瑜伽論記 8.140

8.140

若爾欲若有因者，如前諸行別用欲功用祈願為因，今言復用欲功用祈願離自在外別法為因，是則諸行別有因生，何須妄計無用自在，故論次云：若言此欲更有餘因等。如是略由三種增上作意力故等者，結上三量作意也。

If so, if desire has a cause—just as conditioned formations earlier separately used desire, exertion, and prayerful aspiration as cause—now to say that it further uses desire, exertion, and prayerful aspiration, taking a distinct phenomenon apart from Īśvara as cause, means that conditioned formations arise from a distinct cause. Why make the false imputation of a useless Īśvara? Therefore, the treatise next says: "If it is said that this desire has yet another cause..." and so forth. Regarding "In this way, briefly, through the power of three kinds of predominant attention..." and so forth: this concludes the attention to the above three valid cognitions (pramāṇa).