瑜伽論記 19.368

19.368

自下第三破衛世師計。離相及名外然由名相二種和合句義故別生有句義，和合能令名相和合，有句義能令名相有。今破云：若謂離彼相，及名言外，然由名相二種和合，有句義自性生者，彼有句義自性於諸相中，或於名言中，或相名二中間應現量可得。然不可得，是故此計，不應道理。由此因緣隨言立一切法有自性。於一切種別法中，皆無所有。

From here below, the third part refutes the Vaiśeṣika assertion. They assert that separate from characteristics and names, due to the category of combination of both names and characteristics, the category of existence is separately produced; combination can cause names and characteristics to combine, and the category of existence can cause names and characteristics to exist. Now it refutes this, saying: If one asserts that separate from those characteristics and names, due to the combination of both names and characteristics, the intrinsic nature of the category of existence arises, then that intrinsic nature of the category of existence should be apprehended by direct perception either among the characteristics, or among the names, or in the middle between characteristics and names. However, it cannot be apprehended; therefore this assertion is unreasonable. For this reason, that all phenomena have an intrinsic nature established in accordance with words is completely nonexistent among all kinds of distinct phenomena.