible dharma is established as indeterminate. Question: What retribution does the cord of attainment of the Abhidharmikas induce? Answer: The Vibhāṣā says: "It merely tracks karma in receiving retribution; it cannot induce rebirth. Furthermore, it is merely retribution as cause producing its fruit, so it does not produce retribution by creating karma. The four characteristics are likewise." Question: Why does it differ from the school without promissory contracts? Answer: Sūtras speak of the meaning of having a contract, as when the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa cites a stanza spoken by the arhats in the Samyuktasaṅgīti-sūtra: "The contract of illness, old age, and death has already been torn to pieces." This explains that once an arhat has completely repaid his past debt of retribution and takes no further future debt, the contract of the inexhaustible dharma is destroyed, which is called "torn to pieces." But since Buddhavarman has no separate inexhaustible dharma, there is no separate contract, only the debtor; thus it does not accord with the sūtras, which is why it does not agree with the school without promissory contracts. Question: In how many ways does it differ from the school with promissory contracts? Answer: First, the difference between permanent and impermanent: the Sarvāstivādin cord of attainment is impermanent, arising and ceasing moment by moment; the Sāṃmitīya is functional permanence (gongyong chang), which does not cease moment by moment, but ceases only at the end of its grand period. Second, the Sarvāstivādin contract runs through good and evil and therefore induces retribution; the Sāṃmitīyas explain that it is purely indeterminate, so the contract does not induce retribution. Third, because the Sarvāstivādins hold that it induces retribution, the meaning of a contract is not established; because the Sāṃmitīyas hold that it does not induce retribution, the meaning of a contract is established. Fourth, the Sarvāstivādins explicitly hold that the cord of attainment is severed and the afflictions depart of themselves; for the Sāṃmitīyas, attainment is indeterminate and does not sever the indeterminate, but directly severs unwholesome afflictions. However, in both holding it to be neither form nor mind, it does not differ from the Sarvāstivādins. The explanations of "its nature is indeterminate" differ. Some say: this is still the Abhidharma doctrine, where the cord of attainment actually runs through the three natures. Here, it merely explains the metaphor of the contract above; the Abhidharmikas explain that the contract itself is purely indeterminate—just as the prices of gold and stone differ but the contract itself has no high or low value, so it is purely indeterminate—whereas if interpreted according to the doctrine, it runs through the three natures. Some say: this is not the Abhidharma doctrine, but rather that of Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntikas, and the Tattvasiddhi[-śāstra], which take the sentient being as the one that achieves. Thus the Vibhāṣā says: "Buddhadeva said: That a sentient being is not separated from this dharma is called 'achievement'. Sentient beings do not correspond to good or evil, and are therefore indeterminate." Some say: the Dharmaguptaka school explains the mind as that which achieves; the mind does not correspond to good or evil, so it is called indeterminate, being capable of achieving good and evil. Furthermore, according to the doctrine of the Sāṃmitīya school: the Sāṃmitīyas originally belonged to Vinaya scholarship and arose from the Vātsīputrīyas three hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa; they explain the essence of the inexhaustible dharma as indeterminate. The Mingliao lun (Saṃmatīya-śāstra / Prātimokṣa-sūtra-vibhāṣā) was composed by Master Buddhatrāta, based on the doctrine of the Sāṃmitīya school. The treatise says: "The Sāṃmitīya school has two kinds: first, attainment (prāpti); second, the inexhaustible dharma. The inexhaustible dharma exists only in good and evil, not in external dharmas. Furthermore, it is only intrinsically indeterminate. Moreover, it ceases only when it awaits the arising of the fruit. As for attainment, it tracks dharmas through the three natures and exists in both internal and external dharmas. Before the fruit arises, if one repents, attainment is destroyed. But with the inexhaustible dharma, even if one repents, the sin is not destroyed; it must wait for the fruit to arise before it is destroyed." In all, there are five schools: 1. the Sarvāstivādins, running through the three natures; the remaining four schools are all indeterminate: 1. the followers of Buddhadeva, 2. the Dharmaguptakas, 3. the Sāṃmitīyas, and 4. the Mahāyānasaṃgraha—all are indeterminate. The reason these four agree in being indeterminate has a profound justification: good and evil karma induce retribution of themselves; this dharma that holds karma does not induce retribution, hence it is indeterminate. It is like how in worldly matters the debtor himself repays the debt, while the contract does not repay the debt.