瑜伽論記 13.436

13.436

何以故下，釋不雜亂。（泰云）如薩婆多苦集，是一物，因果故說二，亦不同此，此同經部師立附依止，亦熏習說名種子，然此種子與果報身不定一異，不相雜亂，如穀麥有生芽功能，然功能與麥等不相離。若依大乘真實理門，種子在賴耶識，與識不定一異。若據隨轉理門，種子附身相續中，報身不定一異，攝論亦云：種子在依止處中及本識中，二文據隨轉理門故約諸行說也。（備云）然即諸行如是種姓如是等生等者此明六七識與種子不一果，如是安布名為種子亦名果者此明本識與種子不異。基述上三師釋已，云今解稍別，此並望現行種子為論，亦非餘處，以上釋種子與行不異。而即諸行以下，明種子與行不一，何以故下，釋成上義，譬如穀麥等物下，三藏云：此中意者，謂如一麥芽望後蘂名種，從前種生名果，即以莖為蘂種子亦為前種果。今解：從譬如以下至亦非餘處明穀麥等從芽莖以為種子生，與莖等為果不一異。

From "why is that?" downward, it explains non-confusion. (Tai says:) As in the Sarvāstivāda where suffering and origin are one entity, but spoken of as two on account of cause and effect; nor is it the same as this. This is the same as the Sautrāntika masters establishing reliance upon the support, and also speaking of perfumed habituation as seeds; yet these seeds and the retribution body are neither determinately identical nor different, and are not intermingled. It is like grains and barley having the capability to sprout shoots, yet the capability is not separated from the barley and so forth. If relying on the Mahāyāna perspective of genuine truth, seeds reside in the ālayavijñāna, and are neither determinately identical to nor different from the consciousness. If based on the perspective conforming to provisional conversion, seeds are attached to the continuity of the body, and the retribution body is neither determinately identical nor different. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also states: 'Seeds are in the basis and in the fundamental consciousness'; these two passages are based on the perspective conforming to provisional conversion, and therefore speak in terms of conditioned phenomena. (Bei says:) 'Yet conditioned phenomena having such a gotra arise in such an equal manner and so forth': this explains that the sixth and seventh consciousnesses are not of one fruit with the seeds. 'Such arrangement is called seed and is also called fruit': this explains that the fundamental consciousness is not different from the seeds. After recording the explanations of the above three masters, Ji says: The present explanation is slightly different; these are all discussed in terms of active function and seeds. 'Nor is it elsewhere' and above explains that seeds are not different from conditioned phenomena. From 'yet conditioned phenomena' downward clarifies that seeds are not identical to conditioned phenomena. From 'why is that?' downward explains and establishes the above meaning. From 'for example, substances such as grains and barley' downward, the Tripiṭaka Master said: The meaning here is that just as a single barley sprout is called a seed with respect to the subsequent pistil, and is called a fruit because it arises from the preceding seed, the stalk is thus taken as the seed of the pistil and also the fruit of the preceding seed. The present explanation: from 'for example' downward to 'nor is it elsewhere', it explains that grains and barley, taking the sprout and stalk as seeds, are generated, and are neither identical to nor different as fruits with the stalk and so forth.