瑜伽論記 19.369

19.369

自下第四破僧伽，以苦示癡三德與二十二諦為自性，故說諸法有三德自性。然其自性是常由名故顯。今破云：若謂名言能顯自性，亦不應理。若取不取方立名言，俱有過故。若心取自性相已後方假立名言，其名便不成，顯自性先已解故。若心未取自性相，先假立名言未有所顯事，而立名言不應道理，此亦皆是名前生故，以一義有了名，及一名目九義破，類如前說。外人以名定目法，如燈照色。今破云：照了喻，不相似故立，不應道理。喻，不相似者，照了因緣於一切瓶等事差別無有差別，如燈照瓶時亦照一切物無有差別，名即不爾。一名目心時，則不目色等也。種種亦爾，燈照既然，種種日月寶星藥草等照亦爾，能取因緣，因緣於一照見差別諸法能取因緣，依名不爾。因於色名，但能取色能取心，故知喻不相似法。

From here below, the fourth part refutes the Sāṃkhya. Taking the three guṇas of suffering, pleasure, and delusion together with the twenty-two principles as their intrinsic nature, they say that all phenomena have the three guṇas as their intrinsic nature. However, their intrinsic nature is eternal and is manifested through names. Now it refutes this, saying: If one asserts that names can manifest intrinsic nature, this is also unreasonable, because whether the mind apprehends it or does not apprehend it before establishing names, both incur faults. If the mind, having apprehended the characteristics of intrinsic nature, only then establishes conventional names, then the name does not succeed, because manifesting the intrinsic nature was already understood previously. If the mind has not yet apprehended the characteristics of intrinsic nature and first establishes conventional names, then establishing names when there is not yet an illuminated referent is unreasonable; this also arises before the name, and it is refuted by one referent having multiple names and one name designating nine referents, analogous to what was said before. The external opponent regards names as definitely designating phenomena, like a lamp illuminating form. Now it refutes this, saying: Because the simile of illuminating is not analogous, establishing it is unreasonable. 'The simile is not analogous' means that the conditions of illumination have no differentiation across all differentiated things such as jars; just as when a lamp illuminates a jar, it also illuminates all things without differentiation, names are not like this. When a single name designates the mind, it does not designate form and so forth. Manifold [illuminations] are also like this: just as a lamp's illumination is like this, the manifold illuminations of the sun, moon, jewels, stars, medicinal herbs, and so forth are also like this. As for the conditions of apprehension: the conditions are such that in a single illumination one sees differentiated phenomena as conditions of apprehension, but relying on names is not like this. Dependent on the name of form, one can only apprehend form and apprehend the mind; therefore we know the simile is not analogous to the phenomenon.