瑜伽論記 13.65

13.65

設許執受，亦不應理者，此牒計逐難，謂彼外計眼識起時，非但唯持眼根亦能持餘耳等之根，今設縱之，故云設許執受，亦不應理，識遠離故。今立量云：眼識必不能持耳等諸根（宗），識遠離故（因），如他人識不能持自根等如死屍等。又有意合立量云：意識諸根應無執受（宗），識遠離故（因），猶如死屍（喻），既難無執受已，應成非情攝。立量云：無識諸根應非情攝（宗），無執受故（因），猶如死屍（喻），如前所計自識持自根。

"Even if appropriation is granted, it is also illogical": this cites the posited view to pursue the objection. This means that outsider posits that when the visual consciousness arises, it not only sustains the eye-faculty alone, but can also sustain the other faculties such as the ear. Now, conceding this hypothetically, it is said: 'Even if appropriation is granted, it is also illogical, because consciousness is distant.' Now one formulates the syllogism: 'The visual consciousness definitely cannot sustain the other faculties such as the ear (thesis), because consciousness is distant (reason), like another person's consciousness being unable to sustain one's own faculties, etc., like a corpse, etc.' There is also an intended compound syllogism: 'The various faculties of mental consciousness should lack appropriation (thesis), because consciousness is distant (reason), just like a corpse (example).' Having already raised the objection of lacking appropriation, they should become subsumed under the non-sentient. Formulating the syllogism: 'The faculties lacking consciousness should be subsumed under the non-sentient (thesis), because they lack appropriation (reason), just like a corpse (example)'—as previously posited, one's own consciousness sustains one's own faculty.