十二門論宗致義記 1.8

1.8

問：如前二師所說，何得何失？答：若以機會教，二說俱得，以各依聖教為定量故。何者？謂此二說三教次第，俱不可以三時前後定限而取。何以知之？如《密迹力士經》說「佛初鹿園轉四諦法輪，無量眾生得初果二果乃至阿羅漢果，無量眾生發菩提心，無量菩薩得無生法忍，住初地二地等」，乃至廣說。《大品經》中亦同此說，是故不可定說前後。但知如來施設教，則了不了義有其二門：一、約攝機寬狹、言教具闕，以明了不了；二、約攝機入法、顯理增微，以明了不了。初是戒賢所得。何者？謂如《解深密經》中，初施鹿園唯為發趣聲聞乘者，以四諦相轉正法輪等。第二時唯為發趣修大乘者，依一切法皆無自性，乃至以隱密相轉正法輪。第三時普為發趣一切乘者，依一切法皆無自性乃至無自性性，以顯了相轉正法輪。解云：準此經文，初則唯攝聲聞、次則唯攝菩薩，攝機狹故，名非了義；後具攝小大，故云普為發趣一切乘者說也。又初唯說小教、次唯大乘，此二言教各互闕，故名非了；後具說二教用攝二機，此則教具，故名了義，非是理有淺深。又準此文，亦不可定判《般若》等為第二時教。以《大品經》云「若人欲得須陀洹果者，當學般若波羅密，乃至欲得阿羅漢果及無上菩提等，皆云當學般若波羅密。」故知《般若經》等亦具攝大小，亦是普為發趣一切乘者說。《智論》亦云「此摩訶衍中具攝菩薩、聲聞二眾故也。」解云：既具二諦、俱攝兩機，豈得定判為第二教？是故若定判《般若》，則違此所引；若定執前後，則違《力士經》文。是故但約攝機有寬狹、言教有具闕，判此三教有了不了者，理教無也。二、約攝機入法顯理增微門者，智光所承立也。謂初說心境俱有，不達性空；次顯境空心有，已顯一分性空；後心境俱空，平等具顯，方為了義。又於緣生初說實有，次說似有，後方說空。此文並是入法有漸次、顯理有增微，以明三教了不了義。若定執前後定判，經文亦有違害，準可知耳。又戒賢約教判，以教具為了義；智光約理判，以理玄為了義。是故二說所據各異，分齊顯然，優劣淺深，於斯可見。

Question: Regarding what the two previous masters have stated, what are their merits and shortcomings? Answer: If one matches the teachings to the capacities, both assertions are valid, because each relies on sacred teachings as a valid standard. How so? It is that the sequences of the three teachings in these two assertions cannot be taken as definitively restricted by the chronological order of the three periods. How is this known? As stated in the Guhyakādhipatinirdeśa Sūtra: "When the Buddha first turned the wheel of the Dharma of the four truths in Mṛgadāva, immeasurable sentient beings attained the first fruit, the second fruit, up to the fruit of arhat; immeasurable sentient beings generated the bodhicitta; and immeasurable bodhisattvas attained the anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti and abided in the first bhūmi, the second bhūmi, and so forth," and so on extensively. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra also states the same thing; therefore, one cannot definitively speak of a chronological order. One only needs to know that when the Tathāgata instituted teachings, there are two approaches to the definitive and provisional meanings: First, clarifying the definitive and provisional according to the broadness or narrowness of the capacities embraced, and the completeness or deficiency of the verbal teaching. Second, clarifying the definitive and provisional according to leading capacities into the Dharma, and the increase or subtlety in revealing the principle. The first is what Śīlabhadra attained. How so? As in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, when he first established it in Mṛgadāva, he turned the wheel of the true Dharma with the characteristics of the four truths solely for those oriented toward the Śrāvaka vehicle, and so forth. In the second period, solely for those oriented toward practicing the Mahāyāna, based on all dharmas being without intrinsic nature, and so on, he turned the wheel of the true Dharma with hidden characteristics. In the third period, universally for those oriented toward all vehicles, based on all dharmas being without intrinsic nature up to the nature of non-intrinsic nature, he turned the wheel of the true Dharma with manifest characteristics. The explanation states: According to this sūtra text, the first only embraces Śrāvakas, and the second only embraces Bodhisattvas; because the capacities embraced are narrow, they are called non-definitive. The latter fully embraces both lesser and greater; hence it says it was spoken "universally for those oriented toward all vehicles." Furthermore, the first only taught the lesser teaching, and the next only the Mahāyāna; because these two verbal teachings were mutually deficient, they are called non-definitive. The latter fully taught both teachings to embrace both capacities; this represents completeness of teaching, and is therefore called definitive, not that the principle has shallowness and depth. Moreover, according to this text, one also cannot definitively judge the Prajñā and other sūtras to be the teaching of the second period. For the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Sūtra states: "If someone wishes to attain the fruit of a srotāpanna, they should train in the prajñāpāramitā; up to, if they wish to attain the fruit of an arhat and unexcelled bodhi, etc., it says in all cases that they should train in the prajñāpāramitā." Hence we know that the Prajñā Sūtra and others also fully embrace both the lesser and the greater, and are likewise spoken universally for those oriented toward all vehicles. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa also states: "In this Mahāyāna, both the assemblies of bodhisattvas and śrāvakas are fully embraced." The explanation states: Since it possesses both truths and embraces both capacities, how could it be definitively judged to be the second teaching? Therefore, if one definitively judges the Prajñā, it contradicts what is cited here; if one definitively adheres to chronological order, it contradicts the text of the Guhyakādhipatinirdeśa Sūtra. Therefore, if one merely judges these three teachings to have definitive and provisional aspects according to the broadness or narrowness of capacities embraced and the completeness or deficiency of the verbal teaching, there is no error in principle or teaching. Second, regarding the approach of leading capacities into the Dharma and the increase or subtlety in revealing the principle, this was inherited and established by Jñānaprabha. That is to say, first teaching that both mind and objects exist does not penetrate the emptiness of intrinsic nature; next revealing that objects are empty while mind exists already reveals one portion of the emptiness of intrinsic nature; finally, having both mind and objects empty, fully revealed in equality, is only then definitive. Furthermore, regarding conditioned arising, he first taught real existence, next taught apparent existence, and only later taught emptiness. All of these texts concern the gradual stages of entering the Dharma and the increase or subtlety in revealing the principle, so as to clarify the definitive and provisional meanings of the three teachings. If one definitively clings to chronological order in making definitive judgments, the sūtra texts will also be contradicted, as can be known accordingly. Furthermore, Śīlabhadra judged according to the teaching, taking completeness of teaching to be definitive; Jñānaprabha judged according to the principle, taking the profundity of principle to be definitive. Therefore, the bases of the two assertions are each different and their boundaries distinct; their superiority and inferiority, shallowness and depth, can be seen here.