十二門論宗致義記 2.4

2.4

In the second major section, it is explained that if [the effect] does not previously exist, it also is not produced. Here there are five rounds [of refutation]: First, the refutation that causes would be identical to non-causes. Within this, there are two parts: first, the refutation proper, and second, refuting the defense. In refuting the defense, first comes the defense, and then the refutation. Within the refutation, there are two parts: first, that since [effects are] equally non-existent, distinct effects would be produced; second, that since [causes are] alike in non-existence, they would act as distinct causes; the syllogisms (pramāṇa) in both can be understood. Second, the refutation that a single cause would produce multiple effects. Within this, first is the refutation proper, and then refuting the defense. In the former, it is refuted on concession: namely, that a single cause ought to produce all things, because [the effect] is non-existent. Next, from 'If in the cause' onward is the refutation by deprivation: namely, if it were non-existent, the various causes would not each have the capacity to produce [their respective] effects; now, since the various causes each have the capacity toward their own effects, one knows it is not non-existent. From 'Just as one who requires oil' onward, a concrete case is cited to illustrate this. Second, in refuting the defense, first the proponent's claim is cited and rejected in general; second, the meaning of this rejection is explained and revealed. That is, oil emerging from sesame is [regarded as] production; people of the world falsely consider this to be production, yet in reality it is not produced, being no different from sand. Therefore, when examined critically, production is not established; by what further dharma could one know there is production? Third, from 'Therefore' onward, the rejection is concluded and attachment is rebuked. Third, the refutation based on uncertainty being identical to doubt. Within this, there are three parts: first, indicating one's own intention: namely, it was feared that although the outsider holds no view of non-existence of the effect in the cause, when the treatise master compared sesame to sand such that the non-existence within sesame was not established, they might think the treatise master conceded that it exists, intending to abandon non-existence and grasp onto existence; therefore, the treatise master turns back to avert this, saying: 'I do not merely refute your claim of non-existence; existence and the rest are also refuted.' Hence it is said that all causes and effects are refuted. Second, from 'If in the cause' onward, it explains that all are unestablished: namely, none of the three causes establish production. Third, from 'Therefore' onward, it concludes that it is identical to doubt: namely, you merely say you see sesame yield oil, yet do not know whether within the sesame it exists, does not exist, or both exists and does not exist. Thus you are identical to one who doubts their own cause without comprehension—how could production be established? Fourth, the refutation based on the characteristics of a cause being unestablished. Within this, there are two parts: first, citing the attachment to show that the cause is unestablished; second, explaining and revealing the characteristic of being unestablished. Here, it first explains that the cause is unestablished: direct and indirect [causes] are not one, hence it says 'the various causes'; within them there is no effect-dharma, hence it says 'the non-existent dharma'. If all alike lack the effect-dharma, one does not know which is the direct cause capable of making, and which is the indirect cause capable of completing. Furthermore, if there is no effect-dharma, what is made and what is completed? Because there is neither making nor completion, they are not causes. This text is inverted; it should say: if there is no effect-dharma, what can this cause make, and what can it complete? Because there is no completion or making, there is also no cause. Second, explaining that the effect is unestablished: because the cause is unestablished in this way, the direct cause, called the maker, cannot have any effect that is made. Even if one makes an agent an indirect cause, it also cannot have an effect. Furthermore, in some editions of the treatise, the word 'shi' (使, make/cause) is written as 'suo' (所, that which): then the maker is the artisan, and having no effect-dharma to make, cannot have anything made. That which is made is the clay cause, which also cannot have anything made, because clay is what is used and made through human effort. Fifth, the refutation of the counter-objection violating their own thesis. Within this, there are three parts: first, the outsider raises a counter-objection against the treatise master; second, the treatise master reveals their fault of violating their own thesis; third, concluding the rejection and admonishing them to cease. In the first part, the outsider's counter-objection contains two objections internally: 1. The counter-interrogation objection, which says: 'You refute me by saying that because the effect does not exist in the cause, there is no maker, and because there is no maker, there is no cause. If so, then do you hold that because the effect exists in the cause, there is making, and that the maker is the cause of all dharmas?' 2. The objection of equal fault, which means: 'If, because the effect does not exist in the cause for me, there is no making and it is not a cause, then for you, if the effect previously exists in the cause, there is also neither making nor a maker, because what previously exists does not require making.' Here, making is objected to, and existence is objected to. The maker is the person; making is the active function; the made dharma is the effect that is made. In the text, the heading is the first objection, and the explanation is the second objection, as can be known. Second, in the treatise master's counter-reply and refutation, there are two parts: first, citing their attachment and rejecting it in general; second, separately explaining the two objections. Here there are two parts: First, answering the objection of equal fault, saying: 'Now I refute their maker and making; these are not posited by me, so it does not constitute an objection. If one can refute them, it accords all the more with my thesis of emptiness, so it also does not constitute an objection.' The two passages can be known. From 'Therefore' onward is the conclusion, which can be understood. Second, in answering the counter-interrogation objection, there are two parts: first, the direct reply, meaning that their effect's existence was fundamentally never my thesis; you have merely labored in vain, helping to establish my meaning. Second, averting the objection, meaning: fearing that they might object, 'Since you do not accept that the effect exists, you are identical with my claim of non-existence,' it therefore says: 'I also do not accept that the effect does not exist.' Up to this point, refuting non-existence is concluded.