中觀論疏 9
English (machine translation) 9
- Language
- English
9.1
Composed by the monk Jizang
9.2
Chapter 20: Cause and Effect
9.3
Question: From the beginning up to now, cause and effect have been refuted in chapter after chapter; why are they explained again now? Answer: Cause and effect are the great lineage of all doctrines and the root for establishing faith. Confused people commit many errors regarding them; although briefly refuted above, they ought to be discussed again here in sequence below. For instance, the four tenets of the non-Buddhists asserting erroneous causes and erroneous effects differ, and there are the assertions of the ten schools among Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teachers; hence we know that cause and effect are difficult to illuminate and must be analyzed once more. Second, although cause and effect were refuted previously, it was to establish other dharmas—as in the "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" refuting the cause and effect of the four conditions to establish the principle of non-arising, up through the "Chapter on the Five Aggregates" refuting cause and effect to establish the absence of the five aggregates—none of which directly examined cause and effect. Desiring now to examine cause and effect directly, this chapter is therefore introduced. If traced from what immediately precedes, it arises from the "Chapter on Time." The opponent says: If time in the three times does not exist, how could the dharmas of cause and effect exist? Yet the principle of cause and effect cannot be made non-existent; therefore, time must exist. Question: How many kinds of cause and effect are there? Answer: Briefly, there are three kinds: first, cause and effect of mutual production, like clay and a pot; second, cause and effect of mutual conditioning, like curled fingers; third, cause and effect of revealing causes, like a lamp revealing myriad things or the myriad practices revealing the Dharmakāya. Question: Does this chapter refute cause and effect, or does it elucidate cause and effect? Answer: Within every chapter there are both the refutation and the elucidation. To seek an intrinsically real cause and effect, whether internal or external, Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, is entirely without foundation; hence it is called refuting cause and effect. Because those who assert an intrinsically real [cause and effect] destroy the meaning of cause and effect, the author of the treatise must refute them. Second, once intrinsically real cause and effect are eliminated, only then can cause and effect of dependent origination be distinguished. Being called dependent origination, cause and effect are vividly evident yet constantly tranquil and extinguished; therefore, generating contemplation within causes, prapañca is forgotten.
9.4
The chapter is divided into two parts: first, refuting specifically the causes and effects of the ten schools; second, refuting generally all causes and effects. Refuting the causes and effects of the ten schools comprises ten sections, which can also be subsumed under five pairs: the first pair is existence and nonexistence; the second pair is bestowing and not bestowing, also called cessation and non-cessation; the third pair is simultaneous and sequential; the fourth pair is cessation-transformation and non-cessation-transformation; the fifth pair is pervasive and non-pervasive. The initial pair of existence and nonexistence comprises four verses in total, making four distinct points: The first verse clarifies: if the effect exists within the cause, why rely on conditions to arise? The second verse: if the effect does not exist within the cause, how can conditions produce it? The third verse refutes the existent effect again: if the effect exists within the cause, and the effect possesses the four sense-data, then the sense faculties should perceive it. The fourth refutes nonexistence again: if the effect does not exist within the cause, then the cause is identical to a non-cause. The reason they are refuted in this interwoven manner is that when existence is refuted, the opponent clings to nonexistence, and therefore nonexistence is refuted; next, when nonexistence is refuted, the opponent shifts position and clings to existence, and thus existence is refuted again; when existence is refuted, they cling thoroughly to nonexistence again; because their attachments are unstable, they are refuted in an interwoven manner. Furthermore, this treatise has many approaches to refutation: previously existence and nonexistence were treated separately by category, but now existence and nonexistence are interwoven; since adaptations to circumstances differ, the approaches to refutation are not singular. Question: Why among the ten schools are existence and nonexistence refuted first? Answer: Existence and nonexistence are the root of annihilation and permanence, and annihilation and permanence are the source of all views; wishing now to exhaust their root, they are refuted first. Moreover, cause and effect in the Buddhadharma are precisely the middle way, and existence and nonexistence directly obstruct the middle way. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika are the heads of the non-Buddhist schools, and the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas are the root of the various Buddhist sects; since these inner and outer traditions specifically cling to existence and nonexistence, they are refuted first. Question: Why not refute both-existence-and-nonexistence and neither-existence-nor-nonexistence? Answer: Both-existence together with not-nonexistence still have the meaning of existence; both-nonexistence together with not-existence still have the meaning of nonexistence; therefore, merely by refuting the two barriers, the four doctrines are subsumed. First the prose establishes the position, then the verse refutes it: this is the Sāṃkhya together with the Sthaviras explaining that an effect exists within the cause. Clinging to the existence of an effect has three grounds: First, one visibly sees that the effect comes from the cause, and therefore the effect exists within the cause. Second, it arises by relying on conditions, so one knows it exists within the conditions; if it did not exist within the conditions, even when combined it would not arise. Third, trusting the Buddha's words, as a sūtra states: 'Because there is the nature of arising, arising can bring about arising.' The first half of the verse cites [the position], and the second half refutes it. The opponent rescues [their claim], saying: The actual fact of the effect does not exist within the cause, but relying on the combination of conditions, the actual effect arises; how can you object that it does not need the combination of conditions to arise? Answer: That there is no actual effect within the cause is ultimately the meaning of there being no effect within the cause. Because there is no actual thing within the cause and yet an actual thing arises, one should know that this actual thing previously was nonexistent and now exists, and therefore this is [the thesis that] there is no effect within the cause. Furthermore, if the combination of conditions brings forth the actual thing, the principle should also exist only when there is combination. If the principle exists of itself, the actual thing should likewise be so. Furthermore, if the actual thing is caused by the principle, the principle should have a further cause. Furthermore, if the actual thing is caused by the principle, the actual thing might be existent, but since the principle has no cause, there should be no principle. One further asks: does it already exist originally and then require the combination of conditions, or does it exist only after the combination of conditions? If it already exists originally, why require the combination of conditions? If it exists only after the combination of conditions, then before the combination it is nonexistent; though relying on the combination of conditions, the effect ultimately would not arise. Below 'The question states,' the thesis that the effect does not exist within the cause is established, which is the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika and the Mahāsāṃghika that [the effect in] the two times is nonexistent. In the answer, the first half of the verse cites [the position] and the second half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: if the effect does not exist within the cause, this nonexistence is no different from the nonexistence of empty space or a hare's horn; empty space and a hare's horn do not arise from the combination of conditions, and the effect would likewise be so. If the effect can arise accordingly, while empty space does not arise, then empty space could be nonexistent and the effect should be not nonexistent. If both are alike nonexistent, yet empty space does not arise while the effect arises, then it could also be that empty space should arise while the effect does not arise. The first half of the third verse reiterates existence, and the second half directly refutes it. For the non-Buddhists, the pot in the clay completely possesses the five sense-data, so the five sense faculties should be able to perceive it; in the inner Dharma, the pot is composed of four sense-data, so the four sense faculties should cognize it. Furthermore, in the inner Dharma, if the pot in the clay is provisional, it should be grasped by conceptual thought, but neither is the case; therefore, know that it does not exist. The first half of the fourth verse reiterates nonexistence, and the second half directly refutes it. The refutation has three points: First, mutually and alike being nonexistent, the cause is identical to a non-cause, and mutually they do not arise; furthermore, if all are non-causes, there is no cause, and because cause is nonexistent, non-cause is also nonexistent. Second, mutually and alike being nonexistent, the non-cause is identical to a cause, and mutually all are causes with no non-cause; since there is no non-cause, there is also no cause. Third, if both are alike nonexistent and yet there are causes and non-causes, then both being alike causes, there should also be existence and nonexistence; furthermore, being equally nonexistent, one should also seek fire in ice and seek milk in water, which would cause great chaos in cause and effect.
9.5
Below 'The question states: because the cause [gives the effect]...', the second pair refuting bestowing an effect and not bestowing an effect is presented. First is the refutation of the thesis that the cause bestows [being] as a cause on the effect, and next is the refutation of the thesis that the cause does not bestow [being] as a cause on the effect. First is the establishment, and next is the refutation. In the establishment, the opponent avoids the previous two barriers of existence and nonexistence: because the cause bestows [being] as a cause on the effect, it is not completely nonexistent within the cause; and when the cause has finished bestowing, it ceases, so one cannot say that the effect exists within the cause. The masters of the Tattvasiddhi state: A cause is conditioned, and generally has two meanings: first, intrinsic cessation; second, transformation. By intrinsic cessation, the cause ceases and the effect arises; by transformation, the cause transforms into the effect. They also state: A single moment of cause is sufficient in its power to produce the effect, and thus can bring forth the effect; the cause is conditioned, and therefore ceases as soon as it arises. This is also of this meaning. Because the power to induce the effect is sufficient, it is called 'bestowing the effect'; the meaning of intrinsic cessation is designated as 'cessation.' Hence the text of the Tattvasiddhi states: 'After this cause acts as cause for the effect, it ceases and the retribution arises subsequently.' It also states: 'Having acted as cause, it ceases, but its capacity to bring fulfillment remains, and so it can induce the effect.' This is also of this meaning. The first half of the verse cites [the position], and the second half refutes it. Let us first question the earlier meaning of intrinsic cessation and transformation: You have only a single cause of milk; if you say that it ceases, then there is nothing that can transform into curd; if you say that the milk transforms into the effect of curd, then you cannot say that the milk ceases. Now if you claim that it acts and then ceases, the milk would have two substances: one substance ceases beforehand, and the second milk-substance transforms into curd. Originally a single milk was posited; how can there be two? One also asks: If the cause bestows on the effect, if the effect exists, why need to bestow? If it does not exist, upon what does it act as a cause? The rescue says: The principle of the effect exists, and therefore it acts as a cause for the effect. If the principle is different from emptiness, there is no need to bestow; if it is not different from emptiness, there is nothing to bestow. Furthermore, if your effect has a principle of existence, it also has a principle of nonexistence. As the Śata-śāstra states: 'If existence is existent, if nonexistence is nonexistent.' One also challenges the doctrine of Kaishan, saying: There is present possession (prāpti), and there is also presently active presence. Is the present possession capable of apprehending an object, or does it not apprehend? If it can apprehend, it is presently active and cannot be called possession; if it cannot apprehend, it is like the non-associated defilements of the Vibhajyavādins. Moreover, Kaishan also holds the meaning of a past-of-the-past. The cessation and passing away of the first moment is one past; the possession coming into the present and ceasing once the effect is obtained is another past. This is the same as the Kaśyapīyas' loss after already being lost. Furthermore, your cause is one, yet has cessation and non-cessation, so it has two substances: one is the presently active cause, and the second is the cause of possession coming into the present; hence there are two substances. If it is said that there is only a single substance that passes through two times, since causal dharmas are designated provisionally as time, once there are two times there are two dharmas, which would result in two causes and two effects. One also asks: If after obtaining the effect there is no longer possession, after obtaining the effect it should also not be called past; if after passing away it is still called past, then after obtaining the retribution it should still be called possession. Below 'The question states: if it is said that the cause does not bestow an effect...', the second refutes that the cause does not act as cause for the effect. The opponent avoids the previous two substances, and posits only that the cause ceases and the effect arises. In the answer, the first half cites [the position] and the second half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: when the cause ceases before the effect [arises], there is no cause; how could the effect arise? Even if the effect arises, it would be an effect without a cause. Furthermore, the previous verse explained that if the effect arises and then [the cause] ceases, there is the fault of two causes; now it is explained that if the cause has ceased and then the effect arises, there is the fault of having no cause. The former refutes the meaning of the Tattvasiddhi; the latter refutes the meaning of the Abhidharma. The former also refutes the Mahāsāṃghika, and the latter refutes the Sthavira doctrine. When going to Chang'an, I saw the masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha positing two doctrines: first, positing that hearing-permeation does not cease and becomes the reward Buddha; second, positing that hearing-permeation ceases and does not become the reward Buddha. Saying that it becomes the Buddha falls into the fault of two substances: first, hearing-permeation transforms into the reward Buddha, which is the meaning of the impermanent becoming permanent. Second, hearing-permeation is conditioned, and is also of the meaning of cessation; therefore a single hearing-permeation falls into two substances. Next, positing that it ceases: all virtues arise from the substance of tathatā; hearing-permeation merely serves as a sovereign condition for arising, and does not truly become the reward Buddha, and therefore it ceases. Just as an artisan merely serves as a condition for bringing forth gold from the raw gold ore, while the gold itself comes from the raw gold ore. This is the meaning of the cause ceasing and being lost. Furthermore, the masters of the Tattvasiddhi originally held that the diamond-like mind has two meanings: first, intrinsic cessation of the real dharma; second, the meaning of continuity transforming to become Buddha. Now, those who hold that hearing-permeation does not cease are purely adhering to the Tattvasiddhi doctrine.
9.6
From "Question: When the manifold conditions assemble" downwards is the third pair, refuting simultaneity and non-simultaneity (prior and posterior). The first verse refutes simultaneity. The meaning of the question is: when the manifold conditions assemble, the effect immediately arises; thus, there is no error of being causeless or of existence [prior to the cause]. This is also the doctrine of the Chengshi [school] that the five aggregates simultaneously form a person, and of the Sarvāstivādins that the eight characteristics arise simultaneously together. Furthermore, for the Sarvāstivādins (Abhidharmikas), causes and effects already exist in the future, which is precisely simultaneity, but coming into the present they arise with the cause prior and the effect posterior. Under "Reply", the upper half reiterates [the opponent's thesis] and the lower half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: the way of mutual generation requires that the generator is existent, and so it can generate the other; and that the generated is non-existent, and so it is generated from the other. If one posits simultaneity, then if existent, both are existent; if non-existent, both are non-existent. If both are non-existent, there is only the generated, losing the generator; if both are existent, there is only the generator, losing the generated. Therefore, if they are simultaneous, one loses the generator and the generated; if one preserves the generator and the generated, one loses simultaneity. Refuting the traditionally accepted doctrine: as your person and aggregates are simultaneous, why do you not say that the person is the aggregates, and the boundary of the cause is the effect of the person? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Sentient beings and name-and-form bind one another"; they should then serve as causes for each other and serve as substances for each other. Furthermore, if two dharmas are simultaneous, apart from the dharmas there is no separate time: if time is one, dharmas must be one; if dharmas are two, times must be two. If time is one while dharmas are two, time should also be two while dharmas are one. Moreover, others say: the time when the cause ceases is the time when the effect arises. But arising is existence, and cessation is non-existence—how could they be simultaneous? Furthermore, if one speaks of cause and effect being simultaneous, then simultaneity could also have prior and posterior. Refuting the Abhidharmika doctrine: time is provisionally designated on the basis of dharmas; if nine dharmas arise together, there must be nine times; if one says they share one time, they should also share one dharma. Cause and effect cannot be one dharma, nor can cause and effect be simultaneous. From "Question: If an effect arises first" downwards: up to this point there are three doctrines altogether: the first two pairs refuted prior cause and posterior effect; the next single instance refuted cause and effect being simultaneous; now this refutes prior effect and posterior cause. These three doctrines encompass everything. First it is posited, and next refuted. Both in the sūtras and in theoretical treatises there is this attachment. For example, before Sudatta had cultivated the cause of the vihāra, the effect of the heavenly realm already existed; before Nanda had actually observed or broken [precepts], he already had the retribution of pain or pleasure. Are these not prior effect and posterior cause? Master [Tan]ying also said: "First there is the structure of the house, and later the pillars and beams are provided"; this is also the same sense. Moreover, a sūtra states: "The effect of nirvāṇa originally exists, and later one cultivates practice to attain it." "Reply": the upper half reiterates [the opponent's thesis], and the lower half refutes it. The import of the refutation is: fundamentally an effect exists by virtue of a cause; when the cause does not yet exist, how could an effect be attained? If an effect already exists when the cause does not yet exist, it is called an effect without a cause. Question: The sūtras themselves make this statement; why refute it? Would the treatise refute what the sūtras should not state? Answer: The sūtras have a different, profound intent: to encourage people to cultivate merit, they speak of the affair of Sudatta; to admonish against evil and encourage good, they speak of the affair of Nanda; to counter the view that the beginning of birth-and-death is impermanent, they speak of nirvāṇa being originally existent and permanent. Nirvāṇa has never been permanent or impermanent; how could it ever be an original or beginning existence? Furthermore, regarding prior effect and posterior cause, just as for the Abhidharmikas the life-faculty arises alone, and later any one of the ten fetters is used to moisten the rebirth to make that single life-period firm: the life-faculty is the principal master of karmic retribution, extending through the six destinies and the three realms. Now we ask: whence does the cause of the life-faculty come? Answer: It arises due to karma. Question: If so, then it is prior cause and posterior effect. Furthermore, if the prior cause has ceased and the effect of the life-faculty arises later, it is an effect existing without a cause. Furthermore, if the effect exists first and defilements arise later to moisten it, that is an inverted moistening. Moreover, if the life-faculty and the rest already exist, what need is there ultimately for any one of the ten fetters to moisten them? Furthermore, if there is a prior effect and posterior cause, then the effect generates the cause, and cause and effect are inverted and disordered.
9.7
From "The question says: the cause perishes and transforms into the fruit" downwards is the fourth pair: the cause perishing and transforming [versus] the cause perishing without transforming. The proponent's position states: that the cause perishes and transforms into the fruit means, upon examining the opponent's view, they merely call perishing "transforming"; hence, the cause's perishing is itself transforming into the fruit. In the reply, the first half refutes it by showing the cause reaching the fruit, and the second half refutes it through repeated arising. The first line quotes the opponent's thesis, and the second line refutes it. The refutation says: since the cause transforms into the fruit, the substance of the cause does not perish; because the substance of the cause does not perish, the cause reaches into the fruit. The refutation by repeated arising in the second half means: when it is a cause, that is one arising, and upon reaching the fruit, that is another arising; hence, it is a repeated arising. This simply makes a single entity arise repeatedly, which is why an error is incurred. Furthermore, refuting another view, it says: if the cause transforms into the fruit, then the fruit is not distinct from the cause, and it is still the earlier cause acting as the later fruit. Just as a man named Zhang in the east, when arriving in the west, is still the same man named Zhang. If the cause is distinct from the fruit, then the cause perishes by itself beforehand, and it is not the cause that becomes the fruit. Moreover, we ask: if the cause transforms into the fruit, the cause must be distinct from the fruit; if it were not distinct, it should not transform. Furthermore, as with the transformation of the former Deer King reaching to the Buddha: the Buddha would have to be a deer; if he is no longer a deer, then the fruit is distinct from the cause, and before the cause perishes and there is no fruit, there would be no cause—with no cause, how could there be a fruit? Moreover, we ask: does it transform when perished, or transform when not perished? If it has perished, there is nothing that can transform; if it has not perished, it does not transform. Furthermore, concerning "having arisen, it arises again": as Kaishan states, when acting as a cause, that is one arising, and subsequently, upon attainment arriving in the present, that is another arising. This falls into the error of repeated arising. The prose consists of two parts: first, explaining the root verse; second, refuting alternative views. Regarding "prior-arising cause" and "co-arising cause": a prior-arising cause is a mutually generating cause and effect, where the cause arises prior and the fruit arises later, hence named a prior-arising cause. A co-arising cause is a mutually conditioning cause and effect, like beams and pillars existing simultaneously with the house, named a co-arising cause. These two kinds of causes encompass all instances. Further examining the text, mutually generating causes and effects themselves are of two kinds: first, simultaneous, like major and minor arising; second, sequential, like the retribution cause and effect. Now, intending to refute the prior-arising cause, the co-arising cause is set aside to clarify that the prior-arising cause falls into the fault of repeated arising. Question: Why is the first half of the verse not explained? Answer: Because the cause reaching into the fruit is still the opponent's thesis, it does not need to be explained. From "If it is claimed that the cause immediately transforms" downwards is the second part, which again refutes alternative views. It refutes two schools altogether: first, refuting "immediate transformation". The opponent defends: the cause immediately transforms into the fruit; there is only a single arising, without repeated arising. Hence the refutation now says: since you speak of "immediately", it cannot be called "transformation"; if you speak of "transformation", it cannot be called "immediately". Just as the physical eye (yan) is immediately the eye (mu), it cannot be called a transformation. From "The question says: the cause does not completely perish" downwards is the second defense, which states: the designation perishes while the substance remains constantly; because the substance remains, though transformed, it is immediate; because the designation perishes, though immediate, it transforms. Another says: the former Deer King was my very body; the spiritual awareness of the deer and the spiritual awareness of the Buddha are not distinct; it is merely that the designation of "deer" perished and the designation of "Buddha" arose. The spiritual awareness of humans and gods is also not distinct; it is merely that one designation is lost and another designation arises. Furthermore, according to the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine, the inherently pure mind-nature is neither cause nor fruit; when in the state of cause it is called cause; from beginning to end it is one mind, hence its substance is called one; names differ, so one name is lost and another name arises. Furthermore, like the non-Buddhists, from subtle to coarse, and from coarse to subtle, the meaning is also like this. Furthermore, the She-lun masters say: the substance of the ālaya has neither arising nor perishing, while its names and functions have arising and perishing; this is also of the same meaning. Furthermore, this doctrine contradicts the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, which clarifies the meaning of eight consciousnesses perishing. Regarding "The answer says: the lump of clay perishing prior and the pot subsequently arising is not called transformation": since a designation designates a substance, and a substance corresponds to a designation, when the designation has already perished, the substance must also perish; this being so, with earlier perishing and later arising, how could it be a transformation? Regarding "Moreover, the lump of clay does not arise alone": this phrase clarifies that not only does the designation arise, but in terms of substance it also arises; contrasting with the previous phrase, not only does the designation perish, but the substance also perishes. Furthermore, the opponent holds two tenets: first, that the substance of the cause does not perish; second, that the fruit exists within the cause. The former refutes that the substance does not perish; now this refutes the tenet of its existence. Moreover, it refutes the notion that the substance of the lump of clay is definitely imperishable; since two entities are combined, the substance is not fixed. Regarding "If there were only a designation": this phrase states, if you only claim that designations perish and designations arise, then there would only be designations and no substance; what entity would transform? Regarding "Transformation is named as milk transforming into curds": this phrase proves that when designations perish, substances also perish, and when designations arise, substances also arise. As in the Śata-śāstra, the five factors of shape, time, power, cognition, and name differ, hence they perish together and arise together. Refuting another view, it says: before your single lump of clay is made into a pot, it fully possesses the principles of all objects. When you say that when clay becomes a pot, the other principles undergo apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, there should also be a principle of the pot failing and a principle of the pot succeeding. Answer: There is also a principle of the pot failing. Just as when a single lump of clay is made into whatever one object, the other objects all fail. Question: Since they cannot all succeed simultaneously, they also cannot all fail simultaneously. Answer: Accomplishing an object lies in one; because concrete matters are difficult, they cannot succeed simultaneously. Question: Since the various principles are co-present, the concrete matters should also be co-present. Answer: Concrete matters obstruct one another, so they cannot exist simultaneously; principles do not obstruct one another, so they can exist simultaneously. Question: If when principles exist, concrete matters exist, then principles obstructing should mean concrete matters obstructing; if principles do not obstruct, principles also do not exist. From "The question says: although the cause perishes and is lost" downwards is the second part, refuting perishing without transforming. Since earlier perishing and later transforming falls into two arisings, they now say: it is merely that the cause perishes beforehand and the fruit arises afterward, without the fault of repeated arising. In the reply, the first half refutes: if the cause is lost, there is no cause; what would produce the fruit? The second half clarifies: if the cause is not lost, the cause would reside in the fruit; how could it produce the fruit? Just as if the rice is lost, there is nothing to make into cooked rice; if it is not lost, the raw rice remains and there is no cooked rice either. The reason for repeatedly refuting its not being lost is that the opponent posits cause and effect as only having two options, lost or not lost; if one refutes not being lost, they posit being lost; if one refutes being lost, they posit not being lost; therefore, one refutes them in their advance and retreat. Question: How does this differ from the refutation in the previous verse? Answer: Above, it was refuted through repeated arising; here, it is gathered together to show non-arising. Furthermore, as in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra and others, a single doctrine contains both lost and not lost: real dharmas are lost, while the continuum is not lost; therefore both are refuted: if real dharmas are lost, there is no cause to produce the fruit; if the continuum is not lost, the cause should reside in the fruit. Furthermore, this passage opens up the doctrine of stimulus and response (ganying). Now we ask: regarding the goodness that is to arise which stimulates, is this goodness existent, or is it non-existent? If it is existent, why must it stimulate? If it is claimed that the goodness of principle stimulates and the concrete response occurs, then the cause of principle stimulates the concrete fruit. Unless your doctrine holds that there are no sentient beings, if there are sentient beings, then all principles of goodness exist, and all sentient beings can constantly stimulate the sages, so there would be no need to cultivate concrete goodness to stimulate concrete fruits. Furthermore, we ask: if there is already a response before concrete goodness exists, there should also already be concrete goodness before a response exists. Furthermore, we ask about the meaning of stimulation: if without concrete action one cannot stimulate the fruit, then without concrete goodness one should also not be able to stimulate the sages. Furthermore, we ask: why does your doctrine of stimulus and response not correlate, with principle responding to the capacity of principle, and concrete action responding to the capacity of concrete action? If the capacity of principle stimulates concrete action, the capacity of concrete action should also stimulate principle. Next, we ask: if goodness of the two realms of past and present can stimulate, since goodness already exists, why must it stimulate? If it is said that it stimulates in order to increase and generate goodness, if so, then before goodness exists it should not stimulate; how could the first single thought of goodness arise? If a single thought of goodness arises of itself without needing the sage's response, subsequent ones should also arise of themselves without needing a response. Furthermore, asking Zhuangyan: since the two periods are non-existent, how can one achieve the past? Having achieved the past, how can you say it is non-existent? If a past cause stimulates a future fruit, past understanding should also sever future afflictions. If afflictions, being non-existent, cannot be severed, then the fruit, being non-existent, should also not be stimulated. Furthermore, asking Guangzhai about the doctrine of attainment: the sūtra says that conditioned phenomena are impermanent, yet you claim that the arising of a single thought of good or evil is permanent in function—does this not contradict the sūtra? Moreover, this incurs the faults of permanence within impermanence, and impermanence within permanence.
9.8
From "The question says: this cause pervasively possesses the fruit" downwards is the fifth pair: pervasive [versus] non-pervasive. In general, views of cause and effect differ among people: seeing seeds within the lotus, they claim prior existence; seeing that it arises only upon waiting for conditions, they claim prior non-existence; seeing the cause perish and the fruit arise, they claim the cause precedes the fruit; seeing that it still acts as a cause for the fruit, they claim the cause follows the fruit; seeing fingers brought together to form a fist, they claim cause and effect are simultaneous; seeing milk turned into curds, they claim the cause transforms into the fruit; seeing an image in a mirror, they claim the cause sees the fruit; seeing a seed perish and a sprout arise, they say the cause does not see the fruit; seeing oil emerge from sesame seeds, they say it is pervasively existent; seeing a mother give birth to a child, they say it is non-pervasive, as the child is only in the belly and not in the four limbs. Therefore, now desiring to exhaustively examine all these views, they are fully refuted. This verse clarifies that if it is pervasive, then its entire substance is completely it; what further entity could arise? Just as the five fingers are pervasively the fist, what further fist could arise? If it is not pervasive, can you have the fist on one side and the fingers on the other side? Furthermore, if the fist does not pervasively reside in the fingers, does it reside outside the fingers, inside the fingers, or in between? None of these succeeds. Seeing and not seeing are just pervasive and non-pervasive; pervasive is also prior existence within the cause, and non-pervasive is prior non-existence. Because its entire substance is just it, it is called pervasive; also, because its entire substance is just it, it is called seeing. In the prose: seeing means already existing within the cause, hence needing no arising; not seeing means non-existence within the cause, unable to arise. One can scrutinize the text closely regarding "seeing". The Tattvasiddhi masters say: sentient beings possess the principle of pervasively arising in all the destinies of the six realms. The Sarvāstivādins say: the future exists, and pervasively possesses the natures of the five destinies and the three vehicles; upon reaching the patience of suffering, two of the natures among the three vehicles as well as the three evil destinies all undergo apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. Now we ask: The Nirvāṇa Sūtra refutes Śreṇika, saying, "If the self pervades all destinies, why does it create karma anew for the sake of the body?" Since the Sarvāstivādins hold that future bodies of the five destinies are pervasively possessed, they are subject to this same objection. They defend: the future only has existence of nature, which differs from the non-Buddhist self. Now we ask: if this is distinct from emptiness, it is already existent; if it is not yet distinct from emptiness, what is taken as the nature? Furthermore, we ask: by what cause does this future nature exist? Therefore we know that its inherent, original existence is none other than the view of permanence.
9.9
From "Furthermore, if it is said that a past cause..." downward is the second part: a general refutation of cause and effect. Previously, ten positions were refuted individually in five pairs; now there are further five pairs in the general refutation: first, the refutation in terms of conjunction and non-conjunction; second, the refutation in terms of empty and non-empty; third, the refutation in terms of identity and difference; fourth, the refutation in terms of possessing nature and lacking nature; fifth, the concluding refutation in terms of conjunction and non-conjunction. Regarding the first four verses, there are two parts: the first three verses refute conjunction, and the final verse refutes both conjunction and non-conjunction. In terms of the three verses, there are three points: they all explain that a cause of one period of time does not conjoin with an effect of the three periods of time. The reason for refuting conjunction is that when a cause can produce an effect, it is called the cause conjoining with the effect; and when an effect can repay a cause, it is called the effect conjoining with the cause. In refuting the opponent's position, we ask: If an effect in the present can be obtained from a past cause, since the past has ceased and is non-existent, how could it produce an effect in the present? This refutes the "fulfillment" (prāpti) theory of Zhuangyan. If the past shifts and comes into the present, then it is not called past. If it shifts and comes, it would be permanent; and if it were permanent, how could it yield retribution? This refutes the position of Kaishan. Furthermore, if a past practice-cause (abhyāsa-hetu) exists and can produce an effect in the present, since it is called existent, it is present and not called past. This universally refutes the various masters. Question: How is it that a future cause obtains a future effect? Answer: Others say that one will attain the principle of Buddhahood. The principle lies in the future: in the future, one's pure body will attain bodhi. Again, in the future one will cultivate the cause and attain bodhi; and again, in the future one will cultivate the cause and attain the future effect. Furthermore, they say: All sentient beings constantly possess the principle of good that will arise in the future as their capacity; the sages' response to this is the effect—all of these are instances of this. Question: How does a future cause obtain a present effect? Answer: It is like a future capacity eliciting an effect, so that the sage responds in the present. Question: How can a future cause be for a past effect? Answer: The future has the principle of attaining Buddhahood as its cause; therefore, throughout the two times of future and present, one cuts off afflictions and seeks Buddhahood. Now we ask: If the future were already capable of acting as a cause for cutting off afflictions, then the future must also already possess the understanding that cuts off present delusions. Moreover, if the future effect were already able to generate resolve in the present, it would also share this difficulty. Question: How does a present effect act as a cause for the past? Answer: This is a cause of continuity and designation (santāna-prajñapti). Because a cause connects to the preceding cause, causing the preceding one not to be broken so as to act for the subsequent one, it is a present cause and a past effect. How could the past not, dependent on the present, manage to shift and come into the present? Question again: How is there a future cause and a past effect? Answer: Ordinary sentiments say there is no such principle. Now we clarify that dependent on the future it becomes the past, meaning the future is the cause and the past is the effect. What is a present cause and present effect? The sūtra says: "The moment one gives rise to this thought, the Buddha appears in empty space." A present cause and a future effect is easily understood. As for a present cause and a past effect: it is like cultivating the cause in the present to seek the originally existent Dharmakāya. The prose clarifies that an effect of the three times does not conjoin with a cause of the three times, which corresponds to the verses stating that a cause of the three times does not conjoin with an effect of the three times—reversing and complementing each other. From "Furthermore, if they do not combine...", the second is one verse refuting both conjunction and non-conjunction together. The first half repeats the earlier meaning of non-conjunction to clarify that there is no mutual production; the second half refutes the meaning of combination. Conjunction without mutual production means that the cause has already conjoined with the effect, which entails that the effect already exists and does not require mutual production. Non-conjunction means that the cause does not conjoin with the effect, which entails the non-existence of an effect; what is non-existent cannot be produced. From "If the cause is empty of the effect..." downward is the second: the refutation in terms of empty and non-empty. The three verses form two parts: the first verse refutes in terms of the cause being empty or non-empty; the next two verses refute in terms of the effect being empty or non-empty. This is just like the refutations in terms of determinate and indeterminate in "Examination of Going and Coming" (Chapter 2), and real existence and real non-existence in "Examination of Agent and Action" (Chapter 8). Grasping their general outline, he makes this refutation; the text is easy to see. From "If cause and effect are one..." downward is the third approach: refutation in terms of identity and difference. The first verse brings up both and negates both; the second verse brings up both and challenges both. Identity entails four errors: first, if it is merely the cause, there is no effect; and without an effect, there is also no cause. Second, if it is merely the effect, there is no cause; and without a cause, there is also no effect. Third, since it is one thing, one cannot speak of cause and effect. Fourth, since cause and effect would be one, the agent and the action would also be one, like the potter and the pot being one. Difference also entails four challenges: first, if the cause is different from the effect and also different from non-causes, then both become non-causes. Second, both cause and non-cause would become causes. Third, a cause would become a non-cause, and a non-cause would become a cause. Fourth, if there is a cause and a non-cause, then there is difference and non-difference. From "If the effect determinately has a nature..." downward is the fourth: refutation in terms of possessing nature and lacking nature. The first verse clarifies that whether an effect has a nature or lacks a nature, a cause cannot produce it. Possessing a nature means having an entity: if a person's entity originally exists, it does not require the aggregates to form it; if a person's entity originally does not exist, the combination of the aggregates will not form it. The second verse concludes that there is neither cause nor effect. From "If from various causes and conditions...", the fifth concludes that whether the conditions conjoin or do not conjoin, they cannot produce an effect. The first verse directly clarifies that combination does not produce: how could it produce an effect? Because the cause is non-existent, the effect is non-existent. The second verse concludes that whether conjoining or not conjoining, in neither case is there the meaning of production. Because the effect is non-existent, the cause is non-existent; hence it says: "Where is there an entity of conjunction?" These two verses share the same meaning as the final two verses of "Examination of Conditions" (Chapter 1). The prose only explains the two verses of this fifth approach; the former two are easy to understand, so they are omitted and not explained.
9.10
Chapter 21: Examination of Becoming and Destruction
9.11
The appearance of this chapter has six purposes: First, from the beginning of the treatise up through cause and effect, in twenty topics altogether, persons and phenomena have been sought but cannot be found. Opponents then claim: "The various doctrines originally succeed; when they are refuted, they are destroyed. Since there are becoming and destruction, the myriad transformations are not empty." Second, the opponents establish conventional worldly phenomena in twenty chapters, and above they have individually established worldly phenomena under twenty headings; now, when it is established in general that worldly phenomena all have the characteristics of impermanence, defeat, and destruction, one thereby knows that the world exists. Thus, what was previously established and refuted individually is now established and refuted in general; hence this chapter exists. Third, when the various schools—great and small, internal and external—are all demolished, then Nāgārjuna's doctrine succeeds; and if so, the myriad phenomena are not non-existent. Fourth, cause and effect are the root of all doctrines; once they are refuted, the principle of cause and effect is destroyed. Where there is destruction, there must be becoming; therefore this chapter exists. Fifth, the preceding chapters mostly refuted internal phenomena; this chapter refutes external phenomena, such as the becoming and destruction of heaven and earth. Now it is clarified that the world is originally without becoming and now does not suffer destruction: "My pure land is indestructible, yet the multitudes see it burnt up entirely." This means that those experiencing becoming see becoming, while those experiencing destruction see destruction—just as two conditions perceive a single entity as pure or defiled, while phenomena have never had becoming or destruction. Sixth, worldly people, non-Buddhists, and followers of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, hearing in the sūtras that through the five circles the world becomes and through the three disasters the world is destroyed, that by the aggregate of the five skandhas sentient beings become and by dispersal sentient beings are destroyed, and even seeing with their own eyes jars and clothes becoming and being destroyed, and people's dying and living becoming and being destroyed—because they have seen that there are becoming and destruction, they give rise to the afflictions of craving and views, karma and suffering, and fail to attain liberation. The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, taking pity on these sentient beings, clarify that in reality there are no such becoming and destruction. Therefore, the text below says: "If one says that because it is seen directly there are becoming and destruction, this is foolishness and delusion." However, since the observed object does not exist, the mind capable of conceptualising is also like that which is conceptualised. Because the conceptualised does not exist, there are no external entities; because the conceptualising does not exist, there is no internal mind. Internal and external both merge into silence; object and contemplation are alike stilled. This is called nirvāṇa; therefore, liberation is attained. It is through these causes and conditions that this chapter is spoken. Question: What are called becoming and destruction? Answer: Becoming means the coming together of conditions; destruction means the dispersal of conditions. Briefly, four meanings are raised: First, pointing to the matters before one's eyes, the combination of things is becoming, and the dispersal of things is destruction. Second, the two marks of arising and abiding are becoming, and the two marks of difference and cessation are destruction. Third, the combination of the five circles constitutes the becoming of the receptacle world, and the rising of the three disasters constitutes the destruction of the receptacle world; the combination of the six elements constitutes the becoming of the world of sentient beings, and the rising of the three small kalpas constitutes the destruction of the world of sentient beings. Fourth, in terms of theoretical doctrines: as non-Buddhist doctrines are destroyed, the Buddha-Dharma is established; as the Abhidharma is destroyed, Harivarman's doctrine is established; as the various schools are destroyed, Nāgārjuna's doctrine is established. Furthermore, it is like the Dilun masters using the doctrine of the six characteristics to explain the various sūtras—namely, the characteristic of totality, the characteristic of particularity, the characteristic of similarity, the characteristic of difference, the characteristic of becoming, and the characteristic of destruction. Now, generally seeking such becoming and destruction, they cannot be found; clarifying that all phenomena are originally unestablished and now also indestructible is precisely the middle way. From within the middle, contemplation is produced, and prapañca is extinguished; therefore, the chapter is named after this.
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- 中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese