瑜伽論記 9.148

9.148

基云：彼法者謂能詮教法等，彼事者謂所詮體義等，有體者總指法之自體，有分者別解法之差別分，第二復次中景解，謂外釋救云：我前所說色等諸法隨假名但有一體，不得隨名說有多體，然隨名言定有法體，故牒救云：又如前說色等諸法，若隨假說有自性者，謂小乘宗三世諸法一一各有三世名字以詮召之，是即法體先有後以名詮，以小乘師前立宗云色等諸法隨假說有，故乘此言牒以破之。

Ji says: "Those phenomena" refers to the expressive teachings and so forth; "those real things" refers to the expressed entities, meanings, and so forth. "Possessing an entity" refers generally to the entity of the phenomenon; "possessing parts" specifically explains the distinct components of the phenomenon. In the second argument, Jing explains that the opponent rescues their position by saying: "What I stated earlier was that matter and other phenomena, according to metaphorical names, possess only a single entity; one cannot say they possess multiple entities according to their names. However, corresponding to the verbal designation, there definitely is an entity of the phenomenon." Therefore, the text cites the rescue: "Furthermore, as stated before, if matter and other phenomena possess an intrinsic nature in accordance with metaphorical designation..." In the Hīnayāna school, the phenomena of the three periods of time each possess names belonging to the three periods of time to designate and express them; this means the entity of the phenomenon exists first, and is designated by a name later. Since the Hīnayāna master previously established the thesis that matter and other phenomena exist in accordance with metaphorical designation, [the treatise] takes up this statement to cite and refute it.