瑜伽論記 14.369

14.369

下明依止聚色而有運動與不乖異。以正量部別有行動，薩婆多離聚色外有業性是動。今此問之，以大乘中即異熟色移轉時名動故，此一問答總言。第二問下別釋大總義，生不生滅四義皆失，若言生而有動便越剎那相者，業生不滅至二剎那，從此至彼方始有動，便違佛說剎那滅相。應立量云：汝所立業當應是常，非剎那滅故，如虛空等。名言不生便應無動者，業既不生熟，何辨動？量云：汝所立業畢竟是無，以不生故，猶如兔角。

Below, it explains that relying on aggregated form there is movement, which is not different from the aggregation. For the Saṃmatīya holds that there is separately an act of moving; the Sarvāstivādin holds that apart from aggregated form there is a karmic nature that is motion. Now this is questioned here: because in the Mahāyāna, precisely when fruition form shifts and turns it is termed motion, this is a general explanation across one question and answer. From the second question downward, it separately explains the broad and general meaning: the four meanings of arising, non-arising, and cessation all fail. If one says that it arises and has motion, then it exceeds the characteristic of momentariness: karma arising and not ceasing, reaching a second moment, and only then beginning to move from here to there—this contradicts the characteristic of momentary cessation taught by the Buddha. One should formulate an inference: 'The karma established by you ought to be permanent (thesis), because it does not cease momentarily (reason), like empty space and the like (example).' As for the phrase 'if it does not arise, there should be no motion': since karma does not arise, how can motion be distinguished? The inference is: 'The karma established by you is definitively non-existent (thesis), because it does not arise (reason), just like a hare's horn (example).'