瑜伽論記 13.209

13.209

初難云：如一行故心起，起多心所而得相應，今一行者身，八識三受一時俱起，應得相應，故今為通云：雖與轉識俱轉，亦與容受容善等心法俱轉者，此約前識俱受俱性俱門為有法。然不應說與彼相應為法，即合為宗，何以故不與同緣轉故，立因，如眼識下，出同法喻，凡相應法必須四義等，今經俱起而不同依一根及不同緣，故不相應，略不辨根不同。三藏云：眼根眼識得言同境不名同緣，緣是心法有所緣慮，眼根是色但是對境不得名緣境，如雜心說，五根但是境界有對非緣有對。泰云：外人作量難汝，賴耶識應與轉識三性三受相應，俱時轉故，猶如心法。今通此難，作二過失：一、決定相違，賴耶識不與轉識三性三受得有相應，不同緣故，如眼識眼根等；二、不定過，為如心法俱時轉故，諸識相應，為如眼根眼識俱時轉故，不得相應耶？喻不可全同其法，故云依小分。若全同其法即是其法，不可為喻。

The first objection states: Just as when a single practitioner's mind arises, many mental factors arise and can be associated, now in the body of a single practitioner, the eight consciousnesses and three feelings arise together at the same time, so they should be able to be associated. Therefore, to resolve this, it is now said: Although it functions together with the transforming consciousnesses, it also functions together with mental factors such as permissible feelings and permissible wholesome factors. Here, the preceding gates of co-arising with consciousness, co-arising with feeling, and co-arising with moral nature constitute the subject (dharmin). However, 'it should not be said to be associated with them' is the predicate (dharma), which together form the thesis (pratijñā). Why? 'Because it does not function taking the same object' establishes the reason (hetu). 'Like the visual consciousness' and below presents the example of similar attribute (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). All associated phenomena must possess the four equivalences and so forth; now, although they co-arise, they do not rely on the same single sense-base and do not take the same object, so they are not associated; that the sense-bases are not the same is omitted from the analysis. The Tripiṭaka Master says: The eye faculty and the visual consciousness can be said to have the same objective realm, but they are not called 'taking the same object' (samānālambana). 'Taking an object' belongs to mental phenomena, which possess cognizing reflection; the eye faculty is matter (rūpa), which merely confronts the objective realm and cannot be called 'taking an object,' just as the Za xin says: 'The five faculties merely possess sensory confrontation with the objective realm, not cognitive confrontation with an object.' Tai says: An opponent forms a syllogism to challenge you: 'The ālayavijñāna should be associated with the three natures and three feelings of the transforming consciousnesses; because they function simultaneously; like mental factors.' Now to resolve this challenge, two fallacies are shown: First, the fallacy of contradictory inconclusiveness (viruddha-avyabhicārin): 'The ālayavijñāna cannot be associated with the three natures and three feelings of the transforming consciousnesses; because they do not take the same object; like the visual consciousness and the eye faculty, and so on.' Second, the fallacy of an inconclusive reason (anaikāntika): Is it like mental factors functioning simultaneously, so that the various consciousnesses are associated, or is it like the eye faculty and the visual consciousness functioning simultaneously, so that they cannot be associated? An example cannot be identical in all parts to the phenomenon, hence it is said to rely on a minor part. If it were identical in all parts to the phenomenon, it would simply be that phenomenon, and could not serve as an example.