十二門論宗致義記 1.7

1.7

第三、定教分齊者，此方南北諸師異說紛紜，無勞敘記，且辨西國諸德所傳親問大原寺翻經中天竺三藏法師地婆訶羅，唐言日照，說云：「近代中天竺那爛陀寺，同時有二大德論師：一名戒賢，一名智光，並神解超倫、聲高五印，六師稽顙、異部歸依，大乘學人仰之日月，如天竺獨步，軌範成規，遂各守一宗，互為矛盾。」謂戒賢則遠承彌勒、無著，近踵護法、難陀，依《深密》等經、《瑜伽》等論，明法相大乘，廣分名數，用三教開宗，顯自所依為真了義，謂佛初鹿園轉於四諦小乘法輪，雖說人空翻諸外道，然於緣生定說實有；第二時中，雖依遍計所執，而說諸法自性皆空翻彼小乘，然於依他、圓成猶未說有；第三時中，就大乘正理，具說三性、三無性等，方為盡理。是故於因緣生法，初時唯說有，則墮有邊；次說於空，則墮空邊；既各墮邊、俱非了義，後時具說所執性空、餘二為有，契會中道方為了義。是故依此所說，判般若等經多說空宗，是第二教攝，非為了義。此依《解深密經》判也。二、智光論師遠承文殊、龍樹，近稟青目、清辨，依《般若》等經、《中觀》等論，顯無相大乘，廣辨真空，亦以三教開宗，顯自所依真為了義。謂佛初鹿園為諸小根，轉於四諦小乘法輪，說心境俱有；次於第二時，為中根說法相大乘境空心有則唯識義等，以根猶劣故，未能全入平等真空，故作是說；於第三時，方為上根說此無相大乘，顯心境俱空、平等一味，為真了義。又初則為破外道自性等，故說因緣生法決定是有；次則為破小乘實有，說此緣生但是假有，以恐彼怖畏此真空，故猶存有而接引之；第三方就究竟大乘，說此緣生即是性空、平等一相，此亦是入法之漸次也。則依此說，判法相大乘有所得等為第二教，非了義也。此三教次第，智光法師《般若燈論釋》中引《大乘妙智經》所說，是故依此教理，《般若》等經是真了義，餘法相名數是方便說耳。

Third, regarding determining the scope of the teachings: The diverse assertions of the various masters of the north and south in this land are turbulent and confused, so there is no need to record them here. For now, let us distinguish what was transmitted by the virtuous masters of the Western Realm. I personally inquired of the Central Indian Tripiṭaka Master Divākara (in Tang speech, Rizhao), who translated sūtras at Dayuan Monastery. He said: "In recent times at Nālandā Monastery in Central India, there were simultaneously two great masters of treatises: one named Śīlabhadra, and one named Jñānaprabha. Both had divine understanding surpassing their peers and reputations renowned throughout the five regions of India. The six teachers bowed their heads, the various sects took refuge in them, and Mahāyāna learners looked up to them like the sun and moon. Matchless in India, their standards set the rules; yet they each maintained their own school and were mutually contradictory." This means that Śīlabhadra distantly inherited Maitreya and Asaṅga, and recently followed Dharmapāla and Nanda. Relying on sūtras such as the Saṃdhinirmocana and treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi, he elucidated the Mahāyāna of dharma characteristics, extensively classified names and enumerations, and established his school by using the three teachings, showing that what he relied upon was the truly definitive meaning. That is to say, when the Buddha first turned the wheel of the Hīnayāna Dharma of the four truths in Mṛgadāva, although he taught the emptiness of the person to overturn the various non-Buddhists, he definitively declared that what arises from conditions is truly existent. In the second period, although he relied on parikalpita to teach that the intrinsic natures of all dharmas are empty to overturn that Hīnayāna, he had not yet taught the existence of paratantra and pariniṣpanna. In the third period, proceeding from the correct principle of the Mahāyāna, he fully taught the three natures, the three non-natures, and so forth, only then exhausting the principle. Therefore, regarding dharmas arisen from causes and conditions, teaching only existence in the first period fell into the extreme of existence; next teaching emptiness fell into the extreme of emptiness. Since each fell into an extreme, neither was definitive. Only in the later period, when he fully taught that the imagined nature is empty and that the other two are existent, tallying with the middle way, was it definitive. Therefore, according to this assertion, the prajñā and other sūtras that mostly teach the school of emptiness are judged to be subsumed under the second teaching, and are not of definitive meaning. This is judged by relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Second, the treatise master Jñānaprabha distantly inherited Mañjuśrī and Nāgārjuna, and recently received [the lineage of] Piṅgala and Bhāviveka. Relying on sūtras such as the Prajñā and treatises such as the Madhyamaka, he revealed the signless Mahāyāna and extensively analyzed true emptiness. He also established his school by using the three teachings, showing that what he relied upon was truly definitive. That is to say, when the Buddha first turned the wheel of the Hīnayāna Dharma of the four truths in Mṛgadāva for those of lesser capacities, he taught that both mind and objects exist. Next, in the second period, for those of middling capacity, he taught the Mahāyāna of dharma characteristics—that objects are empty while mind exists, which is the meaning of vijñapti-mātra and so forth. Because their capacities were still inferior, they were unable to enter fully into uniform true emptiness, and so he spoke in this way. In the third period, only then did he speak this signless Mahāyāna for those of superior capacity, revealing that both mind and objects are empty and of a single equal flavor, which is the truly definitive meaning. Furthermore, at first, in order to refute the intrinsic nature and so forth of non-Buddhists, he taught that dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are definitively existent. Next, in order to refute the real existence posited by the Hīnayāna, he taught that this conditioned arising is merely nominal existence; because he feared they would be terrified of this true emptiness, he still preserved existence to guide them. In the third [period], only then, proceeding from the ultimate Mahāyāna, did he teach that this conditioned arising is precisely the emptiness of intrinsic nature, a single equal characteristic; this is also the gradual progression for entering the Dharma. Thus, according to this assertion, the Mahāyāna of dharma characteristics, having an apprehension [of dharmas] and the like, is judged to be the second teaching, and is not definitive. Regarding this sequence of the three teachings, Master Jñānaprabha, in his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā, cited what was spoken in the Mahāyāna-paramārtha-jñāna Sūtra. Therefore, according to this teaching and principle, the Prajñā and other sūtras are truly definitive, while the remaining dharma characteristics, names, and enumerations are merely expedient teachings.