十二門論宗致義記 2.4

2.4

第二大段，釋先無亦不生。於中有五番：一、因同非因破，於中二：先正破，後破救。破救中，先救後破。破中二：先等無生異果，後齊無為異因，比量並可知。第二、一因多果破，於中先正破，後破救。前中約縱破，謂一因應生一切物等，以是無故。後「若因中」下，奪破，謂若無者，不應諸因於諸果各各有力能生果；今既諸因各各於自果有力，故知非無。「如須油」下，舉事曉示。二、破救中，先牒計總非；二、釋顯非義。謂從麻出油是生，此世人虛妄謂生，而實不生，與沙無別，是故徵責則不成生，更以何法知有生也？三、「是故」下，結非呵執。第三、猶豫同疑破，於中三：初、標自意，謂恐外人雖無執因中無果見，論主以沙例麻，麻中無義不成，則謂論主許其是有，意欲移無執有，是故論主還遮云：我非直破汝計無，有等亦破，故云破一切因果也。二、「若因中」下，釋一切不成，謂三因俱不成生。三、「是故」下，結同疑，謂汝但言見麻出油，而不知麻中為是有？為是無？為俱有無？是則汝於自因同疑不了，何得成生？第四、因相不成破，於中二：先牒執不成因；二、釋顯不成相。於中先釋因不成，謂親疏非一，故云諸因；於中無果法，故云無法也。若一種俱無果法，不知何者是親因故能作，何者是疏因故能成。又若無果法，何作何成？無作成故，則非因也。此文倒，應云：若無果法，此因能作何等？能成何等？以無成作，故亦無因。二、釋果不成，如是因不成故，親因名作者，不得有所作果也。使作者是疏因，亦不得有果也。又有論本，「使」字作「所」字，則作者是匠人，無果法可作，故不得有所作。所作是泥因，亦不得有所作，以泥是人功所用作故。第五、反難乖宗破，於中三：初、外人反難論主；二、論主顯彼乖宗之失；三、結非呵止。初中，外人反難，內有二難：一、反質難，云：汝破我以因中無果故則無作者，無作者故是則無因。若爾者，汝則因中有果故有作，作者為諸法因耶？二、齊過難，謂若我因中無果故則無作非因者，汝因中先有果，亦無作作者，以先有不須作故。此中難作及難有也。作者是人，作是業用，作法是所作果。文中標是初難，釋是後難，可知。二、論主反答破中二：初、牒執總非；二、別釋二難。於中二：初答齊過難，云：今破彼作者作法，此非我立，故不成難。若能破彼，彌順我空宗，亦不成難，文二可知。「是故」下，結，可知。二、答反質難中二：初、正答，謂彼有果，本非我宗，汝自唐勞，助成我義。二、遮難，謂恐彼難云：汝既不受有果，則同我無計，故云亦不受無果也。上來破無訖。

In the second major section, it is explained that if [the effect] does not previously exist, it also is not produced. Here there are five rounds [of refutation]: First, the refutation that causes would be identical to non-causes. Within this, there are two parts: first, the refutation proper, and second, refuting the defense. In refuting the defense, first comes the defense, and then the refutation. Within the refutation, there are two parts: first, that since [effects are] equally non-existent, distinct effects would be produced; second, that since [causes are] alike in non-existence, they would act as distinct causes; the syllogisms (pramāṇa) in both can be understood. Second, the refutation that a single cause would produce multiple effects. Within this, first is the refutation proper, and then refuting the defense. In the former, it is refuted on concession: namely, that a single cause ought to produce all things, because [the effect] is non-existent. Next, from 'If in the cause' onward is the refutation by deprivation: namely, if it were non-existent, the various causes would not each have the capacity to produce [their respective] effects; now, since the various causes each have the capacity toward their own effects, one knows it is not non-existent. From 'Just as one who requires oil' onward, a concrete case is cited to illustrate this. Second, in refuting the defense, first the proponent's claim is cited and rejected in general; second, the meaning of this rejection is explained and revealed. That is, oil emerging from sesame is [regarded as] production; people of the world falsely consider this to be production, yet in reality it is not produced, being no different from sand. Therefore, when examined critically, production is not established; by what further dharma could one know there is production? Third, from 'Therefore' onward, the rejection is concluded and attachment is rebuked. Third, the refutation based on uncertainty being identical to doubt. Within this, there are three parts: first, indicating one's own intention: namely, it was feared that although the outsider holds no view of non-existence of the effect in the cause, when the treatise master compared sesame to sand such that the non-existence within sesame was not established, they might think the treatise master conceded that it exists, intending to abandon non-existence and grasp onto existence; therefore, the treatise master turns back to avert this, saying: 'I do not merely refute your claim of non-existence; existence and the rest are also refuted.' Hence it is said that all causes and effects are refuted. Second, from 'If in the cause' onward, it explains that all are unestablished: namely, none of the three causes establish production. Third, from 'Therefore' onward, it concludes that it is identical to doubt: namely, you merely say you see sesame yield oil, yet do not know whether within the sesame it exists, does not exist, or both exists and does not exist. Thus you are identical to one who doubts their own cause without comprehension—how could production be established? Fourth, the refutation based on the characteristics of a cause being unestablished. Within this, there are two parts: first, citing the attachment to show that the cause is unestablished; second, explaining and revealing the characteristic of being unestablished. Here, it first explains that the cause is unestablished: direct and indirect [causes] are not one, hence it says 'the various causes'; within them there is no effect-dharma, hence it says 'the non-existent dharma'. If all alike lack the effect-dharma, one does not know which is the direct cause capable of making, and which is the indirect cause capable of completing. Furthermore, if there is no effect-dharma, what is made and what is completed? Because there is neither making nor completion, they are not causes. This text is inverted; it should say: if there is no effect-dharma, what can this cause make, and what can it complete? Because there is no completion or making, there is also no cause. Second, explaining that the effect is unestablished: because the cause is unestablished in this way, the direct cause, called the maker, cannot have any effect that is made. Even if one makes an agent an indirect cause, it also cannot have an effect. Furthermore, in some editions of the treatise, the word 'shi' (使, make/cause) is written as 'suo' (所, that which): then the maker is the artisan, and having no effect-dharma to make, cannot have anything made. That which is made is the clay cause, which also cannot have anything made, because clay is what is used and made through human effort. Fifth, the refutation of the counter-objection violating their own thesis. Within this, there are three parts: first, the outsider raises a counter-objection against the treatise master; second, the treatise master reveals their fault of violating their own thesis; third, concluding the rejection and admonishing them to cease. In the first part, the outsider's counter-objection contains two objections internally: 1. The counter-interrogation objection, which says: 'You refute me by saying that because the effect does not exist in the cause, there is no maker, and because there is no maker, there is no cause. If so, then do you hold that because the effect exists in the cause, there is making, and that the maker is the cause of all dharmas?' 2. The objection of equal fault, which means: 'If, because the effect does not exist in the cause for me, there is no making and it is not a cause, then for you, if the effect previously exists in the cause, there is also neither making nor a maker, because what previously exists does not require making.' Here, making is objected to, and existence is objected to. The maker is the person; making is the active function; the made dharma is the effect that is made. In the text, the heading is the first objection, and the explanation is the second objection, as can be known. Second, in the treatise master's counter-reply and refutation, there are two parts: first, citing their attachment and rejecting it in general; second, separately explaining the two objections. Here there are two parts: First, answering the objection of equal fault, saying: 'Now I refute their maker and making; these are not posited by me, so it does not constitute an objection. If one can refute them, it accords all the more with my thesis of emptiness, so it also does not constitute an objection.' The two passages can be known. From 'Therefore' onward is the conclusion, which can be understood. Second, in answering the counter-interrogation objection, there are two parts: first, the direct reply, meaning that their effect's existence was fundamentally never my thesis; you have merely labored in vain, helping to establish my meaning. Second, averting the objection, meaning: fearing that they might object, 'Since you do not accept that the effect exists, you are identical with my claim of non-existence,' it therefore says: 'I also do not accept that the effect does not exist.' Up to this point, refuting non-existence is concluded.