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瑜伽論記 19.338

瑜伽論記 19.338

Language
Classical Chinese

19.338

備云:思惟以分別作意為體,以分別故定非正體智,相應作意觀以慧為體,以證真如慧及緣似真相事并名為觀,觀思既不同,故作四句,第一句地前加行智及緣安立後得智,第二句即正體智,第三句緣非安立後得智,問何故第一句中後得智緣真如名安立,第三句中所緣真如者名非安立耶?解云:第三句中所明後智由正體智次第所生故,非安立真如,第一句中所緣真如不似本質故名安立。

Bei says: Contemplation has conceptualizing attention as its essence; because it is conceptualizing, it is definitely not fundamental knowledge. The observation of associated attention has prajñā as its essence; both prajñā that directly realizes tathatā and that which takes as its object conventional phenomena resembling the real are together termed 'observation.' Since observation and contemplation differ, they form four propositions: the first proposition is preparatory knowledge before the stages and subsequently acquired knowledge that takes the conventional as its object; the second proposition is fundamental knowledge itself; the third proposition is subsequently acquired knowledge that takes the non-conventional as its object. Question: Why is the tathatā taken as an object by subsequently acquired knowledge in the first proposition called 'conventional,' whereas the tathatā taken as an object in the third proposition is called 'non-conventional'? Explanation: The subsequent knowledge elucidated in the third proposition is generated in sequence from fundamental knowledge, and therefore it is non-conventional tathatā; the tathatā taken as an object in the first proposition does not resemble the fundamental entity, and therefore it is called 'conventional.'

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