瑜伽論記 24.36

24.36

長行釋中，初解如理門，先略，後廣。略中有二：初明若不如實知諦智如理不如理故，不能盡漏，能如實知，則能盡漏。當知已下，出如理不如理智體。廣釋中，先釋不如理，二、與此相違已下，釋如理。前不如理中有四復次，第四復次中云：依三言事等者，三世之法可出言說，名為說處，故云依三言事。言或緣所取事至或離諸行分別有我者，此開四章，下次第解。若所取事，分別為我，一、或成常見，可知。二、或成斷見乃至是實是常者，計我斷故云我無，其我是實是常，此於所緣中起二見也。若緣能取事乃至我今以我觀察於我者，此計能緣心為我是常，以後念心緣前念能緣心時，即言我觀察於我緣能取心為一見也。或謂我我，先有今無至觀察無我者，第二緣能取心為斷，謂我先時是有觀察今無，此第二見也。或復即緣能取之事乃至昔曾有我者，緣能取心，今離無我昔曾有我，此則計其能取於起三見，前計所取起於二見，合起五見，故云如是且說所取能取差別五相。乃至謂即三世諸行分別有我者，此是第三即行計我。又復乃至分別有我者，此解第四章雜行計我，因此第四計執。次解計我異名，一、或自作業名能作者，或他自在天等令作名等作者，二、能起者等起者，三、能生者等生者，四、或由自他見聞覺知隨起言說名能說者，或於妻子等教勅令住其處亦名能說者，五、能受者等受者，六、或於過去作種種業領受種種異熟名領受者，或云能捨此蘊能續餘蘊，上來六種異名，并是離行計我為作者受者。若異此者，既無有我，云何得成上所作業事者，此是第二起見所由，是名第六不如正理作意思惟等者。景云：從卷初至此起見所由，凡有六種不如理作意思惟也。達師云：前即蘊計我中有五相，更加離蘊計我為第六故也。如是已下結前諸見並是身見。由能障礙已下，明起見過也。與此相違已下，翻過失明得利益。

In the prose commentary, it first explains the gate of appropriate [attention], first in brief and then in detail. In the brief [section], there are two parts: first, it clarifies that if one does not know the truth with wisdom in accordance with reality—due to its being appropriate or inappropriate—one cannot exhaust the taints, whereas if one can know in accordance with reality, one can exhaust the taints. From "it should be known" onward, it identifies the essence of appropriate and inappropriate wisdom. In the detailed explanation, it first explains inappropriate [attention]; second, from "contrary to this" onward, it explains appropriate [attention]. Within the previous [part on] inappropriate [attention], there are four further formulations. In the fourth further formulation, it states: "based on three linguistic matters" and so forth; the phenomena of the three times can give rise to speech and are termed "bases of speech," and hence it says "based on three linguistic matters." As for the passage from "either taking an apprehended matter as an object" up to "or, apart from the conditioned formations, discriminating that there is a self": this introduces four sections, which are explained in sequence below. If one discriminates an apprehended matter as a self, first, it may form the eternalist view, which is evident. Second, it may form the annihilationist view, up to "it is real and eternal": because one posits that the self is annihilated, one says "I do not exist," while that self is real and eternal; these are two views arising with regard to the cognitive object. In the passage from "if it takes an apprehending matter as an object" up to "'now, with myself, I observe myself'": this posits the observing mind that is able to cognize as an eternal self; when a subsequent mind-moment takes the preceding apprehending mind-moment as an object, it says "I observe myself," taking the apprehending mind as an object to form one view. In the passage from "or asserting 'my self previously existed but now does not'" up to "observing non-self": the second takes the apprehending mind as an object to form [the view of] annihilation, asserting that "my self previously existed, but observing [it now], it does not exist"; this is the second view. In the passage from "or again, directly taking the matter of apprehension as an object" up to "'in the past there was a self'": taking the apprehending mind as an object, [it asserts that] now, apart [from this], there is no self, but in the past there was a self; this constitutes three views arisen from positing the apprehending [mind]. Together with the two views arisen from the previous positing of the apprehended, they combine into five views; thus it says, "such is the brief exposition of the five distinct characteristics of the apprehended and apprehending." As for the passage up to "that is to say, discriminating that there is a self in the conditioned formations of the three times": this is the third [section], positing a self in identity with the conditioned formations. As for the passage "further... discriminating that there is a self": this explains the fourth section, positing a self [both in identity with and] apart from the conditioned formations, and it is on account of this fourth positing. Next, it explains the alternative names for positing a self: first, either performing actions oneself is termed 'an agent', or [asserting that] another, like Maheśvara, causes them to be done is termed 'a co-agent'; second, 'an originator' and 'a co-originator'; third, 'a producer' and 'a co-producer'; fourth, either giving rise to speech based on one's own or another's seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing is termed 'a speaker', or enjoining one's wife, children, and so forth to stay in their place is also termed 'a speaker'; fifth, 'an experiencer' and 'a co-experiencer'; sixth, either performing various karmas in the past and experiencing various ripenings is termed 'an experiencer', or saying that it can cast off this aggregate and connect to another aggregate. The above six alternative names are all positing a self apart from the conditioned formations as the agent and experiencer. As for "if it were otherwise, since there is no self, how could the aforementioned activities of karma be accomplished?": this is the second, the basis from which views arise. As for "this is named the sixth, improper attention and reflection" and so forth: Jing says, from the beginning of the fascicle up to this basis from which views arise, there are altogether six kinds of improper attention. Master Da says: within the previous positing of a self in identity with the aggregates there are five characteristics, and adding the positing of a self apart from the aggregates makes the sixth. From "such" onward, it concludes that the preceding views are all the view of selfhood. From "due to the ability to obstruct" onward, it explains the faults of generating views. From "contrary to this" onward, it reverses the faults to explain the benefits gained.