十二門論宗致義記 2.9

2.9

Explaining this gate in four points is the same as before. First, explaining the name: it contemplates and refutes both the characterizing [sign] and the characterized dharma completely, so as to arrive at true emptiness; hence it is so called. Second, the intention behind its sequence: previously it refuted the characterized, and next it refutes the characterizing; because the meaning follows in sequence, it therefore comes next. Furthermore, those who cling to wrong views, hearing in the previous gate that conditions do not produce effects, might claim that signs can produce dharmas; to refute them, this gate is introduced. Furthermore, it reveals the principle through multiple gates to make it clear and pure. Third, what is clarified in the chapter: it completely refutes the three signs, causing the mind that holds views to have nothing to rely on, thereby establishing right contemplation. Fourth, in explaining the text, there are four parts: first, stating the thesis; second, presenting the verse; third, explaining the refutation; fourth, eliminating [other dharmas] by analogy. In the verse, the first line adduces the entity of the dharma; the next line distinguishes the emptiness of the sign; the lower half eliminates the entity of the dharma on the basis of the emptiness of the sign. Third, within the explanation, there are two parts: first, explaining the emptiness of the signs of the conditioned as stated; next, explaining the emptiness of the signs of the unconditioned as stated. The first part also has two sections: first, there are five verses refuting the Sarvāstivāda masters' doctrine of the mutual production of primary and secondary signs through simultaneous cause (sahabhū-hetu); next, five verses refuting the Mahāsāṃghika masters' claim that conditioned signs produce both themselves and others. Within the former, there are also two parts: first, the refutation proper; next, refuting the defense. In the first part, the first line states the thesis, meaning that conditioned dharmas do not become such dharmas by virtue of signs; hence it is said. Second, in directly revealing [this], first a question and answer adduces the signs to fix their nature, and then a question and answer employs reason for the refutation proper. In the first part, there is first a question and then an answer. In the answer, it first explains that dharmas each have their own entities and marks, like cows, vases, and so forth, without needing a separate characterizing [sign] outside the dharma. If these three signs of yours are the signs of the conditioned, one does not know: are these three signs in their own entity conditioned, or are they unconditioned? According to the Abhidharma and the *Satyasiddhi*, both say that the three signs are existent dharmas. The Vibhajyavādins say: the entity of the conditioned cannot stabilize itself; how could it characterize others? One should know that the three signs are unconditioned dharmas. The Dharmaguptakas say: the two signs of arising and abiding are conditioned dharmas, while the sign of cessation is an unconditioned dharma. Therefore, the three signs are both conditioned and unconditioned. Second, in the refutation proper through reason, there are two parts: first, the opponent's question accepting that they are conditioned; second, the internal answer giving the refutation proper. Because the unconditioned and both [conditioned and unconditioned] do not await refutation, the text refutes only the conditioned. In the text, there are two parts: first, stating the verse; the upper half refutes that the three signs are conditioned, pointing out the fault of infinite regress; the lower half refutes that the three signs are unconditioned, pointing out the fault of losing their nature as signs. Another explanation of the lower half is that it refutes a defense: if it is said that the entity of a conditioned dharma requires a sign, but what requires a sign does not further require [another sign], then the entity of the dharma requires a sign to characterize it; the entity of the dharma is conditioned, and since the sign does not require another sign to characterize it, it should be an unconditioned sign; if it is unconditioned, how can it serve as a sign for a conditioned dharma? Therefore it says: how can it be called a sign of the conditioned? The commentary follows this. Second, in the explanation, there are two parts: first, explaining the verse; next, eliminating [other dharmas] by analogy. In the former, first it explains the upper half of the verse, and then the lower half. In the former, it first explains arising, meaning, first, the fault of infinite regress, as is evident from the text. Second, if there is cessation within arising, they are contradictory; if there is no cessation, it is not conditioned. Therefore, both possessing cessation is unfeasible and lacking cessation is unfeasible, and hence arising is empty. Second, abiding and cessation are likewise eliminated by analogy. Second, under "if arising is unconditioned," it explains the lower half of the verse. It also first explains arising through three points: first, refutation through the mutual contradiction of two classes: that is, only when this conditioned is extinguished is there the unconditioned; being diametrically opposed, just like light and darkness, how could light serve as a sign for darkness? Second, refutation by rebuking the sign for losing its entity: that is, if it is unconditioned, then it lacks arising, abiding, and cessation; apart from these three signs, who would know the arising of this conditioned dharma? Third, under "furthermore," refutation through lack of distinction: that is, the unconditioned is of a single limit without duality; where could there be arising distinct from abiding and cessation? Under "therefore there is no arising," it applies the analogy to abiding and cessation; hence it says "it is also thus." Second, in eliminating [other dharmas] by analogy, there are three parts: first, eliminating the entity of dharmas through the non-existence of signs; second, eliminating the unconditioned; third, a general conclusion regarding all [dharmas]. Second, in refuting the defense, first there is the external defense, and next the refutation proper. In the former, there are two parts: first, citing the previous fault; second, establishing the reasoning for the defense. Therein, first is the verse and next the explanation. In the verse, it defends against the previous two objections: the upper half defends against the objection regarding the unconditioned, because it is the primary arising of secondary arising; since the primary arising arises from secondary arising, it is therefore not an unconditioned dharma. The lower half defends against the fault of infinite regress, because it is the secondary arising of primary arising; since secondary arising in turn arises from primary arising, there is therefore no fault of infinite regress. Therein, the first line adduces the entity of secondary arising; because it is what is produced by primary arising, it says "what is produced by it." The next line explains the function of secondary arising; the lower two lines are known by converse analogy to this. Second, in the explanation, there are three parts: first, distinguishing the dharmas; second, defending against the fault; third, concluding the avoidance [of fault]. In defending against the fault, that primary arising produces six dharmas with the exclusion of its own entity means: because it directly produces the primary conditioned entity of the dharma, it is called primary arising (mūla-jāti), as it is the arising of the primary [entity]. Furthermore, because it produces this primary [arising], it is called secondary arising (jāti-jāti), as it is the arising of arising; they are also called major arising and minor arising. This major arising serves as the sign of arising for the six dharmas, but it does not serve as a sign for itself, because major arising itself takes minor arising as its sign. Major abiding and cessation are also like this. Therefore, the major signs are generally capable of characterizing both major and minor, yet they solely do not characterize themselves; the minor signs are not generally capable of characterizing major and minor, but solely characterize one major [sign]. Because the minor is powerless and produces few dharmas, it is called minor; because the major sign is powerful and produces many dharmas, it is called major. For instance, in major arising, it takes minor arising as its sign of arising, and major abiding and cessation as its signs of abiding and cessation. Major abiding takes minor abiding as its sign of abiding, and major arising and cessation as its signs of arising and cessation. Major cessation takes minor cessation as its sign of cessation, and major arising and abiding as its signs of arising and abiding. If in minor arising the three major signs are completely present, the same is also true for minor abiding and cessation; therefore there is not that fault of infinite regress. This is the simultaneous cause (sahabhū-hetu) among the six causes, meaning that because they arise at the same time they are simultaneous, and because they mutually rely on one another they are called causes. Herein, there are cases of being simultaneous and a simultaneous cause, and cases of being simultaneous but not a cause. If one considers the entity of the dharma in relation to the six signs, it can function as both simultaneous and a simultaneous cause. If one considers major arising in relation to the six dharmas, it is also both simultaneous and a simultaneous cause. Major abiding and major cessation are also like this. If one considers minor arising in relation to major arising, it is simultaneous and a simultaneous cause; minor abiding in relation to major abiding, and minor cessation in relation to major cessation, are also simultaneous and simultaneous causes. Minor arising in relation to the five dharmas is simultaneous but not a cause; minor abiding and minor cessation in relation to the five dharmas are also like this. However, as for the two arisings—major and minor—that school holds that within a single kṣaṇa they mutually rely on each other to arise, and abiding and cessation are also like this; hence there is not the former fault. Third, under "therefore," it concludes; under "free from fault," it applies the analogy to abiding and cessation. Second, under "it is answered," is the direct censure and refutation. Therein are two parts: first, two verses clarifying the refutation that that which is [to be produced] does not have that which can [produce]; next, one verse clarifying the refutation that that which can [produce] does not have that which is [produced]. Another explanation: the first two are refutations of non-production in sequence, and the latter one is a refutation of non-production simultaneously. In the former, there are two verses: first, the minor does not produce the major; second, the major does not produce the minor. In the first, minor arising is prior and major arising is posterior, and minor arising does not produce major arising. In the latter, major arising is prior and minor arising is posterior, and major arising does not produce minor arising. In the explanation of the verses following, there are two parts: first, citing the assertion and rejecting it generally; second, explaining the reason for the rejection. Second, in the simultaneous refutation, there are three parts: first, citing the assertion and rejecting it generally; second, stating the verse for the refutation proper. That is, the upper half concedes [the point] with respect to subjective assumption; the lower half rejects it with respect to reason. Third, explaining the refutation. The meaning of the refutation is: the way of mutual production necessarily requires an entity capable of producing, and the non-existence of an entity produced from it. Now when you say "simultaneous," are they both existent, or are they both non-existent? If they are both existent, why would they need to produce each other? If they are both non-existent, what on earth produces what? If one is existent and one is non-existent, how could they be simultaneous? Furthermore, how could they mutually produce each other? Second, refuting the Mahāsāṃghika masters' claim that conditioned signs produce both themselves and others. Therein are two parts: first, citing the assertion and rejecting it generally; second, censuring and refuting it with reason. Herein are two parts: first, four verses refuting the metaphor; next, one verse refuting the dharma. In the former, there are four [verses]: the first verse clarifies the refutation that when already burning it does not reach [darkness]; the second verse clarifies the refutation that at the time of burning it does not reach [darkness]; the third verse clarifies the refutation through near and far mutually following each other; the fourth verse clarifies the refutation by juxtaposing lamp and darkness in reverse. In the first, there are three parts: first, in the verse, the upper half clarifies that because there is no darkness illuminated by itself or by another, the lower half implies that there is consequently no lamp capable of illuminating. Second, the explanation; third, under "therefore," concluding the error and enjoining its cessation. All can be understood. Second, regarding the refutation that at the time of burning it does not reach [darkness], first there is a question. The intention of the question is: when the lamp first arises, because its entity is not yet complete, there is darkness within the flame; because the light is not yet fully grown, the room is still dim; as the entity of the lamp gradually rounds out, this dimness and darkness are completely exhausted. One should know that what dispels darkness is the newly arisen lamp; hence it says that at the time of burning it can dispel darkness, meaning it illuminates both itself and that [other]. Second, in the answer, there is first the verse; the upper half questions the assertion, and the lower half is the refutation proper, meaning that at the very time of this newly arisen lamp, darkness has already ceased; therefore, there is never a newly arisen lamp coexisting with unextinguished darkness; because they do not coexist, it also does not reach the darkness; because it does not reach the darkness, it is not called dispelling; if it reaches the darkness, it also does not dispel it. The prose explanation can be understood. Third, in the refutation through near and far mutually following each other, first in the verse, the upper half cites the assertion, and the lower half is the refutation proper. In the subsequent explanation, taking their both not reaching [darkness] as the reason, there are four objections: 1. assimilating the near to the far, both should fail to dispel; 2. assimilating the far to the near, then both should dispel; 3. since it equally does not reach the darkness, so that it dispels the near but not the far, it should also be that because it equally does not reach, it dispels the far but not the near; 4. since there is dispelling and non-dispelling, there should be reaching and non-reaching. In the text, there are three parts: first, citing the assertion; second, the refutation proper, first conceding and then rejecting; third, concluding with a rebuke. Fourth, the refutation by juxtaposing mutual contradiction. Therein are two parts: first the verse, and then the explanation. In the verse, the upper half cites the assertion, and the lower half refutes by applying the analogy to darkness, meaning that light and darkness are directly contradictory; since light has the efficacy of illuminating darkness, darkness should also have the power of obstructing light; since it has this power, the lamp cannot dispel darkness. Furthermore, if the lamp both illuminates itself and illuminates darkness, darkness should also conceal itself and conceal the lamp. If the lamp is concealed by darkness, how could it dispel darkness? Even if they defend by saying: because light is superior, while illuminating others it also illuminates itself; because darkness is inferior, it conceals itself but does not conceal others; then one objects back: because light is superior, it can oppose darkness; because darkness is inferior, it does not oppose light. If both mutually oppose each other, why would they not need to mutually dispel each other? Speaking generally, taking their mutual contradiction as the reason, there are also four objections: 1. by following darkness from the perspective of the lamp to refute, the lamp should not dispel darkness, because they are mutually contradictory, just as darkness does not conceal the lamp; 2. by following the lamp from the perspective of darkness to refute, darkness would definitely be able to obstruct the lamp, also because of their mutual contradiction, just as the lamp can dispel darkness; 3. since the lamp opposes darkness, and yet the lamp can dispel darkness while darkness cannot conceal the lamp, it could also be that darkness opposes the lamp, and yet darkness can conceal the lamp while the lamp cannot dispel darkness; 4. if one dispels and one does not dispel, one should oppose and one should not oppose. If darkness does not oppose the lamp, there should be darkness in the lamp and light in darkness. All these can be understood. The explanation and conclusion in the text can be understood. The refutation of the metaphor is finished.