十二門論宗致義記 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Expounded by the Śramaṇa Fazang of the Great Xisi Temple in the Western Capital

2.2

Gate Two: Examining Existent Results and Nonexistent Results

In explaining this gate, there are briefly four points: First, explaining the name: all gate names have three meanings: 1. adducing the contemplative wisdom as the observing agent; 2. adducing what is eliminated and relied upon as the gate, which is the observed 'existence of the effect or nonexistence of the effect'; 3. entering the gate and seeing the truth, which is the 'true emptiness' below; all chapters are titled in accordance with the first two meanings. Second, the intention of its occurrence: there are two meanings: 1. the preceding chapter generally refuted causes, conditions, and effects as all being empty; now this [chapter] specifically investigates existence and nonexistence in the cause to reveal unarisenness, and hence it follows next; 2. previously, mutual elimination between self and other regarding causes, conditions, and effects was used to reveal unarisenness; now, inquiry and discernment into existence and nonexistence in the cause are used to reveal unarisenness, so as to make the preceding true emptiness exceedingly clear and to leave the minds of those clinging to existence or nonexistence with nothing to abide in; therefore it follows. Third, the doctrinal purport: first, stating what is refuted: 1. non-Buddhists: the Sāṃkhyas posit that there is an effect in the cause; the Vaiśeṣikas posit that there is no effect in the cause; the Nirgranthas posit that there is both an effect and no effect in the cause; the Jñātṛputras posit that there is neither an effect nor no effect in the cause. 2. Hīnayāna: the Sarvāstivādins posit that the nature of the effect exists in the cause; the Sautrāntikas posit that the substance of the effect does not exist in the cause. Furthermore, the Mahāsāṃghikas posit that the past and future are nonexistent, which means there is no effect in them. The Vātsīputrīyas posit both existence and nonexistence, because there is no concrete thing (vastu) yet there is intrinsic nature. By analogy, the Mahāyāna of Dharma Characteristics states neither existence nor nonexistence, because depending on conditions it is not existent, yet serving as a cause it is not nonexistent. Passages such as these are all what is refuted. 2. What is revealed as the core doctrine: namely, solely because of these four propositions as reasons, in all [cases] production is impossible. The state that does not depend on production is the doctrine entered into. Fourth, in explaining the text, there are four [sections]: 1. general statement; 2. specific explanation; 3. conclusion on the doctrine; 4. analogical elimination. In the first, there are two: first stating the core doctrine and origin, and then quoting the verse to establish the doctrine; this is understandable. In the second, the specific explanation, there are two: first, quoting the verse to set up the three chapter-sections; second, explaining from 'For what reason' onward. In the explanation, there are three: first, explaining that an existing effect in the cause is not produced; next, explaining nonexistence; finally, explaining both. In explaining that existence cannot accomplish production, there are fifteen refutations. The first is the refutation of eternal production and non-production. Within this, there are four: 1. presenting the fault; 2. taking up their doctrine and refuting it; 3. precluding their defense and refuting it; 4. concluding the refutation. The first two are concessions to refute, meaning that assimilating what is already produced to what is not yet produced entails that it should be eternally produced; the latter two are direct eliminations, assimilating what is not yet produced to what is already produced entails that it should be eternally unproduced. In the second of the former [two], taking up their doctrine and refuting it, the formal inference (anumāna) is: The cause ought to produce the effect again after it has already been produced, because the effect always exists in the cause, like the cause whose effect is not yet produced, because the state of the cause does not alter between being unproduced and produced. Furthermore, because the already produced effect is not different from the time when it was not yet produced, therefore it always exists in the cause and is constantly produced. 'From this existent aspect it ought to be produced again' means: because this dharma of the effect is existent both while in the cause and when emerging from the cause, since it is already produced while in the cause, why should it not be produced when emerging from the cause? Therefore, being produced again after having been produced leads to infinite regress; this is the infinite regress of repeated production. 3. Precluding their defense and refuting it is also the refutation of eternal non-production. Within it, first taking up the opponent's defense: What is already produced is accomplished as an actual thing; once accomplished as an actual thing, it does not need to be produced. What is not yet produced exists in nature; because it exists in nature, it must be produced. Later, directly refuting it, [the text] says: As for there being no principle of production, since what is already produced is existent and not produced again, what is not yet produced is also existent and should likewise not be produced; therefore it says there is ultimately no principle of production. There is also an inference: The cause not yet produced ought not to produce an effect, because there is no principle of production for an effect existing in the cause, like the cause whose effect is already produced; this is the fault of eternal non-production. If assimilating what is already produced to what is not yet produced, there would be eternal production; if assimilating what is not yet produced to what is already produced, there would be eternal non-production. Possessing these faults, the fourth therefore concludes with unarisenness. The second is the refutation of the disparity between both being existent. The intent of the refutation is: If both the already produced and the not yet produced are existent, and yet one is produced and one is not produced, it could also be that between the already produced and the not yet produced, one is existent and one is not existent. If you say that the not yet produced is existent in nature and therefore has production, while the already produced is existent as an actual thing and therefore has no production, then production could also have two kinds of production: 1. production of nature; 2. production of actual things. In the text on non-production, first taking up the attachment, and later directly refuting it, can be understood. The third is the refutation of the mutual contradiction between the already produced and the not yet produced. Here, first directly refuting, and later explaining to establish it. In the first, since being produced and not yet being produced are mutually contradictory, if the not yet produced is existent, what is already produced should be nonexistent, because of their mutual contradiction, like light and darkness. In the explanation, 'two actions are also contradictory' means: the not yet produced takes existence as its action-characteristic, and what is already produced also takes existence as its action-characteristic; since the already produced and not yet produced are opposite, how could their action-characteristics not be contradictory? Therefore it causes disparity. It can also be that this is the refutation of losing identity through switching positions, meaning: since the not yet produced is an existent that subsequently acts, when already produced it should lose its own nature, because it has lost the position of not yet being produced. The fourth is the refutation of there being no distinction between the already produced and the not yet produced, meaning that if you do not accept the fault of contradiction, you fall into the error of having no distinction. The inference is: The not yet produced ought to be identical with the already produced, because they are both existent in substance and have no distinction, just like what is already produced. Previously, using the already produced and not yet produced to interrogate their own substances, the substances could not be one. Now, using their own substances to interrogate the already produced and not yet produced, the already produced and not yet produced cannot be distinct. In the text there are three: stating, explaining, and concluding, which can be understood. The fifth is the refutation of prior accomplishment rendering [the cause] useless, meaning that if the effect already exists beforehand, the cause has no productive efficacy, just as when fruit is in a vessel, the vessel has no efficacy in producing the fruit; hence it says 'having been made, it is not made,' and so forth. In the text there are three: 1. direct refutation; 2. adducing an analogy; 3. concluding the error, which can be understood. The sixth is the refutation that what already exists ought to be seen. First directly refuting, meaning: if the effect exists and yet is not seen, by what further dharma is this known to exist? The inference is: The existent is nonexistent, because it is not seen, just like a nonexistent thing. Second, refuting the defense: the defense argues that because it has not transformed, it has no characteristics, and therefore is not seen. The intent of the refutation is: since in the clay it has not transformed and lacks the characteristics of a jar, what difference is there between this and the clay also lacking the characteristics of a horse? If the clay lacks the characteristics of a horse, it also lacks the substance of a horse; if the clay lacks the characteristics of a jar, how could it have the substance of a jar? The inference and the conclusion can be understood. Furthermore, if the clay lacks the characteristics of a horse, there is no way to know there is a horse; if the clay also lacks the characteristics of a jar, by what is it known that there is a jar? There is also an inference, which can be understood. This later part is also refuting by interrogating the effect through its characteristics. The seventh is the refutation of losing the effect by exhausting transformation. Within it, there are two: first directly refuting, and later refuting the defense. In the first, there are three: 1. refutation by assimilating transformation to the effect: if the effect exists, transformation also exists, so now it ought to be visible; this is a concession to refute. From 'yet in reality' onward, concluding the error according to principle, which is a direct elimination. 2. From 'if it is said that before transformation' onward, refutation by assimilating the effect to transformation: if transformation is nonexistent, the effect is also nonexistent, which entails losing the dharma of the effect. Since transformation is initially nonexistent, it is ultimately nonexistent later, because in their school, if an effect is nonexistent beforehand, it is ultimately not produced later; therefore, transformation can ultimately never exist, and because it can ultimately never exist, the effect is permanently nonexistent. 3. Refutation of the indeterminacy of existence and nonexistence: because it contradicts their original doctrine and contravenes their own words; the text can be seen. Second, in refuting the defense, there are four: 1. the opponent's defense; 2. direct refutation; 3. repeated defense; 4. repeated refutation. First, the intent of the opponent's defense is to cite the eight worldly conditions to prove that transformation exists, yet lacks manifestation; therefore, all the preceding objections are thoroughly cleared. In the text there are three: 1. one phrase stating their own school; 2. from 'all things' onward, citing their own kind; 3. from 'what you say of the cause' onward, concluding the refutation of the error. In citing the kinds, there are four: 1. stating; 2. enumerating; 3. explaining; 4. concluding; all can be understood. The opponent's intent merely takes the eighth as an inference. Second, in the direct refutation, there are three: 1. general differentiation of difference; 2. sequential specific differentiation; 3. specifically refuting the eighth. That is, because beginning and end are one, both are definitely existent, and therefore cannot change. The formal inference can be understood. Third, the repeated defense can be understood. Fourth, in the repeated refutation, there are three: 1. refutation of losing the effect by assimilating the effect to coarseness, meaning that your claim that it is subtle when not yet produced entails that the coarse effect is nonexistent beforehand, contradicting your own school. 2. From 'furthermore, in the cause' onward, refutation of losing the effect by using subtlety to eliminate coarseness, meaning that if you say that after being produced it turns coarse, then the subtle is not an effect and cannot be called an effect; being subtle, it is ungraspable. Investigating both coarseness and subtlety, the substance of the effect is fundamentally nonexistent. 3. From 'thus' onward, concluding with a rebuke of their emotional clinging. In the eighth, the refutation of self-destruction of cause and effect: first, taking up the doctrine and stating the destruction; second, from 'For what reason' onward, explaining and revealing the characteristics of destruction. Here, first explaining the destruction of the cause: because the cause lacks a cause and is merely the place where the dharma of the effect resides, just as with fruit in a vessel the vessel is not the cause of the fruit; threads and the like are the subject, the vessel and the like are the analogy; the formal inference can be understood. Second, from 'if the cause is destroyed' onward, explaining the destruction of the effect. First is refutation by mutual dependence, next is explaining the refutation; they can be understood. In the ninth, the refutation of losing dharmas through vain pursuit, there are three: first, stating that because of non-action, the effect is destroyed, meaning that if the effect already exists beforehand, because it exists beforehand it is not that which is produced; not being that which is produced, it cannot be called an effect, which is the loss of the effect. Second, from 'For what reason' onward, explaining that because of non-action, the cause is destroyed, meaning that one never speaks of a cause as having productive capacity merely because an effect resides in it; therefore, lacking productive capacity, there is no cause. Third, from 'thus' onward, concluding with vain pursuit, meaning that since both cause and effect are nonexistent, why futilely pursue existence or nonexistence? Furthermore, in the previous gate, because the cause is destroyed, the effect is destroyed; in this gate, the effect is destroyed and the cause is also lost. The cause takes producing the effect as its productive capacity, and the effect takes arising from [the cause] as what is produced. Since the effect already exists beforehand, the cause loses the function of productive capacity, and the effect destroys the meaning of arising from [the cause]; therefore both are lost. The tenth is the refutation that without characteristics, the substance is lost. How does this differ from the previous inquiry about the characteristics of a jar in the clay? The previous one inquired into substance and characteristics, whereas this one interrogates indicative characteristics; hence they differ. In the text there are three: 1. conceding existence to interrogate characteristics; 2. adducing analogies to point to matters; 3. from 'thus' onward, directly eliminating emotional clinging. All can be understood. In the eleventh, the refutation of demanding whence the effect comes, there are three: first, taking up that the effect does not come from the cause; second, from 'if the cause does not' onward, precisely investigating that the effect has no source; third, from 'if the effect has no' onward, concluding that both are nonexistent; this can be understood. In the twelfth, the refutation of self-destruction of the two categories, there are four: first, stating the attachment and showing the fault through an inference: the effect ought to be permanent, because it is not made from anything, like the nature of nirvāṇa. Second, from 'if the effect' onward, destruction of the conditioned. Third, from 'if all' onward, destruction of the unconditioned. Fourth, concluding the error and rebuking it to cease. All can be understood. In the thirteenth, the refutation of the infinite regress of causes of causes, there are two: first directly refuting, and later refuting the defense. In the first, there are three: first, taking up the attachment and showing the fault; second, from 'like fine cloth' onward, citing analogies, which is also conceding existence based on their attachment, meaning that there is an effect in the cause, and this effect again becomes another cause, in which there is again another effect, and thus it is infinite. Relying on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: just as milk already exists in a cow, and in this milk there is curd, up to clarified butter, therefore the five flavors are already complete in the cow; and it also says: tomorrow one should take ghee, but today one already suffers from its smell, up to [butter] ought to exist in food, and so forth. Furthermore, selling a mare entails taking a foal, and within it is yet another foal, so that a single horse would be an entire herd; this is what it means. Third, from 'yet in reality' onward, directly eliminating based on principle: since the effect inside the cause is distinct, the effect is nonexistent and does not serve as a cause, so the effect in the cause does not exist. Second, in refuting the defense, there are four: 1. taking up the attachment and generally denying it; 2. from 'For what reason' onward, explaining the denial and revealing the refutation. The intent of the refutation is: if it is like the fragrance of the earth, which must await conditions to manifest, before it manifests it is not called an effect. Because you take what can be manifested as an effect, water is the manifesting agent and fragrance is what is manifested; since manifesting is an action, it can be called an effect. Jars and the like already exist beforehand, and not being an action, they are not effects. 3. Re-explaining; 4. concluding the error; both can be understood. The fourteenth is the refutation that being identical to manifestation entails losing production, meaning: if you hold that water manifesting the fragrance of the earth is merely a manifesting cause (jñāpaka-hetu) for jars and the like, it should concurrently accomplish other things, just as a lamp illuminating a jar also illuminates other things. Furthermore, do you take action as the effect, or do you take manifestation as the effect? If the effect is an action, jars and the like exist beforehand; not being actions, they are not called effects. If the effect is manifestation, since clay and the like manifest a jar, why do they not also concurrently produce other things? In the text there are four: 1. dharma; 2. analogy; 3. application; 4. conclusion. All can be understood. The fifteenth is the refutation that two actions cannot be established, meaning that because the effect already exists beforehand, which is made now and which will be made in the future? Because that school posits two different actions, it loses its own doctrine. In the text, first interrogating and then concluding can be understood. The above finishes explaining the section on the non-production of prior existence.

2.4

In the second major section, it is explained that if [the effect] does not previously exist, it also is not produced. Here there are five rounds [of refutation]: First, the refutation that causes would be identical to non-causes. Within this, there are two parts: first, the refutation proper, and second, refuting the defense. In refuting the defense, first comes the defense, and then the refutation. Within the refutation, there are two parts: first, that since [effects are] equally non-existent, distinct effects would be produced; second, that since [causes are] alike in non-existence, they would act as distinct causes; the syllogisms (pramāṇa) in both can be understood. Second, the refutation that a single cause would produce multiple effects. Within this, first is the refutation proper, and then refuting the defense. In the former, it is refuted on concession: namely, that a single cause ought to produce all things, because [the effect] is non-existent. Next, from 'If in the cause' onward is the refutation by deprivation: namely, if it were non-existent, the various causes would not each have the capacity to produce [their respective] effects; now, since the various causes each have the capacity toward their own effects, one knows it is not non-existent. From 'Just as one who requires oil' onward, a concrete case is cited to illustrate this. Second, in refuting the defense, first the proponent's claim is cited and rejected in general; second, the meaning of this rejection is explained and revealed. That is, oil emerging from sesame is [regarded as] production; people of the world falsely consider this to be production, yet in reality it is not produced, being no different from sand. Therefore, when examined critically, production is not established; by what further dharma could one know there is production? Third, from 'Therefore' onward, the rejection is concluded and attachment is rebuked. Third, the refutation based on uncertainty being identical to doubt. Within this, there are three parts: first, indicating one's own intention: namely, it was feared that although the outsider holds no view of non-existence of the effect in the cause, when the treatise master compared sesame to sand such that the non-existence within sesame was not established, they might think the treatise master conceded that it exists, intending to abandon non-existence and grasp onto existence; therefore, the treatise master turns back to avert this, saying: 'I do not merely refute your claim of non-existence; existence and the rest are also refuted.' Hence it is said that all causes and effects are refuted. Second, from 'If in the cause' onward, it explains that all are unestablished: namely, none of the three causes establish production. Third, from 'Therefore' onward, it concludes that it is identical to doubt: namely, you merely say you see sesame yield oil, yet do not know whether within the sesame it exists, does not exist, or both exists and does not exist. Thus you are identical to one who doubts their own cause without comprehension—how could production be established? Fourth, the refutation based on the characteristics of a cause being unestablished. Within this, there are two parts: first, citing the attachment to show that the cause is unestablished; second, explaining and revealing the characteristic of being unestablished. Here, it first explains that the cause is unestablished: direct and indirect [causes] are not one, hence it says 'the various causes'; within them there is no effect-dharma, hence it says 'the non-existent dharma'. If all alike lack the effect-dharma, one does not know which is the direct cause capable of making, and which is the indirect cause capable of completing. Furthermore, if there is no effect-dharma, what is made and what is completed? Because there is neither making nor completion, they are not causes. This text is inverted; it should say: if there is no effect-dharma, what can this cause make, and what can it complete? Because there is no completion or making, there is also no cause. Second, explaining that the effect is unestablished: because the cause is unestablished in this way, the direct cause, called the maker, cannot have any effect that is made. Even if one makes an agent an indirect cause, it also cannot have an effect. Furthermore, in some editions of the treatise, the word 'shi' (使, make/cause) is written as 'suo' (所, that which): then the maker is the artisan, and having no effect-dharma to make, cannot have anything made. That which is made is the clay cause, which also cannot have anything made, because clay is what is used and made through human effort. Fifth, the refutation of the counter-objection violating their own thesis. Within this, there are three parts: first, the outsider raises a counter-objection against the treatise master; second, the treatise master reveals their fault of violating their own thesis; third, concluding the rejection and admonishing them to cease. In the first part, the outsider's counter-objection contains two objections internally: 1. The counter-interrogation objection, which says: 'You refute me by saying that because the effect does not exist in the cause, there is no maker, and because there is no maker, there is no cause. If so, then do you hold that because the effect exists in the cause, there is making, and that the maker is the cause of all dharmas?' 2. The objection of equal fault, which means: 'If, because the effect does not exist in the cause for me, there is no making and it is not a cause, then for you, if the effect previously exists in the cause, there is also neither making nor a maker, because what previously exists does not require making.' Here, making is objected to, and existence is objected to. The maker is the person; making is the active function; the made dharma is the effect that is made. In the text, the heading is the first objection, and the explanation is the second objection, as can be known. Second, in the treatise master's counter-reply and refutation, there are two parts: first, citing their attachment and rejecting it in general; second, separately explaining the two objections. Here there are two parts: First, answering the objection of equal fault, saying: 'Now I refute their maker and making; these are not posited by me, so it does not constitute an objection. If one can refute them, it accords all the more with my thesis of emptiness, so it also does not constitute an objection.' The two passages can be known. From 'Therefore' onward is the conclusion, which can be understood. Second, in answering the counter-interrogation objection, there are two parts: first, the direct reply, meaning that their effect's existence was fundamentally never my thesis; you have merely labored in vain, helping to establish my meaning. Second, averting the objection, meaning: fearing that they might object, 'Since you do not accept that the effect exists, you are identical with my claim of non-existence,' it therefore says: 'I also do not accept that the effect does not exist.' Up to this point, refuting non-existence is concluded.

2.5

The third major section refutes the attachment to both existence and non-existence. Why does this appear? Because when that outsider's previous claim of existence was not established, they shifted their attachment to non-existence. Furthermore, seeing that the treatise master's refutation had left it unestablished, they thought: 'Because I one-sidedly posited existence or non-existence, it could not establish a cause; adopting both meanings should accord with reason.' Therefore, the gate of refutation arrives. Moreover, faculties have three grades: the superior faculty awakens at the first gate; the middling faculty reaches the second; the inferior faculty reaches this one; therefore this arrives. In the text, there are two rounds: First, the refutation based on natures being mutually contradictory. Within this, there are four parts: 1. citing the attachment and rejecting it in general; 2. explaining and revealing the contradiction; 3. citing examples to point to concrete cases; 4. concluding generally that there is no production. Alternatively, they may be: 1. thesis (pakṣa), 2. reason (hetu), 3. example (dṛṣṭānta), 4. conclusion (nigamana). The second points to its identity with the previous two refutations, as can be seen. The third major section, concluding the fundamental thesis, has two parts: first, concluding that under the three gates above there is no production; second, from 'in all' onward, concluding by returning to non-production. In the fourth part, eliminating by extension, there are three: first, eliminating conditioned [dharmas] by extension; second, eliminating unconditioned [dharmas]; third, eliminating the self. All of these can be understood.

2.6

Chapter 3: Examination of Conditions

2.7

The four meanings in explaining this gate are the same as before: First, distinguishing the name: bringing forth an effect is a condition (pratyaya); contemplating that conditions lack intrinsic nature is therefore taken as the gate. Second, the reason for its appearance: previously, when seeking production within causes it could not be found; now, when seeking within conditions there is also no production, hence it follows next. Furthermore, it is because attachments are completely eliminated through multiple gates, and also to show that wherever one touches the path, all is unproduced. Third, clarifying what is elucidated in the chapter: namely, investigating that the four conditions are all devoid of any principle of production is what is held as the thesis. Fourth, in explaining the text, there are five parts: 1. stating the thesis; 2. refuting existence; 3. refuting non-existence; 4. refuting conditions; 5. eliminating by extension. In the first, all dharmas are effects and conditions, which are both unestablished. Second, in refuting existence, there are three parts: 1. presenting the verse to state it briefly; 2. setting forth the characteristics of those conditions; 3. critically refuting them to clarify emptiness. In the first part, the verse is first established, followed by a brief explanation. In the verse, the first half refutes by deprivation, and the second half concludes with rebuke. Alternatively, the first half reveals the principle, and the second half cross-examines subjective views. In the brief explanation, each single condition is broad, while their combination is brief. Within these two gates, seeking the production of existence is impossible. Second, in distinguishing the characteristics of conditions, there are two parts: first a question, then an answer. In the answer, first is the verse, then the explanation. In the verse, the first half settles the matter, and the second half enumerates the names. Because non-Buddhists posit the spiritual self (ātman) as a fifth condition, it is absent here. In the explanation, there are two parts: first, enumerating the names; second, explaining the characteristics. In explaining the characteristics, explaining the four conditions consists of four parts, each having three aspects: heading, explanation, and conclusion. In the first, 'cause condition' (hetu-pratyaya) means taking the cause as a condition, hence it is called 'cause'. Here, the cause is itself the condition, hence it is called 'cause condition'; it is not that direct and indirect are both cited to name it cause condition. Saying 'that from which [something] is produced' reveals the sense of directly producing. Furthermore, this which is produced from it is an effect-dharma, its essence being conditioned, and thus it is subsumed under the three times. In the second, 'the dharma having ceased' refers to the prior mental dharma passing away and ceasing. 'Produced in sequence' means: although the prior mind and mental factors have passed away and ceased, they have the power to vacate and guide, causing the subsequent mental dharmas to be produced without interruption; hence it says 'produced in sequence'. Because it serves as a condition for sequential dharmas, it is so named. In the new translation it is named the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya). This exists only for mental dharmas; all others lack it. In the third, 'condition' means the objective referent (ālambana). Because objective referent dharmas condition the arising of the cognitive mind, mental factors, and so forth, they are called conditions. Thus, taking the objective referent as a condition is called the condition of objective referent (ālambana-pratyaya); the new name is the objective referent condition (ālambana-pratyaya). 'That which is recollected' in the explanation is the objective referent in principle; in reality, it merely gives rise to mind and mental factors, which are established based on the volition-dharma as the two karmas of body and speech, and therefore it generally encompasses all three karmas. In the fourth, because this dharma has predominant, superior power toward that dharma, it is called 'predominant'. The predominant is itself the condition, hence it is called 'predominant condition' (adhipati-pratyaya). This has two kinds: 1. non-obstructive predominance; 2. superior-power auxiliary predominance. This text encompasses both, but is stated according to the latter. Third, critically refuting them to clarify emptiness. Within this, there are five parts: 1. general statement; 2. separate examination; 3. dual cross-examination; 4. concluding non-existence; 5. concluding the thesis. In the separate [examination], first, deprivation of the cause by the condition clarifies that it is non-existent in the cause; second, deprivation of the condition by the cause clarifies that it is non-existent in the condition; third, from 'If in' onward, dual cross-examination; fourth, from 'Therefore' onward, concluding non-existence; fifth, from 'In this way, each single' onward, concluding by directly cross-examining subjective views. 'Each single' is a separate cross-examination, hence broad; 'combination' is a general examination, hence brief. Third, in refuting non-existence, there are three parts: first, establishing the verse, in which the first half cites the outsider's claim, and the second half refutes it alongside non-conditions; then the explanation reveals it. That is, the outsider's intention is: 'Although seeking [the effect] within conditions briefly or broadly fails, what prevents this effect from being produced from the four conditions?' The refuting intention is: 'Since conditions and non-conditions equally lack the effect, yet it can emerge from conditions, why should it not emerge from non-conditions?' The establishment of the syllogism and the rest can be known. Third, from 'Therefore' onward, concluding non-production. Fourth, in refuting conditions, there are two parts: first, stating the thesis, meaning that because they produce an effect they are called conditions; since the effect is not produced, how could there be conditions? Next, in the explanation, 'if the condition is first and the effect is later' is a refutation by pursuing principle based on subjective views, meaning: if the condition is first and lacks [the effect], of what is it a condition? Therefore it is not [a condition]. Fifth, in eliminating by extension, there are three parts: first, concluding that conditioned [dharmas] are empty by extension; second, that unconditioned [dharmas] are empty; third, that the self is empty. Therefore, the three emptinesses eliminate the two selves.

2.8

Chapter 4: Examination of Characteristics

2.9

Explaining this gate in four points is the same as before. First, explaining the name: it contemplates and refutes both the characterizing [sign] and the characterized dharma completely, so as to arrive at true emptiness; hence it is so called. Second, the intention behind its sequence: previously it refuted the characterized, and next it refutes the characterizing; because the meaning follows in sequence, it therefore comes next. Furthermore, those who cling to wrong views, hearing in the previous gate that conditions do not produce effects, might claim that signs can produce dharmas; to refute them, this gate is introduced. Furthermore, it reveals the principle through multiple gates to make it clear and pure. Third, what is clarified in the chapter: it completely refutes the three signs, causing the mind that holds views to have nothing to rely on, thereby establishing right contemplation. Fourth, in explaining the text, there are four parts: first, stating the thesis; second, presenting the verse; third, explaining the refutation; fourth, eliminating [other dharmas] by analogy. In the verse, the first line adduces the entity of the dharma; the next line distinguishes the emptiness of the sign; the lower half eliminates the entity of the dharma on the basis of the emptiness of the sign. Third, within the explanation, there are two parts: first, explaining the emptiness of the signs of the conditioned as stated; next, explaining the emptiness of the signs of the unconditioned as stated. The first part also has two sections: first, there are five verses refuting the Sarvāstivāda masters' doctrine of the mutual production of primary and secondary signs through simultaneous cause (sahabhū-hetu); next, five verses refuting the Mahāsāṃghika masters' claim that conditioned signs produce both themselves and others. Within the former, there are also two parts: first, the refutation proper; next, refuting the defense. In the first part, the first line states the thesis, meaning that conditioned dharmas do not become such dharmas by virtue of signs; hence it is said. Second, in directly revealing [this], first a question and answer adduces the signs to fix their nature, and then a question and answer employs reason for the refutation proper. In the first part, there is first a question and then an answer. In the answer, it first explains that dharmas each have their own entities and marks, like cows, vases, and so forth, without needing a separate characterizing [sign] outside the dharma. If these three signs of yours are the signs of the conditioned, one does not know: are these three signs in their own entity conditioned, or are they unconditioned? According to the Abhidharma and the *Satyasiddhi*, both say that the three signs are existent dharmas. The Vibhajyavādins say: the entity of the conditioned cannot stabilize itself; how could it characterize others? One should know that the three signs are unconditioned dharmas. The Dharmaguptakas say: the two signs of arising and abiding are conditioned dharmas, while the sign of cessation is an unconditioned dharma. Therefore, the three signs are both conditioned and unconditioned. Second, in the refutation proper through reason, there are two parts: first, the opponent's question accepting that they are conditioned; second, the internal answer giving the refutation proper. Because the unconditioned and both [conditioned and unconditioned] do not await refutation, the text refutes only the conditioned. In the text, there are two parts: first, stating the verse; the upper half refutes that the three signs are conditioned, pointing out the fault of infinite regress; the lower half refutes that the three signs are unconditioned, pointing out the fault of losing their nature as signs. Another explanation of the lower half is that it refutes a defense: if it is said that the entity of a conditioned dharma requires a sign, but what requires a sign does not further require [another sign], then the entity of the dharma requires a sign to characterize it; the entity of the dharma is conditioned, and since the sign does not require another sign to characterize it, it should be an unconditioned sign; if it is unconditioned, how can it serve as a sign for a conditioned dharma? Therefore it says: how can it be called a sign of the conditioned? The commentary follows this. Second, in the explanation, there are two parts: first, explaining the verse; next, eliminating [other dharmas] by analogy. In the former, first it explains the upper half of the verse, and then the lower half. In the former, it first explains arising, meaning, first, the fault of infinite regress, as is evident from the text. Second, if there is cessation within arising, they are contradictory; if there is no cessation, it is not conditioned. Therefore, both possessing cessation is unfeasible and lacking cessation is unfeasible, and hence arising is empty. Second, abiding and cessation are likewise eliminated by analogy. Second, under "if arising is unconditioned," it explains the lower half of the verse. It also first explains arising through three points: first, refutation through the mutual contradiction of two classes: that is, only when this conditioned is extinguished is there the unconditioned; being diametrically opposed, just like light and darkness, how could light serve as a sign for darkness? Second, refutation by rebuking the sign for losing its entity: that is, if it is unconditioned, then it lacks arising, abiding, and cessation; apart from these three signs, who would know the arising of this conditioned dharma? Third, under "furthermore," refutation through lack of distinction: that is, the unconditioned is of a single limit without duality; where could there be arising distinct from abiding and cessation? Under "therefore there is no arising," it applies the analogy to abiding and cessation; hence it says "it is also thus." Second, in eliminating [other dharmas] by analogy, there are three parts: first, eliminating the entity of dharmas through the non-existence of signs; second, eliminating the unconditioned; third, a general conclusion regarding all [dharmas]. Second, in refuting the defense, first there is the external defense, and next the refutation proper. In the former, there are two parts: first, citing the previous fault; second, establishing the reasoning for the defense. Therein, first is the verse and next the explanation. In the verse, it defends against the previous two objections: the upper half defends against the objection regarding the unconditioned, because it is the primary arising of secondary arising; since the primary arising arises from secondary arising, it is therefore not an unconditioned dharma. The lower half defends against the fault of infinite regress, because it is the secondary arising of primary arising; since secondary arising in turn arises from primary arising, there is therefore no fault of infinite regress. Therein, the first line adduces the entity of secondary arising; because it is what is produced by primary arising, it says "what is produced by it." The next line explains the function of secondary arising; the lower two lines are known by converse analogy to this. Second, in the explanation, there are three parts: first, distinguishing the dharmas; second, defending against the fault; third, concluding the avoidance [of fault]. In defending against the fault, that primary arising produces six dharmas with the exclusion of its own entity means: because it directly produces the primary conditioned entity of the dharma, it is called primary arising (mūla-jāti), as it is the arising of the primary [entity]. Furthermore, because it produces this primary [arising], it is called secondary arising (jāti-jāti), as it is the arising of arising; they are also called major arising and minor arising. This major arising serves as the sign of arising for the six dharmas, but it does not serve as a sign for itself, because major arising itself takes minor arising as its sign. Major abiding and cessation are also like this. Therefore, the major signs are generally capable of characterizing both major and minor, yet they solely do not characterize themselves; the minor signs are not generally capable of characterizing major and minor, but solely characterize one major [sign]. Because the minor is powerless and produces few dharmas, it is called minor; because the major sign is powerful and produces many dharmas, it is called major. For instance, in major arising, it takes minor arising as its sign of arising, and major abiding and cessation as its signs of abiding and cessation. Major abiding takes minor abiding as its sign of abiding, and major arising and cessation as its signs of arising and cessation. Major cessation takes minor cessation as its sign of cessation, and major arising and abiding as its signs of arising and abiding. If in minor arising the three major signs are completely present, the same is also true for minor abiding and cessation; therefore there is not that fault of infinite regress. This is the simultaneous cause (sahabhū-hetu) among the six causes, meaning that because they arise at the same time they are simultaneous, and because they mutually rely on one another they are called causes. Herein, there are cases of being simultaneous and a simultaneous cause, and cases of being simultaneous but not a cause. If one considers the entity of the dharma in relation to the six signs, it can function as both simultaneous and a simultaneous cause. If one considers major arising in relation to the six dharmas, it is also both simultaneous and a simultaneous cause. Major abiding and major cessation are also like this. If one considers minor arising in relation to major arising, it is simultaneous and a simultaneous cause; minor abiding in relation to major abiding, and minor cessation in relation to major cessation, are also simultaneous and simultaneous causes. Minor arising in relation to the five dharmas is simultaneous but not a cause; minor abiding and minor cessation in relation to the five dharmas are also like this. However, as for the two arisings—major and minor—that school holds that within a single kṣaṇa they mutually rely on each other to arise, and abiding and cessation are also like this; hence there is not the former fault. Third, under "therefore," it concludes; under "free from fault," it applies the analogy to abiding and cessation. Second, under "it is answered," is the direct censure and refutation. Therein are two parts: first, two verses clarifying the refutation that that which is [to be produced] does not have that which can [produce]; next, one verse clarifying the refutation that that which can [produce] does not have that which is [produced]. Another explanation: the first two are refutations of non-production in sequence, and the latter one is a refutation of non-production simultaneously. In the former, there are two verses: first, the minor does not produce the major; second, the major does not produce the minor. In the first, minor arising is prior and major arising is posterior, and minor arising does not produce major arising. In the latter, major arising is prior and minor arising is posterior, and major arising does not produce minor arising. In the explanation of the verses following, there are two parts: first, citing the assertion and rejecting it generally; second, explaining the reason for the rejection. Second, in the simultaneous refutation, there are three parts: first, citing the assertion and rejecting it generally; second, stating the verse for the refutation proper. That is, the upper half concedes [the point] with respect to subjective assumption; the lower half rejects it with respect to reason. Third, explaining the refutation. The meaning of the refutation is: the way of mutual production necessarily requires an entity capable of producing, and the non-existence of an entity produced from it. Now when you say "simultaneous," are they both existent, or are they both non-existent? If they are both existent, why would they need to produce each other? If they are both non-existent, what on earth produces what? If one is existent and one is non-existent, how could they be simultaneous? Furthermore, how could they mutually produce each other? Second, refuting the Mahāsāṃghika masters' claim that conditioned signs produce both themselves and others. Therein are two parts: first, citing the assertion and rejecting it generally; second, censuring and refuting it with reason. Herein are two parts: first, four verses refuting the metaphor; next, one verse refuting the dharma. In the former, there are four [verses]: the first verse clarifies the refutation that when already burning it does not reach [darkness]; the second verse clarifies the refutation that at the time of burning it does not reach [darkness]; the third verse clarifies the refutation through near and far mutually following each other; the fourth verse clarifies the refutation by juxtaposing lamp and darkness in reverse. In the first, there are three parts: first, in the verse, the upper half clarifies that because there is no darkness illuminated by itself or by another, the lower half implies that there is consequently no lamp capable of illuminating. Second, the explanation; third, under "therefore," concluding the error and enjoining its cessation. All can be understood. Second, regarding the refutation that at the time of burning it does not reach [darkness], first there is a question. The intention of the question is: when the lamp first arises, because its entity is not yet complete, there is darkness within the flame; because the light is not yet fully grown, the room is still dim; as the entity of the lamp gradually rounds out, this dimness and darkness are completely exhausted. One should know that what dispels darkness is the newly arisen lamp; hence it says that at the time of burning it can dispel darkness, meaning it illuminates both itself and that [other]. Second, in the answer, there is first the verse; the upper half questions the assertion, and the lower half is the refutation proper, meaning that at the very time of this newly arisen lamp, darkness has already ceased; therefore, there is never a newly arisen lamp coexisting with unextinguished darkness; because they do not coexist, it also does not reach the darkness; because it does not reach the darkness, it is not called dispelling; if it reaches the darkness, it also does not dispel it. The prose explanation can be understood. Third, in the refutation through near and far mutually following each other, first in the verse, the upper half cites the assertion, and the lower half is the refutation proper. In the subsequent explanation, taking their both not reaching [darkness] as the reason, there are four objections: 1. assimilating the near to the far, both should fail to dispel; 2. assimilating the far to the near, then both should dispel; 3. since it equally does not reach the darkness, so that it dispels the near but not the far, it should also be that because it equally does not reach, it dispels the far but not the near; 4. since there is dispelling and non-dispelling, there should be reaching and non-reaching. In the text, there are three parts: first, citing the assertion; second, the refutation proper, first conceding and then rejecting; third, concluding with a rebuke. Fourth, the refutation by juxtaposing mutual contradiction. Therein are two parts: first the verse, and then the explanation. In the verse, the upper half cites the assertion, and the lower half refutes by applying the analogy to darkness, meaning that light and darkness are directly contradictory; since light has the efficacy of illuminating darkness, darkness should also have the power of obstructing light; since it has this power, the lamp cannot dispel darkness. Furthermore, if the lamp both illuminates itself and illuminates darkness, darkness should also conceal itself and conceal the lamp. If the lamp is concealed by darkness, how could it dispel darkness? Even if they defend by saying: because light is superior, while illuminating others it also illuminates itself; because darkness is inferior, it conceals itself but does not conceal others; then one objects back: because light is superior, it can oppose darkness; because darkness is inferior, it does not oppose light. If both mutually oppose each other, why would they not need to mutually dispel each other? Speaking generally, taking their mutual contradiction as the reason, there are also four objections: 1. by following darkness from the perspective of the lamp to refute, the lamp should not dispel darkness, because they are mutually contradictory, just as darkness does not conceal the lamp; 2. by following the lamp from the perspective of darkness to refute, darkness would definitely be able to obstruct the lamp, also because of their mutual contradiction, just as the lamp can dispel darkness; 3. since the lamp opposes darkness, and yet the lamp can dispel darkness while darkness cannot conceal the lamp, it could also be that darkness opposes the lamp, and yet darkness can conceal the lamp while the lamp cannot dispel darkness; 4. if one dispels and one does not dispel, one should oppose and one should not oppose. If darkness does not oppose the lamp, there should be darkness in the lamp and light in darkness. All these can be understood. The explanation and conclusion in the text can be understood. The refutation of the metaphor is finished.

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十二門論宗致義記 — Classical Chinese