瑜伽論記 2.374

2.374

下文但言貪通二種，不說常我亦起貪者，從勝說故，我常見俱亦有貪故，諸文皆說於四境，貪名心倒故，世間多於樂淨偏起，非實唯二，不爾，如何於彼前四倒見所執著中貪等為性，見取是不淨淨倒戒取是於苦樂倒者，隨其所應緣見緣戒，及相應法為勝能淨故，是二取，不爾便成邪見所攝，想心見三皆通四種，四無別體。

The text below only says that craving extends to both kinds, not mentioning that craving also arises regarding permanence and self, because it speaks in terms of the predominant ones, for craving also co-occurs with self and permanence. All texts say that craving regarding the four objects is called inversion of mind, because in the world it arises predominantly regarding pleasure and purity; it is not genuinely limited to only two. Were it not so, how could its nature be craving and so forth within the grasping of the preceding four inverted views? Grasping views as supreme is the inversion of purity regarding the impure; grasping rules and vows is the inversion of pleasure regarding suffering: because it takes the view, takes vows, and takes associated dharmas as superior and capable of purifying according to their suitability, they are the two graspings. Were it not so, they would be subsumed under wrong view. Conception, mind, and view all three extend to the four kinds, and the four have no separate intrinsic natures.