十二門論宗致義記 1.29

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第四、會異說者，於中有二：先敘異說，後會無違。前中此大乘內於緣生法二宗盛諍，一執為有、二說為空。且執有者，說此緣生決定不空，以有因緣之所生故，猶如幻事不可言無。若言空者，應非緣生，如兔角等。若爾，則便斷滅因果、破壞二諦，以若無心、心法，何斷何證？何修何益？故《唯識論》云「若一切空，何有智者為除幻敵，求石女兒以為軍旅？」如是等。設有處說緣生空者，應知此就遍計所執說緣生法無二我故密意言空，非謂彼法舉體全無。若此無者則是斷無惡取空見，甚為可畏。經云「寧起有見如須彌山，不起空見如芥子許」，《中論》云「若復見於空，諸佛所不化」。如是空見既是深過，明知緣生必定不無。《攝論》、《瑜伽》、《深密經》等決定說有，不可違故。二執空者，言此緣生法決定是空，以從緣生必無自性故，猶如幻事不可言有。若言有者，則不從緣；不從緣故，則非緣起之法也。設有處說緣生法體是有者，應知但是隨俗假說，非謂彼體實是不空。以若有體則不從緣，不從緣故則無知斷證修，亦壞於二諦。《大品》云「若諸法不空，則無道無果」，《中論》云「若一切不空，則無三寶四諦，成大邪見」，《智論》云「觀一切法從因緣生，從因緣生則無自性，無自性故畢竟皆空」。又若言此幻事不空者，今且問：如幻巾為兔，此兔為在巾內？為在巾外？為即是巾？為離巾有？為有皮毛為有？骨肉既並絕，無依何執有？當知此兔不待滅而自亡、本不生而虛現，是故要由性空得有二諦。又汝以我宗為空見者，此過屬汝。何者？若汝執有則不藉緣，不藉緣故則斷因果，豈非空見？橫執有法，豈非有見？有無二見雙負汝宗，何不生畏？又汝不了我所說空離有無見，執為空見而生怖者，此是汝自空見，非關我宗。又汝橫怖自見，而執情有復成有見，俱失佛法，於顛倒情而恒流轉，雖染法衣常在法外，是汝之失。又汝云「何有智者為除幻敵」等者，諸大乘經何處不說諸法如化？菩薩修幻智、斷幻惑、成幻行、得幻果等，如是聖教豈不違害？何不生怖？又汝意謂有斷證故非如幻者，非如幻故非從緣生，非緣生故何有斷證？是故反是大邪見也。又汝無著菩薩《順中論》內，尊承龍樹稱阿闍黎，師其所說釋彼餘論，況護法等而輒毀謗？《入楞伽》中佛記龍樹住初歡喜地，能破有無見，往生安樂國。既是破有無見，何曾是空？若言龍樹是空見者，深成誹謗。此既佛所讚歎，餘人毀謗，與佛違諍，非釋種矣。

Fourth, harmonising differing views: within this there are two parts: first, stating the differing views; second, harmonising them so that there is no contradiction. In the first part, within this Mahāyāna there has been intense debate between two schools regarding conditionally arisen phenomena: one clings to existence, and the other speaks of emptiness. Now, those who cling to existence say that this conditioned arising is definitely not empty; because it is produced from causes and conditions, just like an illusion it cannot be called non-existent. If one were to say it is empty, it should not be conditionally arisen, like rabbit horns and the like. If so, then causes and effects would be annihilated, and the two truths destroyed, for if there were no mind and mental factors, what would be severed and what would be realised? What would be cultivated and what benefit would there be? Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Śāstra says: "If all were empty, what wise person, in order to dispel illusory enemies, would seek the sons of barren women to serve as their army?" and so forth. If there are places that speak of conditioned arising as empty, one should know that this is said with hidden intent regarding parikalpita, stating that conditionally arisen phenomena lack the two types of self; it does not mean that the entire substance of those phenomena is completely non-existent. If these were non-existent, it would be an annihilationist, perniciously grasped view of emptiness, which is truly terrifying. A sūtra says: "Better to give rise to a view of existence as vast as Mount Sumeru than to give rise to a view of emptiness as small as a mustard seed." The Madhyamaka Śāstra says: "If someone again perceives emptiness, the Buddhas cannot convert them." Since such a view of emptiness is a profound error, we clearly know that conditioned arising is definitely not non-existent. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the Yogācārabhūmi, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and so forth definitively speak of existence, and this cannot be contradicted. Second, those who cling to emptiness say that this conditionally arisen phenomenon is definitively empty; because it arises from conditions, it must lack intrinsic nature, and just like an illusion it cannot be called existent. If one were to say it exists, then it would not depend on conditions; because it does not depend on conditions, it is not a conditionally arisen phenomenon. If there are places that state that the substance of conditionally arisen phenomena exists, one should know that this is merely a conventional metaphor; it does not mean that their substance is truly not empty. For if there were an intrinsic substance, it would not depend on conditions, and because it would not depend on conditions, there would be no knowing, severing, realising, or cultivating, and this would also destroy the two truths. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "If all phenomena were not empty, there would be no path and no fruit." The Madhyamaka Śāstra says: "If everything were not empty, there would be no Three Jewels and no Four Truths, which constitutes great wrong view." The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Contemplate that all phenomena arise from causes and conditions; arising from causes and conditions, they have no intrinsic nature; having no intrinsic nature, they are ultimately all empty." Furthermore, if one says that this illusion is not empty, let us now ask: when a kerchief is conjured into a rabbit, is this rabbit inside the kerchief? Is it outside the kerchief? Is it identical to the kerchief? Or does it exist apart from the kerchief? Does it have skin and fur? Does it have bone and flesh? Since all these are entirely absent, upon what does it rely that you cling to its existence? One should know that this rabbit vanishes naturally without waiting to be extinguished; fundamentally unproduced, it falsely appears. Therefore, only by virtue of the emptiness of intrinsic nature can the two truths exist. Furthermore, in taking our school to hold a view of emptiness, this fault belongs to you. Why? If you cling to existence, then it does not depend on conditions; because it does not depend on conditions, it annihilates cause and effect—how is this not a view of emptiness? And by arbitrarily clinging to existent phenomena, how is that not a view of existence? Both views of existence and non-existence fall upon your school—why are you not terrified? Furthermore, you do not understand that the emptiness I teach is free from the views of existence and non-existence; clinging to it as a view of emptiness and generating fear, this is your own view of emptiness, having nothing to do with our school. Furthermore, arbitrarily fearing your own view, you cling to emotional existence and again form a view of existence; losing the Buddha-Dharma in both ways, you constantly transmigrate in inverted emotions. Though clad in the Dharma robes, you remain ever outside the Dharma—this is your error. Furthermore, regarding your statement, "what wise person, in order to dispel illusory enemies...", where do the Mahāyāna sūtras not say that all phenomena are like magical creations? Bodhisattvas cultivate illusory wisdom, sever illusory defilements, accomplish illusory practices, attain illusory fruits, and so on—does this not contradict and harm such holy teachings? Why are you not terrified? Furthermore, your intention was that because there are severing and realising, [phenomena] are not like an illusion; but because they are not like an illusion, they do not arise from conditions; and because they are not conditionally arisen, how could there be severing and realising? Therefore, it is rather a great wrong view. Furthermore, in your Bodhisattva Asaṅga's Shun zhong lun, he reverently adhered to Nāgārjuna, calling him ācārya, taking what he taught as master and commenting upon his other treatises; how much less should Dharmapāla and others rashly slander him? In the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the Buddha prophesied that Nāgārjuna would abide in the first Pramuditā-bhūmi, be able to destroy the views of existence and non-existence, and be reborn in the Land of Peace and Joy. Since he destroys the views of existence and non-existence, how could he ever be [holding a view of] emptiness? If one says that Nāgārjuna holds a view of emptiness, this constitutes grave slander. When he was thus praised by the Buddha, for other men to slander him is to contend against the Buddha, and they are no sons of the Śākya clan.