瑜伽論記 13.78

13.78

Regarding the fifth characteristic, this also does not directly establish the eighth [consciousness] while refuting another; rather, it responds to the objection of another, and because of resolving that objection, the eighth is consequently established. There are four kinds of activities: first, the activity of cognizing the receptacle, which refers to the external receptacle world; second, the activity of cognizing the support, namely the internal five sense faculties, the five external sense data supporting the faculties, the internal seeds, and so forth, because these two are activities of the eighth consciousness. As the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: 'One's own body and the implements of living are cognized at once simultaneously.' This first activity is that the eighth only manifests and thus cognizes; because it arises from seeds, it is called 'only manifesting', and because that is its object, it is called 'cognizing that'. Its activity of [cognizing] the internal support has two meanings: first, manifesting and thus cognizing; second, appropriating and thus cognizing. 'Manifesting and thus cognizing' is understood as above; 'appropriating and thus cognizing' is designated as what pertains to sentient beings. Third, the activity of cognizing the self, namely the manas constantly conceiving the eighth to be the self. Fourth, the activity of cognizing external objects, namely the other six consciousnesses each cognizing its own object. The intended meaning here is that when the fourth activity regarding external objects of a single consciousness arises, moment by moment all four activities turn together; it is not that at all times—such as during mindlessness, fainting, and so on, or upon entering mindless concentrations—one can possess all four, for one possesses only the first three. As the sūtra states, if an activity regarding an object arises, then necessarily moment by moment the four activities are obtainable; if there were no eighth, the various consciousnesses could not co-arise, and these four activities could not exist simultaneously at one time in a single consciousness. Would this not contradict both sūtra and reason? If the Hīnayāna believed in the Mahāyāna teaching and that these four activities exist within a single moment, they could raise such an objection; but since the other does not believe in the sūtra and does not accept that the four activities are presently obtainable within a single moment, how could they raise such an objection in this way?