瑜伽論記 2.359

2.359

見取中，以薩迦耶見、邊執見等者，此明見取之境。所依者根，所緣者境，所因者種子，總執為勝，及與能淨二義，具足方名見取行相，戒取亦然。所執見戒有差別故分成二取，此中見取，但言為勝，不說能淨，戒取但說能淨解脫不說為勝，唯識會云：是影略說或隨轉門，不爾如何，非滅計滅，非道計道，說是邪見非二取攝。

Under clinging to views, "with the view of identity, extreme views, and so forth": this clarifies the object of clinging to views. What is relied upon is the sense-faculty; what is taken as an object is the sense-sphere; what is the cause is the seed. Grasping them comprehensively as supreme and as capable of purifying—only when both meanings are complete is it called the cognitive aspect of clinging to views; clinging to precepts is also like this. Because the grasped views and precepts differ, they are divided into two kinds of clinging. Here, clinging to views is only said to be supreme, not capable of purifying; clinging to precepts is only said to be capable of purifying liberation, not supreme. The Cheng weishi lun reconciles this: this is an elliptical explanation, or a teaching conforming to [provisional] modes. If it were not so, how could conceiving what is not cessation as cessation, or conceiving what is not the path as the path, be called wrong views and not be subsumed under the two kinds of clinging?