瑜伽師地論略纂 3.121

3.121

「見倒」，即以妄想境中，忍可欲樂，建立執著，三見一少分為性，謂身見、常見、見戒取。如文自說。　「心倒」，即以除前諸見所餘貪等煩惱為性，能染惱心，故名心倒。此心倒云「謂即於彼所執著中貪等煩惱」。　有說：心倒體唯是貪，染心勝故。言「貪等」者，等取一切貪，非離貪外等餘瞋等。五十三云：此想顛倒，諸在家者能發心倒，一分出家者能發見倒。想體非倒，由妄取相以為總門，在家、出家依之，方起心倒、見倒，故與倒名。論解根本、自體、等流，合解見、心二倒之體，想體非倒，故不重釋。《俱舍論》說：四顛倒自體，謂從於三見，唯倒推增故，想心隨見力。彼說：常見為常倒，計淨計樂，俱為見取，有身見為我倒。要具三因，勝者成倒。一、一向倒故，簡戒禁取，緣少淨故；二、推度性故，簡非見戒；三、妄增益故，簡斷見、邪見，非妄增益，無門轉故。所餘受等，非世極成。世間但說想、心、見倒，不說貪等，故餘非倒。今此不然。一、倒依，二、倒體。所依想勝，受等非倒，顯出家者增益見名倒故，斷邪非倒；諸在家者煩惱亂心，或多由貪難可解脫，故說一切惑貪為倒。故倒體中，唯分心、見。《顯揚論》說，由四因緣，起於四顛，故餘非倒。此中，心倒通緣四貪，下文但言貪通二種，不說常我亦起貪者，從勝說故。我常見俱亦有貪故，諸文皆說於四境貪名心倒故，世間多於樂淨偏起，非實唯二。不爾，如何言即於彼彼前四倒見所執中貪等為性？　「見取是不淨淨倒，戒取是於苦樂倒」者，隨其所應，緣見緣戒及相應法為勝能淨，故是二取。不爾，便成邪見所攝。　想、心、見三，皆通四種，四無別體。且於四見倒中，常我通見修，中二唯見斷，想、心二倒隨應通二。如其所應，觀自相引，成於本等流。廣如《對法》第二及第十卷疏釋。

The 'perversion of view' takes as its nature acquiescing, delighting, establishing, and clinging to the domain of false conception, which consists of three views and a portion of one: namely, view of self-existence, view of permanence, view-attachment, and attachment to rules and vows. This is as the text itself states. The 'perversion of mind' takes as its nature the remaining defilements such as greed apart from the aforementioned views; because they can defile and trouble the mind, they are called the perversion of mind. Concerning this perversion of mind, it says: 'meaning defilements such as greed regarding that which has been clung to.' Some say: The essence of the perversion of mind is solely greed, because it surpasses in defiling the mind. When it says 'greed and so forth', 'and so forth' encompasses all [grades of] greed, not other [defilements] such as anger outside of greed. Fascicle 53 says: This perversion of conception can give rise to the perversion of mind in householders, and can give rise to the perversion of view in a portion of monastics. The essence of conception is not itself a perversion; because it falsely grasps characteristics to serve as the general doorway, householders and monastics rely upon it to then give rise to the perversions of mind and view, and it is therefore given the name of perversion. The treatise, in explaining the root, intrinsic nature, and outflow, jointly explains the nature of the two perversions of view and mind; because the essence of conception is not itself a perversion, it does not explain it again. The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya states: The intrinsic nature of the four perversions derives from three views, for only [views] have perversion, inference, and superimposition; conception and mind follow the power of view. It explains: View of permanence constitutes the perversion of permanence; conceptualizing pure and conceptualizing pleasurable both constitute view-attachment; view of self-existence constitutes the perversion of self. Three causes must be fully present for the preeminent to constitute a perversion: first, being completely perverse, which excludes attachment to rules and vows because it takes a little purity as its object; second, having the nature of deliberative inference, which excludes non-views and precepts; third, being false superimposition, which excludes annihilation view and wrong view, since they are not false superimpositions and operate without a doorway. The remaining factors like feeling are not universally acknowledged by the world. The world speaks only of the perversions of conception, mind, and view, and does not speak of greed and so forth; therefore, the rest are not perversions. In our system, this is not so. First is the support of perversion; second is the essence of perversion. The supporting conception is preeminent, while feeling and so forth are not perversions; to show that the monastic's superimposed views are called perversions, annihilation and wrong views are not perversions; because householders' defilements perturb the mind, or mostly due to greed from which it is difficult to be liberated, it says that all defilements of greed are perversions. Thus, within the essence of perversions, only mind and view are distinguished. The Prakaraṇāryavācā states that due to four causes and conditions the four perversions arise, and therefore the rest are not perversions. Here, the perversion of mind generally takes the four [objects of] greed as its object; where the lower text only says greed applies to two kinds, not stating that it also arises toward permanence and self, it speaks from the perspective of preeminence. Because greed is also present together with the views of self and permanence, and because all textual passages state that greed regarding the four objects is called the perversion of mind, worldly beings mostly give rise to it one-sidedly toward pleasure and purity, not that it is truly only two. Were it not so, how could it say that its nature consists of greed and so forth within what is clung to by those respective previous four perverse views? Regarding 'view-attachment is the perversion of purity regarding the impure, and attachment to rules and vows is the perversion of pleasure regarding suffering': according to their proper application, taking views, taking vows, and their associated phenomena as superior and capable of purifying constitutes the two attachments. Were it not so, they would be subsumed under wrong view. Conception, mind, and view all encompass the four types; the four have no separate essence. Furthermore, among the four perversions of view, permanence and self encompass seeing and cultivation, the middle two are abandoned only by seeing, and the two perversions of conception and mind encompass both as appropriate. Observing how their own characteristics induce each other as appropriate, they form root and outflow. This is fully explained in the commentary on fascicles 2 and 10 of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā.