瑜伽論記 2.281

2.281

若言不過彼形質量等者，因果二量大小既同，云何極微名質分麁形有分，成唯識云：所生果色不越因量，應如極微不名麁色為量。如彼，顯揚第十四云：若不過者，麁質礙物應如極微，不可執取，不見質礙。不明淨物同在一處故非道理，彼說量德合故非麁似麁等救，皆如彼破，若言過者，諸極微體無細分故，不可分折，所生麁物，亦應常是常者，顯揚十四云：若過彼量者，過量之處麁質礙物非極微成，應是常住。此意難言，極微無細分不可折稱常，諸所生麁物過量之處，餘之細分不可分折，亦應是常，且難初二合所生名極微，非難餘有分。若轉計言，過量之處，餘之細分，一分極微，本無今起者，是則汝計極微為常，不應道理，許新生故。顯揚云：若復許有餘極微生，是則極微應非常住，或許麁物是細極微而得新生，本無今起者，應一切極微體皆非常。此應難前不過量義，過量義是轉計，不過量是本宗。

Regarding "if one says it does not exceed that physical size and mass," and so forth: Since the two measures of cause and effect, large and small, are identical, how can an atom be called a mass-part while the coarse form is a whole possessing parts? The Cheng weishi lun states: "The produced effect-form does not exceed the measure of its cause; like an atom, it should not be called coarse form"—this serves as the measure. As stated there, the fourteenth fascicle of the Xianyang [shengjiao lun] says: "If it does not exceed it, coarse, obstructing matter should be like an atom: it could not be grasped and obstruction could not be seen. It is unreasonable for non-luminous and impure matters to occupy the same location." Their rescue, saying that due to the conjunction of the quality of measure it is not coarse but resembles the coarse, is all refuted as in that text. Regarding "if one says it exceeds it, because all atomic entities have no minute parts and cannot be divided, the produced coarse object should also always be permanent": The fourteenth fascicle of the Xianyang says: "If it exceeds that measure, the coarse, obstructing matter at the place exceeding the measure would not be composed of atoms, and should be permanent." The meaning of this challenge is: An atom has no minute parts and cannot be divided, and is called permanent; the remaining minute parts at the place exceeding the measure of all produced coarse objects cannot be divided, and so should also be permanent. This temporarily challenges what is produced by the initial combination of two as being called an atom, rather than challenging the remaining whole possessing parts. If they shift their position to say: "At the place exceeding the measure, the remaining minute parts, as a fraction of atoms, previously did not exist and now arise," then your positing of atoms as permanent is unreasonable, because you accept newly arisen ones. The Xianyang says: "If one further accepts that there are other atoms produced, then atoms should not be permanent." Or, if one accepts that a coarse object is newly arisen from minute atoms, previously non-existent and now arising, all atomic entities should be impermanent. This should challenge the previous meaning of not exceeding the measure; exceeding the measure is a shifted position, while not exceeding the measure is the primary tenet.