瑜伽論記 13.78

13.78

第五相者，此亦非正立第八而破於他，亦因他難，解難之由，遂成第八。四種業用：一、了別器業，謂外器世界；二、了別依業，即內五根扶根五塵及內種子等，此二第八識之業故。勝鬘經云：自身資生具，一時頓分別，此第一業第八唯變故緣，從種生故名為唯變，是彼境故名為彼緣。其內依業具有二義：一、變故緣，二、執故緣，變故緣了。如上可知，執故緣者名眾生數；三、了別我業，即末那常計第八以為我也；四、了別境業，即餘六識各了自境。此中意者，謂第四境業一識起時剎那，剎那四業俱轉，非一切時無心悶絕等及入無心定而能具四，唯具前三故，如經所說若一境業起時必剎那剎那四業可得，若無第八諸識不得並生，而此四業不可一識一時頓有，豈不違經及於道理，小乘若信大教及一剎那中有此四業可如此難，他既不信經及不許有四業一剎那中而現可得，何得如此而起難耶？

Regarding the fifth characteristic, this also does not directly establish the eighth [consciousness] while refuting another; rather, it responds to the objection of another, and because of resolving that objection, the eighth is consequently established. There are four kinds of activities: first, the activity of cognizing the receptacle, which refers to the external receptacle world; second, the activity of cognizing the support, namely the internal five sense faculties, the five external sense data supporting the faculties, the internal seeds, and so forth, because these two are activities of the eighth consciousness. As the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: 'One's own body and the implements of living are cognized at once simultaneously.' This first activity is that the eighth only manifests and thus cognizes; because it arises from seeds, it is called 'only manifesting', and because that is its object, it is called 'cognizing that'. Its activity of [cognizing] the internal support has two meanings: first, manifesting and thus cognizing; second, appropriating and thus cognizing. 'Manifesting and thus cognizing' is understood as above; 'appropriating and thus cognizing' is designated as what pertains to sentient beings. Third, the activity of cognizing the self, namely the manas constantly conceiving the eighth to be the self. Fourth, the activity of cognizing external objects, namely the other six consciousnesses each cognizing its own object. The intended meaning here is that when the fourth activity regarding external objects of a single consciousness arises, moment by moment all four activities turn together; it is not that at all times—such as during mindlessness, fainting, and so on, or upon entering mindless concentrations—one can possess all four, for one possesses only the first three. As the sūtra states, if an activity regarding an object arises, then necessarily moment by moment the four activities are obtainable; if there were no eighth, the various consciousnesses could not co-arise, and these four activities could not exist simultaneously at one time in a single consciousness. Would this not contradict both sūtra and reason? If the Hīnayāna believed in the Mahāyāna teaching and that these four activities exist within a single moment, they could raise such an objection; but since the other does not believe in the sūtra and does not accept that the four activities are presently obtainable within a single moment, how could they raise such an objection in this way?