瑜伽論記 16.483

16.483

答：至下緣境中，更當知，廣釋差別二說。此遍常論皆名邪見，非我見後生，如前文言是邊見及梵網、對法等邊見攝者，似常見體是邪見，夫言邊見必我見後生故。故此中次上文云：即用如是我見為依止，於五蘊見我斷常，斷常二見即唯我後起遍常論不緣為我故非邊見，亦無此地薩迦耶見，不同經部緣壞而生，不同薩婆多緣有而起，此中以依他性為依止計有遍計所執故。

Answer: When coming to the objects taken below, this should be further understood; the differences are explained at length in two accounts. This universal eternalism is completely termed wrong view, not arising after a view of self. As stated earlier that it is an extreme view and subsumed under extreme views in the *Brahmajālasūtra*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, etc., it resembles the view of permanence, but its essence is wrong view; for whenever an extreme view is spoken of, it must arise after a view of self. Therefore, the text just preceding this says: 'Namely, using such a view of self as support, one sees the five aggregates as having an end or as being permanent.' The two views of annihilation and permanence arise solely after a [view of] self. Universal eternalism does not take [the five aggregates] as a self and is therefore not an extreme view. Nor is there a satkāyadṛṣṭi of this stage; it is not like the Sautrāntika where it arises taking destruction as object, nor like the Sarvāstivāda where it arises taking existing things as object. Here, using the other-dependent nature (paratantra) as support, one conceives the imaginary nature (parikalpita) to exist.