瑜伽論記 9.135

9.135

泰云：如薩婆多等，眼見青黃等色稱眼所見說是青黃等色，乃至意識緣涅槃隨意識所緣說有定性散滅涅槃，故一切法可言說說自心識所緣分齊，今大乘不爾，如眼識緣色之時，眼識是證量知，境稱眼識行解，乃證依他性色不可言說，同時分別意識所證色分齊亦不可說其色相貌，故證量所知稱法，能證所證皆不可言說，從眼識後起意識始分別之，我眼見色說眼所見是青黃等色，乃至說無漏滅智後起後智，云我從涅槃說是涅槃，故言說說諸法是色乃至是涅槃，皆不稱證量所知，能是假說色自相乃至說涅槃自相。上問斯事以何道理應知諸法離言自性。下答，謂一切法假立自相，或說為色，或說為受乃至涅槃，當知一切唯假建立，諸法自相乃至證量所知不可言說。非有自性乃至是言境界者，亦薩婆多等說即一切是有自性，衛世師說六句義，由第四有句義故令一切法皆成有，此有與諸法各有自性，故法體之外別立有自性，如小乘及外道所立自性皆是言說所行，是言說境界，即非彼執故。言非有自性者，非薩婆多即法有自性，是言所行是言境界也。亦非離彼別有自性等者，非衛世師離彼法體外別有自性，是言所行是言境界。謂離增益實無妄執等者，一、釋大同景師；第二、又釋：離增益實無執即是真實性，離損減實有執即是依他性。如是而有者，依他真實謂有也。備述答意云：於依他性離遍計性實有妄執，及離依他所依真如實無妄執，如是離有離無非有而有，即是諸法究體相，圓成實性法釋二空所顯真如。

Tai says: Such as the Sarvāstivādins and others—when the eye sees colors such as blue and yellow, they correspond to what is seen by the eye and say that these are colors such as blue and yellow; up to the mental consciousness taking nirvāṇa as an object, in accordance with what is cognized by the mental consciousness, they say that there is a nirvāṇa of fixed nature or dispersion and cessation. Thus, all phenomena can be spoken of, expressing the bounds cognized by one's own mind and consciousness. Now the Mahāyāna is not like this. When the eye-consciousness cognizes form, the eye-consciousness knows by direct perception; the object corresponds to the cognitive engagement of the eye-consciousness, and what is directly realized is paratantra form, which is ineffable. The bounds of form directly realized by the simultaneously discriminating mental consciousness are likewise ineffable in terms of the characteristics of that form. Therefore, what is known by direct perception corresponds to the Dharma: both the realizer and the realized are ineffable. Only when the mental consciousness arises subsequent to the eye-consciousness does it first discriminate it, saying, "My eye saw form," and stating that what the eye saw is color such as blue or yellow; up to the subsequent wisdom arising after the taintless wisdom of cessation, which says, "I express nirvāṇa based on nirvāṇa." Therefore, speech expressing that phenomena are form up to nirvāṇa does not correspond to what is known by direct perception; it can only conventionally designate the intrinsic characteristic of form up to the intrinsic characteristic of nirvāṇa. Above, it asked: By what reasoning should one know the ineffable intrinsic nature of phenomena? Below, it answers: That is, all phenomena are conventionally designated with intrinsic characteristics, spoken of either as form, or as sensation, up to nirvāṇa; one should know that all are solely conventional designations, and the intrinsic characteristics of phenomena up to what is known by direct perception are ineffable. Regarding "do not have an intrinsic nature" up to "an object of speech": also, the Sarvāstivādins and others say that all things intrinsically have an intrinsic nature. The Vaiśeṣikas speak of six categories, and by means of the fourth category, existence (bhāva), they cause all phenomena to become existent; this existence and all phenomena each have their own intrinsic nature, and so apart from the entity of a phenomenon they separately posit an intrinsic nature of existence. Intrinsic natures as posited by the Hīnayāna and non-Buddhists are all the domain of speech, the object of speech; and because they are not those attachments, it says "they do not have an intrinsic nature"—meaning, not that phenomena intrinsically have an intrinsic nature as in the Sarvāstivāda, which is the domain and object of speech. Regarding "Nor is there, apart from that, a distinct intrinsic nature," etc.: it is not that apart from the entity of that phenomenon there is a distinct intrinsic nature as in the Vaiśeṣika, which is the domain and object of speech. Regarding "Through freedom from the false attachment that superimposes true nonexistence," etc.: first, the explanation is largely the same as Master Jing's. Second, it is alternatively explained: freedom from the attachment that superimposes true nonexistence is the true nature (pariniṣpanna); freedom from the attachment that deprecates true existence is the paratantra nature. As for "exist in this way": it means that the paratantra and the true exist. Stating fully the intent of the answer: in the paratantra nature one is free from the false attachment to the real existence of the parikalpita nature, and free from the false attachment to the real nonexistence of tathatā upon which the paratantra relies. Existing in this way—free from existence and free from nonexistence, not existent and yet existent—is the ultimate entity and characteristic of all phenomena: the pariniṣpanna nature of phenomena, which is tathatā revealed by the two kinds of emptiness.