中觀論疏 9.41

9.41

From "If permanence, pleasure, self, and purity..." is the third, refuting inversion and non-inversion relying on nominal designation. Why is it called refuting relying on nominal designation? Since it is named inversion, how could it be real? If it were really existent, why would it be named inversion? Hence it is called refuting relying on nominal designation. The first verse refutes inversion in terms of inversion; the second verse refutes non-inversion in terms of inversion. The first verse is as in the text. The prose from "If it is said..." onward generates the second verse. The opponent's meaning is: Since the four inversions are non-existent, the four practices should be existent, because existence and non-existence are mutually dependent phenomena. The root verse directly refutes this: You take non-inversion as existent because inversion is non-existent; if this is the mutual dependence of existence and non-existence, inversion and non-inversion are also mutually dependent. Only because there is fundamentally inversion could there be non-inversion; with no inversion to depend upon, how could there be non-inversion? From "In this way inversions are extinguished..." onward: from above up to here was the first section refuting afflictions and inversions; now the second section generally explains the intent of the refutation. Because one can contemplate correctly as above, afflictions and inversions are ultimately and permanently extinguished; for one who contemplates differently from this, they are not extinguished. In the text there are two parts: the first line directly concludes the extinction of inversions; the lower three lines conclude the first section, clarifying the extinction of afflictions. Once afflictions and inversions are extinguished, the river of the twelve links of dependent origination overturns and the river of Buddha-nature is filled; for one who contemplates differently from this, the river of Buddha-nature overturns and the river of dependent origination is filled. From "If the intrinsic nature of afflictions is real..." onward: from above up to here was the first, refuting the opponent's view of the arising of afflictions and inversions; now the second section refutes the opponent's view of cultivating the path of antidotes to sever afflictions. People with grasping in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, inside and outside [the Dharma], have two kinds of faults regarding afflictions: first, not knowing that afflictions fundamentally do not arise of themselves, but arbitrarily claiming there is arising; second, further raising the path of antidotes wanting to extinguish these afflictions, which is to produce further inversions within inversions. Therefore the former section clarified that afflictions fundamentally do not arise of themselves, and this present section distinguishes that now there is nothing to be extinguished. Neither arising nor perishing is precisely the correct contemplation; only then are afflictions extinguished. If generating this section immediately following [the previous]: above it said that in this way inversions are extinguished, and the outsider then thought there were afflictions that could be extinguished; for this reason their extinction is refuted next. The two verses form two parts: the first refutes that afflictions of real intrinsic nature cannot be extinguished; the second refutes that provisionally designated afflictions have nothing to be extinguished; all afflictions do not go beyond nature and designation. Furthermore, the first refutes that afflictions belong to a person, clarifying they cannot be extinguished; the next refutes that afflictions have no person to belong to, and also cannot be extinguished. Furthermore, the first refutes the afflictions of Hīnayāna practitioners, clarifying they cannot be extinguished; the next refutes Mahāyāna afflictions, clarifying there is nothing to be extinguished. In all cases the first half cites and the second half refutes; the text is easily understood. Question: If so, the sūtra says: "Wisdom corresponding in a single thought-moment severs afflictions and habitual propensities." How can you now say there is no severing? Answer: If one says there is something severed, then afflictions are not severed. Now, here, seeking severing is unattainable, and then afflictions are severed. Furthermore, seeing that there are afflictions and cultivating the path of antidotes to sever them not only fails to sever afflictions, but on top of afflictions further generates the illness of subject and object, claiming that the path of antidotes is the agent of severing and afflictions are what is severed. Now, realizing that afflictions are empty of intrinsic nature, both illnesses together subside.