瑜伽論記 11.428

11.428

前中文有九番，初由思釋方能修作，未能任運成辨勝修，勝修是定因，定所生神通等果。亦未能得者，未得根本定故。未越五怖畏者，基云：准下對治五怖畏等，所治是此怖體，此以何為體。第一不活畏，以我見及我愛資生愛為體，故下云：由修無我智分別我想尚不復轉，況當得有分別我愛或資生愛，故知以我見及愛為體。第二惡名畏，以貪欲為體，故下文言：由於他所無所希望，常自發起如是具樂，當饒益一切有情非有情有所求覓，由是因勝無惡名畏，故知以貪欲為體。第三死畏，以我見為體，故下文云：由離我見於我無有失壞想轉，故無死畏，明知以我見為體。第四惡趣畏，以癡為體，下論云：自知死後，於當來世決定值遇諸佛菩薩，由此決定無惡趣畏，五處眾性畏，以癡為體，故下論云：由意樂見一切世間，尚無一與我齊等，何況殊勝，是故有處眾佉畏，此所治以癡為體也。第二信無他已下，明信他故作未自了知，第三成就狹小聞下，明五根未滿，成就狹小聞所成知等者，明慧根未滿，或時妄失者，念根未成，苦遲通行者，定根於大菩提無猛利。樂欲者，此顯欲心無熾然，精進者，明勤根無有甚深牢固，淨信者，是信根，四於三處有忘失念，五聰慧下念慧不定。言或於一時具足憶或於一時成忘念類者，基云：有憶得不得故名忘念類，非念忘故言類也。第六、於諸有情下不如實知自利利他種種方便。第七、或於一時於大菩提下明二利行進退不定，由思擇故欲令他樂者，自利則易，利他事難，要由思擇。第八、於諸菩薩所有違犯下明數有犯猶預疑惑。第九、於諸有情遠離大悲。

In the former text, there are nine points. First, only through reflection can one cultivate and act, being unable yet to spontaneously accomplish superior cultivation. Superior cultivation is the cause of meditative concentration; the supernatural knowledges and other fruits produced by concentration also cannot yet be attained, because one has not attained the fundamental concentration. Regarding 'not yet surpassing the five fears': Ji says: in accordance with the antidotes to the five fears below, etc., what is to be countered is the substance of these fears. What are they in substance? The first is the fear of lack of livelihood, taking the view of self, love of self, and love of requisites for life as its substance; hence it says below: 'Because of cultivating the wisdom of selflessness, conceptualizations of a self no longer arise, how much less could there be conceptualized love of self or love of requisites for life,' so we know it takes the view of self and love as its substance. The second is the fear of ill repute, taking desire as its substance; hence the text below says: 'Because one has no expectations regarding others and constantly generates such complete joy oneself, seeking to benefit all sentient beings without seeking anything from them, due to this supreme cause there is no fear of ill repute,' so we know it takes desire as its substance. The third is the fear of death, taking the view of self as its substance; hence the text below says: 'Because of being free from the view of self, the notion of ruin regarding oneself does not arise, and thus there is no fear of death,' making it clear that it takes the view of self as its substance. The fourth is the fear of miserable destinies, taking delusion as its substance; the treatise below says: 'Knowing oneself that after death one will certainly encounter the buddhas and bodhisattvas in future lives, because of this certainty there is no fear of miserable destinies.' The fifth is the fear of assemblies, taking delusion as its substance; hence the treatise below says: 'Because one's aspiration perceives all the world as having none equal to oneself, how much less superior, therefore there is fear of assemblies'—what this counters takes delusion as its substance. Second, from 'having faith without another' onward, it explains that because one acts out of faith in others, one does not yet understand for oneself. Third, from 'achieving narrow hearing' onward, it explains that the five faculties are not yet complete: 'achieving the knowledge arisen from narrow hearing' and so on explains that the faculty of wisdom is not yet complete; 'at times forgetting' means that the faculty of mindfulness is not yet achieved; 'operating with difficulty and slowness' means that the faculty of concentration lacks sharpness regarding great bodhi; 'desire' shows that the mind of desire is not blazing; 'vigor' explains that the faculty of diligence is not profound and firm; 'pure faith' is the faculty of faith. Fourth, having forgetful mindfulness in three situations. Fifth, from 'intelligent' onward, mindfulness and wisdom are undetermined. Regarding 'at one time completely remembering, or at another time belonging to the class of forgetful mindfulness': Ji says: because one sometimes remembers and sometimes does not, it is called the class of forgetful mindfulness, not that mindfulness is forgotten, hence it says 'class'. Sixth, from 'regarding sentient beings' onward, one does not know in accordance with reality the various skillful means of benefiting oneself and benefiting others. Seventh, from 'or at one time regarding great bodhi' onward, it explains that the practices of the two benefits advance and regress indeterminately; regarding 'wishing to bring happiness to others through reflection': benefiting oneself is easy, while the work of benefiting others is difficult, so it must be done through reflection. Eighth, from 'regarding the transgressions of bodhisattvas' onward, it explains having frequent transgressions, hesitations, and doubts. Ninth, being far removed from great compassion regarding sentient beings.