瑜伽論記 2.357

2.357

薩迦耶見者，景云：名身見，緣身起見故名身見，從境得名亦名我見。行解為目，如正量部名偽身見，以所計身虛偽不實故，迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師名有身見，以所緣身是其有漏故。若偏名偽身見失於有義，若言有身見失於偽義，欲在兩義名薩迦耶？薩迦耶名含二義故，由親近等起見遠緣，不如理作意者，起分別見緣。

Regarding the view of self-existence (satkāyadṛṣṭi), Jing says: It is called the view of a body. Because it gives rise to a view taking the body as its object, it is called the view of a body; taking its name from the object, it is also called the view of a self. It is designated by its cognitive operation. For example, the Saṃmatīya calls it the 'view of a false body' because the conceived body is unreal and false; the Vaibhāṣikas of the Kaśmīra country call it the 'view of an existent body' because the body taken as an object is defiled (sāsrava). If one exclusively calls it the 'view of a false body', one loses the sense of 'existent'; if one calls it the 'view of an existent body', one loses the sense of 'false'. Wishing to encompass both senses, is it called satkāya? Because the name satkāya contains both senses. Giving rise to a view through intimacy and so forth is a remote condition; improper mental attention is the condition for giving rise to conceptually constructed views.