瑜伽論記 24.36

24.36

In the prose commentary, it first explains the gate of appropriate [attention], first in brief and then in detail. In the brief [section], there are two parts: first, it clarifies that if one does not know the truth with wisdom in accordance with reality—due to its being appropriate or inappropriate—one cannot exhaust the taints, whereas if one can know in accordance with reality, one can exhaust the taints. From "it should be known" onward, it identifies the essence of appropriate and inappropriate wisdom. In the detailed explanation, it first explains inappropriate [attention]; second, from "contrary to this" onward, it explains appropriate [attention]. Within the previous [part on] inappropriate [attention], there are four further formulations. In the fourth further formulation, it states: "based on three linguistic matters" and so forth; the phenomena of the three times can give rise to speech and are termed "bases of speech," and hence it says "based on three linguistic matters." As for the passage from "either taking an apprehended matter as an object" up to "or, apart from the conditioned formations, discriminating that there is a self": this introduces four sections, which are explained in sequence below. If one discriminates an apprehended matter as a self, first, it may form the eternalist view, which is evident. Second, it may form the annihilationist view, up to "it is real and eternal": because one posits that the self is annihilated, one says "I do not exist," while that self is real and eternal; these are two views arising with regard to the cognitive object. In the passage from "if it takes an apprehending matter as an object" up to "'now, with myself, I observe myself'": this posits the observing mind that is able to cognize as an eternal self; when a subsequent mind-moment takes the preceding apprehending mind-moment as an object, it says "I observe myself," taking the apprehending mind as an object to form one view. In the passage from "or asserting 'my self previously existed but now does not'" up to "observing non-self": the second takes the apprehending mind as an object to form [the view of] annihilation, asserting that "my self previously existed, but observing [it now], it does not exist"; this is the second view. In the passage from "or again, directly taking the matter of apprehension as an object" up to "'in the past there was a self'": taking the apprehending mind as an object, [it asserts that] now, apart [from this], there is no self, but in the past there was a self; this constitutes three views arisen from positing the apprehending [mind]. Together with the two views arisen from the previous positing of the apprehended, they combine into five views; thus it says, "such is the brief exposition of the five distinct characteristics of the apprehended and apprehending." As for the passage up to "that is to say, discriminating that there is a self in the conditioned formations of the three times": this is the third [section], positing a self in identity with the conditioned formations. As for the passage "further... discriminating that there is a self": this explains the fourth section, positing a self [both in identity with and] apart from the conditioned formations, and it is on account of this fourth positing. Next, it explains the alternative names for positing a self: first, either performing actions oneself is termed 'an agent', or [asserting that] another, like Maheśvara, causes them to be done is termed 'a co-agent'; second, 'an originator' and 'a co-originator'; third, 'a producer' and 'a co-producer'; fourth, either giving rise to speech based on one's own or another's seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing is termed 'a speaker', or enjoining one's wife, children, and so forth to stay in their place is also termed 'a speaker'; fifth, 'an experiencer' and 'a co-experiencer'; sixth, either performing various karmas in the past and experiencing various ripenings is termed 'an experiencer', or saying that it can cast off this aggregate and connect to another aggregate. The above six alternative names are all positing a self apart from the conditioned formations as the agent and experiencer. As for "if it were otherwise, since there is no self, how could the aforementioned activities of karma be accomplished?": this is the second, the basis from which views arise. As for "this is named the sixth, improper attention and reflection" and so forth: Jing says, from the beginning of the fascicle up to this basis from which views arise, there are altogether six kinds of improper attention. Master Da says: within the previous positing of a self in identity with the aggregates there are five characteristics, and adding the positing of a self apart from the aggregates makes the sixth. From "such" onward, it concludes that the preceding views are all the view of selfhood. From "due to the ability to obstruct" onward, it explains the faults of generating views. From "contrary to this" onward, it reverses the faults to explain the benefits gained.