瑜伽論記 15.112

15.112

答：不害是假，今翻為害豈得是實，又掉是貪分，云何得與一切煩惱相應？解云：即就貪體有躁動不止義說為掉，即是義與體相應，若爾，瞋躁動義說為掉，義與相應亦是順合，解云：此理實有，然此貪欲掉動相強，偏說掉舉是其貪分，尋伺二種至俱是假有者，據說云：若思為尋伺體今云加行分等者，即是意思起語業為前加行及慧分故，俱是假有。泰云：無慚等四法是實有者，如對法忿等皆是假有，何以相違者，一釋云：彼總據言故云忿等皆假，此據實論，故此四法實也，又假有多端，或無體名假體名假如忿等，成有體別從種子生要相依貪瞋等法起名假如此無慚等，彼論據相依而起故在假門，此論據別有種義故，此應難，謂無慚愧二，一切不善心有福可爾，信等亦翻善中來如何不信懈怠是實，豈以翻善中來是實耶？其別境等中來者何以非實？

Answer: 'Non-harmfulness is designated; now that it is overturned into harmfulness, how could it be real? Furthermore, restlessness is a part of greed; how can it be conjoined with all afflictions? Explanation: based on the very entity of greed having the sense of restless and incessant motion, it is said to be restlessness; that is, the meaning is conjoined with the entity. If so, anger having the sense of restless motion being spoken of as restlessness, with the meaning conjoined with it, is also compliant. Explanation: this principle truly exists; however, the restless agitation of this greed is strong, so restlessness is specifically said to be a part of greed. As for both investigation and reflection being designated existents: based on the statement that "if volition is the entity of investigation and reflection, now it is said to be a part of preparatory application, etc.", which means mental volition initiating verbal karma serves as their prior preparatory application and a part of wisdom, therefore both are designated existents.' Tai says: 'That the four dharmas such as shamelessness are real existents: as the Abhidharma states that anger and the like are all designated existents, why are they contradictory? One explanation says: that text speaks comprehensively and therefore says anger and the like are all designated, whereas this [text] speaks from reality, and therefore these four dharmas are real. Furthermore, "designated" has multiple aspects: either lacking an entity is termed designated, or having an entity is termed designated, as in the case of anger and the like; or having an entity and arising separately from seeds, yet necessarily arising in dependence on dharmas like greed and anger, is termed designated, as with shamelessness and the like here. That treatise, based on arising in dependence, places them in the category of designated, whereas this treatise relies on the meaning of having separate seeds. Here one should object: Shamelessness and unconscionableness being in all unwholesome minds might well be so; faith and the like are also overturned from the wholesome, so how are non-faith and sloth real? Is it merely because being overturned from the wholesome makes them real? Why are those derived from the particular objects and the like not real?'