瑜伽論記 9.149

9.149

又後二復次進退破之。初破隨說即有法體；後破前有色等後以名詮。今是初破即從救破也。天下道理要先有事後立其名，汝既前說色等諸法隨言有，是即諸法待言方有未言說時應無自性，未言說時無自性者，豈不違汝云未來諸法先已有體後從緣生。

Furthermore, the latter two arguments refute it forward and backward: the first refutes the idea that the entity of a phenomenon exists immediately in accordance with speech; the second refutes the idea that matter and so forth exist beforehand and are designated by names afterward. Here, this is the first refutation, which refutes them directly from their attempted rescue. The principle of the world demands that real things exist first and their names are established afterward. Since you stated earlier that matter and other phenomena exist in accordance with words, it follows that phenomena depend on words to exist, and when unspoken, they should lack an intrinsic nature. If they lack an intrinsic nature when unspoken, does this not contradict your own view that future phenomena already possess entities beforehand and only subsequently arise from conditions?