瑜伽論記 8.139

8.139

假設欲有因即用自在為因者，自在本有故欲亦應本有，有自在時即有欲故，如前諸行破，故次論云：若言有因即用自在等，欲用自在為因既破已，後更有餘因非用自在為因。

If it is hypothesized that desire has a cause, which is to use Īśvara as its cause, then since Īśvara is fundamentally existent, desire should also be fundamentally existent, because whenever Īśvara exists, desire would exist, just as was refuted above for conditioned formations. Therefore, the treatise next says: "If it is said to have a cause, which uses Īśvara..." and so forth. Desire having Īśvara as its cause having already been refuted, there would then have to be another cause besides, not using Īśvara as its cause.