瑜伽論記 19.367

19.367

自下二破一說部計。彼部一切法唯有其一名言言說，言說名外更無別法，由言說名故諸法顯現。今牒計破云：若謂諸相如名言說故安立，由名勢力，諸相自性起者，是即彼相假立名前未立名時應無自性，是一過也。又彼相既先無有，相無故名無，後假立言亦應無有，是第二過；是故二種俱成無之過。又假名言有眾多故，此一義有多名也。有差別故，此一名目九義差別也。應有眾多差別性，意同前釋。又相但依他名起過，由彼諸相但依於他假建立故。下初法；次喻；後合。總結，可解。

From here below, the second part refutes the Ekavyāvahārika school's assertion. In that school, all phenomena are merely their single name and verbal expression; outside of verbal names there are no other phenomena, and because of verbal names, all phenomena appear. Now, citing their assertion to refute it, it says: If one asserts that all characteristics are established in accordance with names and verbal expressions, and that due to the power of names the intrinsic natures of all characteristics arise, then before those characteristics had conventional names established, when names were not yet established, they should lack an intrinsic nature; this is the first fault. Furthermore, since those characteristics previously did not exist, because characteristics do not exist, names do not exist, and subsequent conventional words should also not exist; this is the second fault. Therefore, both incur the fault of becoming non-existent. Furthermore, 'because conventional names are manifold,' this single referent has many names. 'Because they have differentiations,' this single name designates nine differentiated referents. There should be manifold differentiated natures; the meaning is the same as the previous explanation. Furthermore, there is the fault that characteristics merely arise dependent on other names, because those characteristics are merely conventionally established dependent on another. Below, there is first the doctrine, next the simile, and finally the application. The general conclusion can be understood.