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中觀論疏 9.13

English (machine translation) 9.13

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English

9.13

From "The question says" onward arises the second refutation, the gate of exhaustion and non-exhaustion. The earlier proposition said that there is manifestly the characteristic of exhaustion and cessation; after the two gates of togetherness and separation refuted it, [the opponent] had no words to reply, so they merely raised manifest events to question the treatise master. From the Avīci Hell up to the diamond-like mind of the Mahāyāna, all are impermanent phenomena of exhaustion and cessation; hence it is said, "Impermanence is neither loose nor swift; the suffering of conditioning is neither heavy nor light." Furthermore, hitherto their asserted positions were defeated; at the beginning of this chapter their asserted position of defeat was defeated once again; is this not manifestly seeing the characteristic of exhaustion and cessation? "In this characteristic of exhaustion and cessation, we also speak of exhaustion and non-exhaustion": earlier it was explained generally that all is impermanent; now within impermanence there are nominal and real: real phenomena are completely exhausted, while the continuity of provisional designations is called non-exhaustion. The intent of the refutation is: a real phenomenon does not abide for a single thought-moment, so how could one wish it to bring things to be? Hence it says "if exhausted, there is no coming-to-be." If one wishes to dissolve it, it has long since passed away into cessation; what is there to speak of dissolving? Moreover, non-exhaustion is permanent, and with what is permanent what is there to speak of coming to be? Hence it says "if unexhausted, there is also no coming-to-be." Furthermore, the meanings of exhaustion and cessation in Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna differ: in Hīnayāna, from moment to moment there are phenomena that are completely exhausted; in Mahāyāna, that which ceases from moment to moment contains no phenomena, like a mirage running. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Dichi lun*) refers to unestablished impermanence: provisional designations continue without interruption, which is permanence. Since it is permanent, what is permanent has no coming-to-be; and because coming-to-be does not exist, dissolution does not exist either. An attempted rescue says: "The entire entity continues, and the entire entity ceases; how can you make this refutation?" Answer: You must pay close attention. In terms of your entire entity continuing, it certainly does not cease, therefore it is called permanent; hence under both gates of nominal and real, there is neither coming-to-be nor dissolution. This gate of exhaustion and non-exhaustion is still the gate of permanent and impermanent, and also refutes via the gate of determined and undetermined. The prose explanation is exceedingly clear. "If exhausted, there is also no dissolution": this is a refutation based on mutual dependence. If there had been coming-to-be just now, there could be dissolution; but since ultimately there is no coming-to-be, how could there be dissolution? "If unexhausted, there is also no dissolution": this refutes from the approach of permanence.

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