瑜伽論記 9.134

9.134

亦非離彼至是言境界者，外人救云：能詮言中雖無所詮法性，何妨言下別有所詮是言所行。故復破云：亦非離言別有自性是言所行，此義至于後文中論家自破。外人復云：言本詮法性，法性非有。言性應無，故今復云：如是諸法非有自性，如言所說，亦非一切都無所有，隨言所執法雖非有，不可即諦言說都無。外人復言：隨言詮法尚自非有，離言說法應非有，故後論云：如是非有，亦非一切都無所有者，隨言說性如是非有亦非一切離言自性都無所有。云何而有者，既不都無，云何而有。謂離增益乃至如是而有者，若離增減二執境界，是故言有，謂遍計所執實無增益為有，依他圓成實有損減言無，由此增減二種妄執不能證會離言法有，若離增減方證知有，下出二智離增減故知二性有，故言即是諸法勝義自性。當知唯是無分別智所行境界者，望遍計所執顛倒法無，故餘二性皆名勝義，圓成實性無分別智所行，依他因緣無分別後智所行，是故總云：勝義自性唯是無分別智所行境界。

Regarding the passage from "Nor is there, apart from that" to "an object of speech": The opponent rescues [his position] by saying, "Although the expressed nature of phenomena is absent within the expressing speech, what prevents there being another expressed object apart from the speech that serves as the domain of speech?" Therefore, [the treatise] refutes it again, saying, "Nor is there, apart from speech, a distinct intrinsic nature that is the domain of speech." This meaning is refuted later by the author of the treatise himself. The opponent further says, "Speech fundamentally expresses the nature of phenomena. If the nature of phenomena does not exist, the nature of speech should also not exist." Therefore, [the treatise] now says again, "Such phenomena do not have an intrinsic nature as spoken of by speech; nor are they utterly nonexistent." Although the phenomena grasped according to speech do not exist, one cannot take this to mean that the conventional speech is completely nonexistent. The opponent further says, "If the phenomena expressed according to speech do not even exist themselves, then phenomena beyond speech should not exist either." Therefore, the subsequent text of the treatise says, "Being nonexistent in this way, yet not utterly nonexistent": just as what is spoken of by speech is nonexistent in this way, so too the intrinsic nature beyond speech is not utterly nonexistent. As for "In what way do they exist?": since they are not utterly nonexistent, in what way do they exist? Regarding "Through freedom from superimposition" up to "exist in this way": they are said to exist if they are free from the objects of the two attachments to superimposition and deprecation. That is to say, superimposition takes what is truly nonexistent in the parikalpita as existent, while deprecation asserts what is truly existent in the paratantra and pariniṣpanna to be nonexistent; because of these two kinds of false attachment, one cannot realize and accord with the existence of phenomena beyond speech. Only if one is free from superimposition and deprecation does one realize and know existence. Below, it sets forth the two wisdoms: because they are free from superimposition and deprecation, they know that the two natures exist; hence it says, "That is the ultimate intrinsic nature of all phenomena. One should know that it is solely the domain of non-conceptual wisdom." Looking from the perspective of the nonexistence of erroneous parikalpita phenomena, both of the remaining two natures are called ultimate: the pariniṣpanna nature is the domain of non-conceptual wisdom, and the paratantra causal conditions are the domain of subsequent non-conceptual wisdom. Therefore, it states generally: "The ultimate intrinsic nature is solely the domain of non-conceptual wisdom."